The problems relating to the electorate and representation are basic to a democratic form of government. Democracy implies popular sovereignty. When the electorate exercises the function of voting, the concept of popular sovereignty becomes meaningful. Hence, democracy has everywhere advanced by way of an ever-increasing extension of the right to vote. Today, it is almost axiomatic that a democratic state must maintain a system of universal or nearly universal suffrage.

Growing political consciousness of the masses led to the belief that governmental actions must conform to the interest of the public. Under the ancient democracies, the citizens of the city-states participated in the making of law and administration of public business. In the large nation-states of the later ages, direct popular participation became impossible. Consequently, the practice of electing periodically some representatives, who would work as the trustee of the people, came to be developed. This gave birth to the idea of representation which, as one authority defines it, is the process through which the influence the entire citizenry or a part of them have upon governmental action is, with their express approval, exercised on their behalf by a smaller number among them with binding effect upon those represented.

Representation and Responsibility

Historically, the purpose of the various schemes of representation has been to secure responsibility in government. Thus, ‘representative government’ and ‘responsible government’ have come to be interpreted almost synonymously. Yet, these two phrases should be carefully distinguished. Usually, the purpose of representation is the attainment of responsibility. But there may be governments which, in spite of the fact that they are characterised by representative assemblies, are not responsible in their manner of operation. The fascist government of Italy and the government in Hitler’s Germany had elections, still these were not responsible governments. Contrarily, a government may be responsible without being representative. For instance, the ancient democracies operating through direct popular vote did not have any system of representation. In a democracy, however, representation is a method of securing responsible government. As Finer observes, “The real question …….. is not whether the government designs to take notice of popular criticisms and votes, but whether it can be voted out of office or forced by some machinery or procedures to change its policy, above all against its own will.“

Representation, in this sense, has a wider significance; it does not merely mean that the people delegate authority to some body and thereby surrender their right of judgment of policy. Such delegation, which manifested itself in the acceptance by the French people of Napoleon as the Emperor, involves selection of the personnel of government but not the direction of and control over exercise of power. “Delegation,” as MacIver observes, “involves the choice of men, but representation involves also the choice of measures. Delegation in its completest form…… assigns no limitation of tenure, and no conditions of the exercise of power. Representation implies both direction and control. Delegation requires the consent of the governed, whereas representation requires the fulfilment of their will.“

Modern representation is not another name for delegation. Its purpose is as much to choose representatives as to exercise control over the direction of government policy.

Nature of Representation

History throws some light on the nature of representation. As the ancient democracies operated through direct popular participation in public affairs, the problem of representation did not arise at all. In the absence of any device of representation, the expanding Roman Republic failed to secure popular participation in government. Historically speaking, representation is an important aspect of the medieval constitutional order. It originated “in the practice of the early Christian Church in calling together representative councils to deal with matters affecting the government of Christendom. With the emergence of kings in the feudal societies of Europe, the custom of calling representatives from the communities under their sway developed.” This was necessary for the purpose of obtaining their consent to extraordinary taxes or levies. The local representatives presented complaints and petitions, and bargained on grants of money. Hence, they were not, really speaking, “national representatives, but agents of local powers acting under special instructions or mandates.” When, however, the king and the representatives could patch up their differences and reach a compromise, a general interest would perhaps emerge. In that case they were supposed to be representing the entire body politic.

Generally speaking, in the past a representative used to represent the shire or borough in the councils of the king. For, the shire or borough, in those days, was a close-knit community with a distinctive unity of its own. It could well serve the purpose of a constituency. To treat a community as a constituency is however not very satisfactory. For, if in such a case, the legislature is composed of separate local interests, who shall speak for the nation as a whole? This led to the theory that a representative must rise above petty localism and represent the national interest. The idealistic conception of representation and responsibility was authoritatively enunciated by Burke in an eloquent address to his electors at Bristol:

“Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good resulting from the general reason of the whole.”

Now-a-days, constituencies are strips of territory where various kinds of voters live. Hence, the boundaries of constituencies are frequently readjusted to give representation by populations. “The practice of readjusting the boundaries of constituencies gives the clue to the modern theory of representation. It is individual and not communities which are represented.

The transformation of the older social unity based on territory into diverse specialised interests has created a problem in the theory of representation. How can the diverse individual opinions and group interests be represented? A partial solution to this problem can be found in the political parties. In so far as the parties cut across local and personal prejudices, sectional and occupational differences, they serve to integrate the diverse forces. Still, the representation of the multifarious interests through the political parties is not quite satisfactory. For, when in a single-member constituency, one representative is elected from among the competing party-candidates by a bare majority of votes, he cannot be expected to represent all the interests in the constituency. Several methods like proportional representation, functional representation etc., have been suggested to solve these problems of representation. To quote Friedrich, “It is generally agreed that the traditional method of basing representation upon territorial subdivisions is quite artificial since no genuine community corresponds to them any longer, especially in the great urban conglomerations. Yet no one has succeeded in discovering a really workable plan for a change that would take account of the transformation of communal bonds.“

Theories of the Nature of the Suffrage

The electorate consists of the voting public. Regarding the nature of this ‘Political rights‘, several theories have been propounded:

A. The Natural Rights Theory: According to this theory, the right to vote is a natural and inherent right of every citizen. It draws its support from the theory of social contract as an explanation of the origin of the state. The contract theory assumed a hypothetical state of nature where the people were supposed to be living a free and equal life under the laws of nature. Since the state was created by the people through a contract among themselves, they have a natural right to take part in government. This right to vote is thus an abstract right derived from the ancient laws of nature. As Gettell points out, “The fallacy in this theory results from confusing the ethical and the legal concept of law and rights. Only those possess the right to vote, in the legal sense, upon whom the state has conferred such right by law.“

B. The Legal Theory: This theory treats suffrage not as a natural right but as a political right granted by the law of the state. Voting is a public function and the electorate is an organ of government. Hence the composition and powers of the electorate are determined by law. It is not an ethical right but political expediency that decides who shall vote and what the voters shall do.

C. The Ethical Theory: This theory regards the right to vote as a means for the self-expression of the individual in political affairs. By allowing the individual to associate himself with the government, suffrage ensures the development of human personality.

D. The Tribal Theory: The conception of inclusive citizenship developed among the early Greek, Roman, and Germanic people led to this theory of suffrage. Within a narrow citizen-class, voting was supposed to be a part of the life of the community. It was a necessary attribute of membership of the state. Citizenship as a qualification for voting, today, is a survival of the tribal theory.

E. The Feudal Theory: According to this theory developed in the latter part of the Middle Ages, the right to vote depends on a particular social status. In the past, it was usually associated with the ownership of land. The modern emphasis in some states on property qualification may be said to be a relic of the feudal theory.

Of the theories examined above, the feudal theory and the legal theory tend to limit the right to vote by imposing some restrictions. The present tendency, however, is to ensure widest possible extension of suffrage which is supported by the tribal theory, the natural-rights theory and the ethical theory. Still, as Garner points out, “The view which practically all writers on political science adopt today in regard to the nature of the suffrage is that it is an office or function which is conferred by the state upon only such persons as are believed to be most capable of exercising it for the public good, and not a natural right which belongs without distinction to all citizens of the state.“

Opinions, however, differ as to whether the exercise of voting should be regarded as a moral duty or as a legal obligation. It may well be argued that for an accurate representation of the will of the electorate, voting should be made compulsory. Contrarily, if the suffrage is viewed as a right or a privilege, the individual may have the discretion to exercise it or not as he deems fit. In practice, however, compulsory voting is in operation in only a few states like Belgium, Rumania, Argentina, some of the Swiss Cantons etc. Compulsory voting, it is generally believed, lowers political life, produces anti-governmental feelings and tends to create political corruption. “After all, a man has a right not to use a right, and is not obliged to be interested in political issues: he may be short-sighted and foolish, and cannot complain if things don’t go according to his wishes, but voting is his own business — that is of the essence of democratic freedom.“