Social Constructivism in International Relations (IR) emerged as one of the most influential theoretical perspectives in the post–Cold War era, challenging the dominant paradigms of Realism and Liberalism. Unlike these earlier theories that viewed international politics through the lens of material power or institutional cooperation, social constructivism focuses on the social dimensions of international life—namely, how ideas, norms, identities, and intersubjective meanings shape the behaviour of states and other actors. The theory argues that the international system is not an objective or pre-given structure but a socially constructed reality produced and reproduced through human interaction. In this sense, constructivism provides a powerful alternative to the materialist and rationalist assumptions that had long dominated IR, offering a more nuanced understanding of how states define their interests, perceive threats, and act in world politics.

The roots of social constructivism lie in the broader intellectual movement of constructivism in sociology and philosophy, particularly influenced by scholars such as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their seminal work The Social Construction of Reality (1966). They argued that social realities are not natural or inevitable but are created through human interaction, institutionalization, and shared meanings. This sociological insight was later adopted by IR scholars to explain how international norms, institutions, and identities come into being and influence state behaviour. Thus, constructivism in IR is not a rejection of material factors per se, but a critique of the assumption that material power alone determines state conduct.

The most prominent figure associated with the formal development of constructivism in IR is Alexander Wendt, particularly through his influential article “Anarchy is What States Make of It” (1992) and his later book Social Theory of International Politics (1999). Wendt’s work provided a systematic theoretical foundation for constructivism, emphasizing that the structure of the international system is not merely material but social, constituted by shared ideas and intersubjective understandings among states. He famously asserted that “anarchy is what states make of it,” meaning that the self-help and power politics often assumed under realism are not inevitable consequences of anarchy but social outcomes shaped by state interaction and mutual expectations. States behave the way they do not because anarchy forces them to, but because they believe it does and act accordingly.

At the heart of social constructivism lies the distinction between material and social structures. While material structures—such as military capabilities, geography, and economic resources—undeniably shape international relations, constructivists argue that social structures—composed of shared norms, rules, and ideas—determine how these material elements are interpreted and acted upon. For example, nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States are perceived differently by the international community than nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea. This difference cannot be explained by material power alone; it reflects shared understandings and social meanings attached to identities and intentions. As Wendt puts it, “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean ones because of the shared identity of the former and the enemy image of the latter.” Thus, state behaviour is mediated by ideas, and material capabilities only acquire significance within social contexts.

Constructivism also diverges from realism and liberalism in its understanding of state interests. Whereas realists assume that interests are given and determined by survival imperatives, constructivists argue that interests are constructed through social interaction. States define their interests not in isolation but through normative and ideational environments. For example, the European Union’s commitment to human rights or multilateralism reflects not mere instrumental calculation but an internalized identity as a normative power. Similarly, the shift in German foreign policy after World War II—from militarism to pacifism—demonstrates how historical experience and collective identity shape national interests. In this sense, constructivism provides a dynamic and historical account of state behaviour, emphasizing that states can change their identities and interests over time as their social environment evolves.

Nicholas Onuf, who first coined the term “constructivism” in IR through his book World of Our Making (1989), emphasized that international relations are made and remade through speech acts and rule-based interactions. According to Onuf, language plays a constitutive role in shaping the social world; through communication and mutual recognition, states continuously produce and reproduce the norms that govern their relations. Similarly, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie highlighted the constitutive nature of norms—not merely as constraints on state behaviour but as factors that constitute the very identities and possibilities of action. Ruggie’s concept of “embedded liberalism,” for example, explains how post-war international institutions were grounded in shared understandings that balanced economic openness with domestic social stability. This approach contrasts with the rationalist view of institutions as instruments to maximize utility; for constructivists, institutions are carriers of collective meaning.

One of the most significant contributions of constructivism is its emphasis on norms and norm entrepreneurs. Scholars such as Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink demonstrated in their works (e.g., International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 1998) how international norms emerge, spread, and become internalized by states. According to them, norms go through a “life cycle”—from norm emergence to norm cascade and finally to internalization. For example, the global campaign against slavery, the proliferation of human rights norms, and the development of environmental protection standards all exemplify the power of ideas and moral persuasion in shaping international conduct. These developments challenge the realist assumption that only coercion and material interest drive state behaviour, highlighting instead the transformative power of normative structures.

Constructivism also provides a compelling framework to understand state identity formation. Identity, as defined by scholars like Ted Hopf and Jutta Weldes, refers to how states see themselves and others within the international system. These self-conceptions guide their perception of threats, allies, and appropriate behaviour. For instance, during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union defined themselves through mutually exclusive identities—capitalist versus communist—which structured the entire logic of confrontation. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, these identities were redefined, leading to new patterns of cooperation and competition. Constructivists argue that such identity transformations are central to understanding changes in international order.

In examining state behaviour, constructivists stress that social interaction and mutual recognition produce patterns of cooperation or conflict. Through repeated interactions, states learn to expect certain behaviours from others, developing shared understandings or “cultures of anarchy.” Wendt identifies three such cultures: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. In a Hobbesian culture, states view each other as enemies, leading to self-help and survival struggles (as seen in early modern Europe). In a Lockean culture, states recognize each other’s sovereignty and coexist despite rivalry (typical of the 19th-century European state system). In a Kantian culture, states see each other as friends and cooperate to promote collective security (as in the post–World War II Western alliance). This typology demonstrates how anarchy does not dictate behaviour; rather, the meanings attributed to anarchy—constructed through interaction—shape the character of international politics.

Another crucial insight of constructivism lies in its methodological pluralism and intersubjectivity. Constructivists reject both the rigid positivism of traditional IR theories and the extreme relativism of postmodernism. They adopt an interpretivist epistemology, emphasizing understanding over prediction, and focusing on how social meanings are created and maintained. Scholars like Emanuel Adler describe constructivism as a “middle ground” between rationalism and reflectivism, combining a concern for empirical explanation with an appreciation of ideational factors. Through this lens, constructivism does not deny causality but redefines it in social and ideational terms, emphasizing how shared beliefs produce material outcomes.

The significance of constructivism in understanding state behaviour becomes particularly evident when analyzing foreign policy transformation and normative change. For instance, the end of the Cold War—a development that confounded realist expectations—can be more plausibly explained through constructivist logic. The Soviet Union’s collapse was not solely the result of material weakness but also a shift in ideological legitimacy and collective identity, as seen in Mikhail Gorbachev’s adoption of glasnost and perestroika. Similarly, the expansion of NATO and the European Union reflects not just strategic calculation but the spread of shared values and collective identity around democracy and liberal governance. Constructivism thus captures how ideas, discourse, and legitimacy can drive major systemic changes.

Moreover, the rise of international norms such as human rights, humanitarian intervention, and climate responsibility underscores the growing importance of ideational factors in global governance. Constructivist scholars such as Thomas Risse and Audie Klotz have shown how the diffusion of norms alters state preferences and domestic policies. For instance, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa or the ban on landmines demonstrates how international moral pressure reshapes internal political dynamics. Constructivism thereby provides the analytical tools to trace the interaction between domestic identities and international norms, bridging the gap between internal and external dimensions of state behaviour.

However, constructivism is not without critique. Some scholars argue that it lacks predictive power and remains overly descriptive. Realists contend that constructivists underplay the role of material power and security imperatives. Others, like John Mearsheimer, argue that norms and ideas often fail to constrain great powers when vital interests are at stake. Yet, constructivists respond that their goal is not to replace material analysis but to complement it by explaining how material interests are constituted through ideas. As Wendt clarifies, “constructivism is not idealism; it is structuralism with an idealist ontology.” This means that while material forces matter, they only acquire meaning through the social context in which they operate.

In recent years, constructivism has diversified into multiple strands—such as critical constructivism, feminist constructivism, and normative constructivism—each emphasizing different dimensions of social reality. Friedrich Kratochwil, for instance, emphasizes the linguistic and rule-based construction of norms, while Maja Zehfuss critiques the epistemological assumptions of mainstream constructivists, calling for a more reflexive approach. These developments indicate that constructivism is not a monolithic theory but a broad intellectual tradition concerned with understanding how social meanings constitute world politics.

In conclusion, social constructivism revolutionized the study of International Relations by shifting the focus from material power to the realm of ideas, norms, and identities. It has demonstrated that state behaviour cannot be understood solely through rational calculations or structural imperatives but must be seen as embedded in social contexts of meaning and mutual recognition. By highlighting the constitutive role of ideas and the socially constructed nature of international reality, constructivism provides an indispensable framework for explaining both continuity and change in global politics. Its significance lies in revealing that the international system is not merely a stage upon which states act, but a social arena they continuously construct through interaction. In a world increasingly shaped by global norms, transnational identities, and ideological contestation, social constructivism remains a vital tool for interpreting the evolving patterns of state behaviour and the transformation of the international order.