1.Early Attempts at Easing Tensions

• Détente, as it came to occupy the centre stage of US–Soviet relations, naturally raised the question as to why both the superpowers suddenly sought détente or temporary relaxation of tensions.
• The point to be noted here of course is that before the Cuban Missile Crisis also there were attempts to ease tensions.
• After the Potsdam Summit, the two superpowers met in Geneva in 1955.
• Though there was no such pathbreaking achievements, yet the meeting was an expression of the altered climate between the East and the West, the ‘spirit of Geneva’ as it came to be known.
• President Eisenhower and Bulganin exchanged assurances that nuclear warfare had no rational purpose and both the powers were not interested in beginning such a war.
• Following the Geneva Summit, Moscow joined the Olympic Winter Games in 1956, negotiations on arms control also proceeded, though no final agreement was reached.
• The death of Stalin in March 1953 also brought about changes in the Soviet policy.
• Yet the spirit could not be carried forward due to the suppression of Hungarian revolution by the Soviets, the Suez Crisis and the German problem.
• But given the intensity of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which almost turned the Cold War into a hot war, the two superpowers gave a rethinking to their strategies towards each other.

2.Attainment of Strategic Parity by the Superpowers

• The shift in the balance of power signalled a shift in the policies of both the superpowers towards the path of détente.
• The USA so long used its Strategic Air Command (SAC), later supplemented by the navy’s nuclear submarines, to deter the Red Army.
• The US bombers and missiles deterred the Soviets with their implied threat of destroying their cities.
• But this strategic superiority, that was enjoyed by the United States was soon challenged by the Soviets.
• The American–Soviet balance had been asymmetric so far: the USA enjoyed strategic superiority and an intercontinental reach, and the Soviet Union enjoyed conventional superiority and a regional reach.
• But the Soviets gained its inter-continental capability and capacity of destroying USA as well as Western Europe from its massive build-up that began after 1964.
• The number of Soviet intercontinental missiles had surpassed the number of American land-based missiles.
• As Northedge and Grieve observed, “The fear of thermonuclear war, which could annihilate both sides, and determination to avoid the kind of confrontations between two superpowers from which thermonuclear war could spring”.

3.American Compulsions

• The first and the foremost factor, which compelled the United States to walk in the path of détente, was the rising public opinion which was very much critical about America’s role as a “global policeman”.
• The mood within the United States reflected its weariness resulting from its foreign policy burdens.
• For Nixon and Ford, détente was necessary until the nation could “recover its nerve” and once more play the leading role.
• Therefore, détente was required to protect the US interests against Soviet expansion.
• The Vietnam debacle had placed the United States in a difficult position.
• Due to heavy involvement in the Vietnam War huge amount of US resources had to be committed.
• The more the Americans fought, the higher was the morale of the North Vietnam and the Viet Cong.
• Even extensive bombing by the United States could not prevent escalation of the war on the part of North Vietnam.
• But the US involvement in the warfare and massive bombing raised criticisms from many quarters, including the Americans themselves.
• The truth was that the massive effort did not result in any visible success, especially after the Tet offensive of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in 1968.
• Therefore, the United States wanted to end the Vietnam War in an honourable way and thought that Soviet help was necessary as the Soviets were also actively involved in the war and provided economic and military assistance to North Vietnam.
• Disengagement from Vietnam became the prime motivation for Nixon and Kissinger to seek détente.

4.Soviet Compulsions

• The change in the attitude of the policy makers in Kremlin also became a factor for Moscow to seek détente.
• Malenkov, who became the Russian Prime Minister after Stalin’s death, had started his drive towards détente but it became more evident in Khrushchev and later in Brezhnev–Kosygin period.
• They embarked upon a policy of peaceful coexistence.
• Besides, there were also economic compulsions on the part of the Soviet Union.
• The lopsided development created shortage of wage-goods and other consumer durables as a result unemployment was on the rise.
• As Northedge and Grieve observed, “Again the rising living standards in the Soviet Union probably gave that country a strong interest, like Americans’; in reducing the massive scale of arms expenditure in the cold war by arms control agreements, in increasing its lagging technology by agreements with the Western powers to make their skills and equipment available to Russian industry and perhaps above all, in keeping status quo stable in eastern Europe, when it was threatened by liberalization programme of Dubchek of Czechoslovakia”.

5.The China Factor

• The emergence of China as another major power led not only to easing of tensions between the two superpowers but also ushered in the Sino–American rapprochement.
• The rise of Communist China posed a direct challenge to the Soviet Union as China became the alternative source of aid and encouragement to the liberation movements in South-East Asia and even communist states in Eastern Europe, such as Albania and Rumania.
• Further, in 1964 China detonated its first atomic bomb.
• What became evident was the growing Sino–Soviet rift, which erupted into open clash in 1969 over the border dispute regarding the number of islands located in the Ussuri River.
• The bipolar world of the Cold War was becoming tripolar.
• The worsening of relation of China with the Soviet Union led the United States to take leverage of the Sino–Soviet split.
• Nixon and Kissinger played the China card well.
• USA took the initiative to recognize Mao’s regime as the rightful government of China in early 1971.
• USA also sent a US table-tennis team to China, dubbed as a ping-pong diplomacy, which was well-acknowledged by the Chinese.
• In July 1971, Kissinger’s secret visit to China, followed by Nixon’s tour, only six months later surely showed the US intentions of playing China against the Soviet Union.
• Therefore, the US fostered good relations with both the communists giants, and more precisely, towards the Soviet Union using the policy of ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’.

6.Brandt’s Ostpolitik

• The German Chancellor, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik was largely responsible for easing of tensions between the two superpowers.
• Bonn initially tried to extend relations with the countries of Eastern Europe but that got a jolt with the Soviet invasion on Czechoslovakia in 1968.
• Bonn realized that without Moscow’s support this could not be achieved.
• Therefore, improvement of relations with Moscow became a priority.
• On 12 August 1970, Soviet Union entered into a non-aggression treaty with West Germany.
• This agreement with the Soviet Union laid the foundation for similar agreements with Poland and East Germany.
• Even Brandt acceded to the Oder–Neisse line as Polish frontier and this was designed to propagate the spirit of Ostpolitik.
• This normalized relations not only between West Germany and Soviet Union but also between the Eastern and the Western blocs.
• Thus, Summits between the East and the West became common.

7.Linkage Theory

• The chief architects of détente, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, envisaged the easing of tensions on the basis of linkage strategy.
• This aimed at binding the two rivals in a common fate by making peaceful superpower relations dependent on the continuation of mutually rewarding exchanges (such as trade concessions), thereby lessening the incentives for conflict and war.