Unit I
China's Confrontation with External and Internal Crisis
Introduction: Land, Politics and Culture
Ancient History
The country’s ancient history is still very much alive in the everyday activities of today’s China. While sometimes shadowed by the growing technological society, historical traditions such as Confucianism and the complex dynasty system still have an obvious influence on modern-day China. Before you begin your China tour, enhance your experience with some background information on the origins of Chinese civilization.
Supposed to have co-existed in areas around the Yellow River as independent principalities from 2200-221 BC, it is believed that the Xia were conquered by the Shang, who were than later conquered by the Zhou. Little is known about the Xia Dynasty (2200 – 1750 BC). In fact, the Xia were once debated by historians to be a myth. While no writing examples have survived, it is almost certain that their writing systems were a precursor to the Shang dynasty’s “oracle bones” system. Shang Dynasty (1750 –1040) has produced the earliest records of an absolute Chinese writing system. These people were very advanced in working with bronze. Human sacrifice was also a large part of their culture. Later dynasties, upon uncovering the mass graves, replaced the Shang sacrifices with terra cotta figures – the clay statues resembling an underground army.
The Shang were conquered in 1040 by the Zhou Dynasty. The Zhou practiced a system of a father-son king succession pattern, and unlike the Shang, rejected human sacrifice. The Zhou were able to maintain peace and stability for a few hundred years, until 771 BC, when the capital was stormed by “barbarians” from the west. After this the Zhou moved east causing a decline in their power.
On a tour of China you will learn the origins of concepts, and ideas birthed during this period that continue to be studied and practiced today. Some of the most important of such concepts are Confucianism, Legalism, and Daoism (which profoundly influenced the later development of Zen Buddhism). Confucius (500BC) believed that moral men make good rulers and that virtue was attainable by following the proper behaviors. Confucius is also responsible for creating the thought that the Emperor had the mandate of heaven to rule, or was the “Son of Heaven”. Legalism called for the suppression of dissenters, and sought to unify a then divided China through control and imposition of fear. The concept of “loyal opposition” did not exist, since the Emperor had the mandate of heaven to rule. Small battles between divisions soon gave birth to a period characterized by massive armies and long battles.
Early Empire (221BC-589AD)
The warring years ended in 221 BC with the conquering Qin Shihuangdi, a devout legalist. Qin was responsible for linking together old defensive walls to create the beginnings of a China wall (which would later be built by the Ming Dynasty into the Great Wall it is today). Qin died in 210 BC, and not long after the dynasty fell to the Han. The Han perfected the bureaucratic process that all successive dynasties would follow. By developing a system based on the proper behavior from the Confucian Classics and loyalty to the Emperor, the Han made managing a country of roughly 60 million people possible for many years. Due to tribal raiders from the north and a huge population shift from the center of the empire, the Han dynasty lost control in 220 AD, plunging China into 350 years of chaos and disunity. During this period of “three kingdoms”, the ‘barbarians’ maintained control in the north, while the Han resided predominantly in the south. The other notable change was the introduction of Buddhism from India, which then merged with Daoism to form a popular religion and helped shape the emerging culture.
The Second Empire (589-1644)
The Sui Dynasty, while their rule was not exceptionally long, managed to re-unify China under one Emperor. Even though Sui, and the Tang to follow, were based in the north and considered part ‘barbarian’, these dynasties are accepted as being Chinese. The Tang are considered one of the greatest dynasties and extended China’s borders significantly during their rule. The only woman Empress took power during this dynasty, and a devastating eight-year civil war shattered Tang control and the country disintegrated during the following 150 years. The Song Dynasty was the next to step up to re-unify China; this dynasty ushered in a period of tremendous technological, economic and cultural growth. The Song developed agricultural and farming techniques that allowed for sufficient food distribution. These techniques can still be found in use today in remote areas of China, as you may see firsthand on a China tour. The Mongol invasion from the north slowly pushed this dynasty out of power.
The time of Mongol rule, while a dynasty in essence, is considered only an occupation. During this period, reactionary Neo-Confucianism was developed, which led to the Ming Dynasty’s rise to power. The Ming were responsible for moving the capital to Beijing, building the Great Wall and the Forbidden City. The Qing (or Manchu) Dynasty was the last to rule starting in 1644. Under the Qing the arts flourished, and China cut itself off from contact with the developing western nations. Rampant corruption, territoriality of western nations over China and decentralization led to many rebellions. One such rebellion was the Taiping, which lead to the final the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. On your tour of China you will find it interesting to observe the transformation the country has experienced and how present day China has come into existence.
See below a brief timeline of the history of the dynasties as well as what each is most noted for:
Shang Dynasty (1766-1122 BCE) –Silk weaving invented. Chinese writing developed.
Zhou Dynasty (1122-221 BCE) – Iron casting and multiplication tables. Large scale irrigation. Confucius teaches on code of behavior.
Qin Dynasty (221-206 BCE)– Strict law code and tax system implemented. Writing, weights, and measures are standardized. Began construction of the Great Wall and Xi’an’s army of terracotta warriors.
Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) – Buddhism arrives from India. Trade routes to India and Persia are established. Paper invented.
WARRING STATES (220 CE – 581) – Multiple warring kingdoms keep China in chaos.
Sui Dynasty (589-618) – Powerful emperors reunite China. Transportation network is developed, including Grand Canal.
Tang Dynasty (618-907) – Height of Silk Road trade. Golden age of art and learning.
Song Dynasty (907-1279) – First 50 years are marked by disorder. Age of high culture, printing, calligraphy, and poetry.
Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) – Genghis Khan leads Mongols in attack on China, his grandson founds the Yuan Dynasty.
Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) – European traders arrive. commerce grows. Forbidden City is built, and Great Wall is extended.
Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) – Manchu invaders from the North set up this dynasty. Nationalist uprisings bring collapse.
Modern History
China has gone through startling changes in the past hundred years. China travel today provides the opportunity to learn more about the historical events that helped shape modern China.
The last Chinese dynasty ended officially in 1911, with the following years being marked by a battle for power between urban capitalist forces and Mao Zedong of the rural Chinese Communist Party.
A republican China began in 1911, and due to continuing internal strife – including the development of nationalist and communist parties – China found itself vulnerable to a Japanese invasion in 1937. By 1945, 20 million Chinese had died. With the start of WWII, Japan redirected its attention toward the United States. China’s communist party then began to build up their ranks in the north in order to resume civil war after the Japanese were defeated.
After the end of WWII, China’s nationalist party struggled with debt and disorganization, and was defeated by the CCP. Thereafter, Mao Zedong announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China.
In 1958, after becoming increasingly estranged from the original financial backers in Moscow, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward. This program focused on collectivizing farms to increase crop production. The greatest man-made famine resulted, and millions of Chinese starved to death. In its recovery, China tried to position itself as a superpower. But in 1966, Mao’s promotion of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution led to the anti-authoritarian anarchy. Students were encouraged to join Red Guard units and fought government troops, and eventually fought each other for power. The revolution “officially” ending in 1969 with cessation of abuses, but in reality, it did not come to rest until the death of Mao in 1976, having accomplished little of importance.
Deng Xiaoping emerged with an economic reform program in 1978 and instilled the value of function. Propelled by events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, unarmed demonstrators gathered in Tiananmen Square in 1989 to question political reformation and were put down with force by the CCP. This is a popular sight for China tours to include – it can be an emotional visit for many travelers. Tiananmen Square evokes a variety of passions from local people, as well.
In 1993 Deng publicly approved of economic growth efforts, and afterwards the economy exploded with rapid growth. Deng, perhaps in an effort to change the course of Chinese politics, passed power to Jiang Zemin several years before dying, which may help to establish a pattern for stable transitions between leaders in the future. Though the legacy of intellectual oppression and censorship still exists today, China’s recent leaders have embraced free trade and as such the country’s economy is on the rise due to the influx of global trade. On a China trip, travelers are able to observe how history has shaped current conditions within the country.
Politics
Many improvements have been made in an effort to establish human rights, including allowing citizens to sue officials for abuse of authority, as well as the establishment of trial procedures including rights due process. China acknowledges in principle the necessity to protect human rights and is beginning to undergo a process to bring its practices up to standards with international norms. While in its beginning stages, the initial groundwork is being laid to protect citizens from a repeat of the totalitarian rule of China’s history.
China politics are as fascinating as its traditional cultures, diverse landscape, and rare wildlife. Taking the time to learn a little bit about the country’s politics will only add to the intimacy of your China travel experiences.
Culture
People: Over one hundred ethnic groups have inhabited the country of China, many assimilating into neighboring ethnicities, disappearing altogether, or merging into the more prominent Han comprised of various smaller groups.
Language: On your China trip it is quite possible that you will hear variety in the language being spoken, as the Han speak several different dialects and languages that share a common written standard. This standard is called Vernacular Chinese and is based on Standard Mandarin, the most prominent spoken language. The People’s Republic of China now officially recognizes a total of 56 ethnic groups wrapped into this one country that is makes up 1/5 of the world’s population.
Religion: Though the Chinese government has officially classified the country as an athiest nation, supervised religions are allowed. Historically, Taoism and Buddhism are the dominant religions, with Christianity and Islam comprising less than 6% of the population when combined.
Literature: Chinese literature has been an ingrained art since the development of printmaking during the Song Dynasty. Many manuscripts of Classics and religious texts comprised of Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist were manually written by ink brush. Tens of thousands of ancient manuscripts still exist and many more are being discovered each day.
Education: The Chinese developed a meritocratic method for creating opportunity for social advancement. Anyone who could perform well on the imperial examinations, which required students to write essays and demonstrate mastery of the Confucian classics, became elite scholar-officials known as jinshi. This method largely excluded females or those too poor to prepare for the test. This theory was largely different from the European system of blood nobility. Chinese philosophers, writers, and poets in past and present have been highly respected and continue to play key roles in promoting the culture of the Chinese empire.
Calligraphy: Even before you begin your China travels, it is likely you will have had previous exposure to one of China’s highest ranking art forms—calligraphy. Calligraphy ranks even higher in China than painting or music. It holds an association with elite scholars, and after becoming commercialized, the work of a famous artist becomes very valuable.
Art & Music: The amazing variation in Chinese landscapes has inspired great works of art and Chinese paintings; during your China trip, you’ll have plenty of opportunities to visit the regions of China that have long motivated the masters. Sushi and Bonzai, also native Chinese art forms, spread later to Japan and Korea due to their popularity. The Chinese have also contributed many musical instruments, including the zheng, xiao and erhu.
The Opium Wars and the Unequal Treaty System
The Opium Wars in the mid-19th century were a critical juncture in modern Chinese history. The first Opium War was fought between China and Great Britain from 1839 to 1842. In the second Opium War, from 1856 to 1860, a weakened China fought both Great Britain and France. China lost both wars. The terms of its defeat were a bitter pill to swallow: China had to cede the territory of Hong Kong to British control, open treaty ports to trade with foreigners, and grant special rights to foreigners operating within the treaty ports. In addition, the Chinese government had to stand by as the British increased their opium sales to people in China. The British did this in the name of free trade and without regard to the consequences for the Chinese government and Chinese people.
The lesson that Chinese students learn today about the Opium Wars is that China should never again let itself become weak, ‘backward,’ and vulnerable to other countries. As one British historian says, “If you talk to many Chinese about the Opium War, a phrase you will quickly hear is ‘luo hou jiu yao ai da,’ which literally means that if you are backward, you will take a beating.”1
Two Worlds Collide: The First Opium War
In the mid-19th century, western imperial powers such as Great Britain, France, and the United States were aggressively expanding their influence around the world through their economic and military strength and by spreading religion, mostly through the activities of Christian missionaries. These countries embraced the idea of free trade, and their militaries had become so powerful that they could impose such ideas on others. In one sense, China was relatively effective in responding to this foreign encroachment; unlike its neighbours, including present-day India, Burma (now Myanmar), Malaya (now Malaysia), Indonesia, and Vietnam, China did not become a full-fledged, formal colony of the West. In addition, Confucianism, the system of beliefs that shaped and organized China’s culture, politics, and society for centuries, was secular (that is, not based on a religion or belief in a god) and therefore was not necessarily an obstacle to science and modernity in the ways that Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism sometimes were in other parts of the world.
But in another sense, China was not effective in responding to the “modern” West with its growing industrialism, mercantilism, and military strength. Nineteenth-century China was a large, mostly land-based empire (see Map 1), administered by a c. 2,000-year-old bureaucracy and dominated by centuries old and conservative Confucian ideas of political, social, and economic management. All of these things made China, in some ways, dramatically different from the European powers of the day, and it struggled to deal effectively with their encroachment. This ineffectiveness resulted in, or at least added to, longer-term problems for China, such as unequal treaties (which will be described later), repeated foreign military invasions, massive internal rebellions, internal political fights, and social upheaval. While the first Opium War of 1839–42 did not cause the eventual collapse of China’s 5,000-year imperial dynastic system seven decades later, it did help shift the balance of power in Asia in favour of the West.
Map 1: China’s Borders as of 1820.
Opium and the West’s Embrace of Free Trade
In the decades leading up to the first Opium War, trade between China and the West took place within the confines of the Canton System, based in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou (also referred to as Canton). An earlier version of this system had been put in place by China under the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), and further developed by its replacement, the Qing Dynasty, also known as the Manchu Dynasty. (The Manchus were the ethnic group that ruled China during the Qing period.) In the year 1757, the Qing emperor ordered that Guangzhou/Canton would be the only Chinese port that would be opened to trade with foreigners, and that trade could take place only through licensed Chinese merchants. This effectively restricted foreign trade and subjected it to regulations imposed by the Chinese government.
For many years, Great Britain worked within this system to run a three country trade operation: It shipped Indian cotton and British silver to China, and Chinese tea and other Chinese goods to Britain (see Map 2). In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the balance of trade was heavily in China’s favour. One major reason was that British consumers had developed a strong liking for Chinese tea, as well as other goods like porcelain and silk. But Chinese consumers had no similar preference for any goods produced in Britain. Because of this trade imbalance, Britain increasingly had to use silver to pay for its expanding purchases of Chinese goods. In the late 1700s, Britain tried to alter this balance by replacing cotton with opium, also grown in India. In economic terms, this was a success for Britain; by the 1820s, the balance of trade was reversed in Britain’s favour, and it was the Chinese who now had to pay with silver.
Map 2: Great Britain’s Three-Country Trade, Early 19th Century.
Figure 1: A “stacking room” in an opium factory in Patna, India. On the shelves are balls of opium that were part of Britain’s trade with China.
The Scourge and Profit of Opium
The opium that the British sold in China was made from the sap of poppy plants, and had been used for medicinal and sometimes recreational purposes in China and other parts of Eurasia for centuries. After the British colonized large parts of India in the 17th century, the British East India Company, which was created to take advantage of trade with East Asia and India, invested heavily in growing and processing opium, especially in the eastern Indian province of Bengal. In fact, the British developed a profitable monopoly over the cultivation of opium that would be shipped to and sold in China.
By the early 19th century, more and more Chinese were smoking British opium as a recreational drug. But for many, what started as recreation soon became a punishing addiction: many people who stopped ingesting opium suffered chills, nausea, and cramps, and sometimes died from withdrawal. Once addicted, people would often do almost anything to continue to get access to the drug. The Chinese government recognized that opium was becoming a serious social problem and, in the year 1800, it banned both the production and the importation of opium. In 1813, it went a step further by outlawing the smoking of opium and imposing a punishment of beating offenders 100 times.
Figure 2: Opium smoking in China.
In response, the British East India Company hired private British and American traders to transport the drug to China. Chinese smugglers bought the opium from British and American ships anchored off the Guangzhou coast and distributed it within China through a network of Chinese middlemen. By 1830, there were more than 100 Chinese smugglers’ boats working the opium trade.
This reached a crisis point when, in 1834, the British East India Company lost its monopoly over British opium. To compete for customers, dealers lowered their selling price, which made it easier for more people in China to buy opium, thus spreading further use and addition.
In less than 30 years—from 1810 to 1838—opium imports to China increased from 4,500 chests (the large containers used to ship the drug) to 40,000. As Chinese consumed more and more imported opium, the outflow of silver to pay for it increased, from about two million ounces in the early 1820s to over nine million ounces a decade later. In 1831, the Chinese emperor, already angry that opium traders were breaking local laws and increasing addiction and smuggling, discovered that members of his army and government (and even students) were engaged in smoking opium.
The Users Versus Pushers Debate
By 1836, the Chinese government began to get more serious about enforcing the 1813 ban. It closed opium dens and executed Chinese dealers. But the problem only grew worse. The emperor called for a debate among Chinese officials on how best to deal with the crisis. Opinion were polarized into two sides.
One side took a pragmatic approach (that is, an approach not focused on the morality of the issue). It focused on targeting opium users rather than opium producers. They argued that the production and sale of opium should be legalized and then taxed by the government. Their belief was that taxing the drug would make it so expensive that people would have to smoke less of it or not smoke it at all. They also argued that the money collected from taxing the opium trade could help the Chinese government reduce revenue shortfalls and the outflow of silver.
Another side vehemently disagreed with this ‘pragmatic’ approach. Led by Lin Zexu, a very capable and ambitious Chinese government official, they argued that the opium trade was a moral issue, and an “evil” that had to be eliminated by any means possible. If they could not suppress the trade of opium and addiction to it, the Chinese empire would have no peasants to work the land, no townsfolk to pay taxes, no students to study, and no soldiers to fight. They argued that instead of targeting opium users, they should stop and punish the “pushers” who imported and sold the drug in China.
Figure 3: Lin Zexu.
In the end, Lin Zexu’s side won the argument. In 1839, he arrived in Guangzhou (Canton) to supervise the ban on the opium trade and to crack down on its use. He attacked the opium trade on several levels. For example, he wrote an open letter to Queen Victoria questioning Britain’s political support for the trade and the morality of pushing drugs. More importantly, he made rapid progress in enforcing the 1813 ban by arresting over 1,600 Chinese dealers and seizing and destroying tens of thousands of opium pipes. He also demanded that foreign companies (British companies, in particular) turn over their supplies of opium in exchange for tea. When the British refused to do so, Lin stopped all foreign trade and quarantined the area to which these foreign merchants were confined.
After six weeks, the foreign merchants gave in to Lin’s demands and turned over 2.6 million pounds of opium (over 20,000 chests). Lin’s troops also seized and destroyed the opium that was being held on British ships—the British superintendent claimed these ships were in international waters, but Lin claimed they were anchored in and around Chinese islands. Lin then hired 500 Chinese men to destroy the opium by mixing it with lime and salt and dumping it into the bay. Finally, he pressured the Portuguese, who had a colony in nearby Macao, to expel the uncooperative British, forcing them to move to the island of Hong Kong.
Figure 4: British officers in their tent during the first Opium War, circa 1839.
Taken together, these actions raised the tensions that led to the outbreak of the first Opium War. For the British, Lin’s destruction of the opium was an affront to British dignity and their concepts of trade. Many British merchants, smugglers, and the British East India Company had argued for years that China was out of touch with “civilized” nations, which practised free trade and maintained “normal” international relations through consular officials and treaties. More to the point, British representatives in Guangzhou requested that merchants turn over their opium to Lin, guaranteeing that the British government would compensate them for their losses. The idea was that in the short term, this would prevent a major conflict, and that it would keep the merchants and ship captains safe while reopening the extremely profitable China trade in other goods. The huge opium liability (the opium was worth millions of pounds sterling), and increasingly shrill demands from merchants in China, India, and London when they discovered their profits were destroyed, gave politicians in Great Britain the excuse they were looking for to act more forcefully to expand British imperial interests in China. War broke out in November 1839 when Chinese warships clashed with British merchantmen.
Figure 5: Chinese swordsman, 1844.
In June 1840, 16 British warships and merchantmen—many leased from the primary British opium producer, Jardine Matheson & Co.—arrived at Guangzhou. Over the next two years, the British forces bombarded forts, fought battles, seized cities, and attempted negotiations. A preliminary settlement called for China to cede Hong Kong to the British Empire, pay an indemnity, and grant Britain full diplomatic relations. It also led to the Qing government sending Lin Zexu into exile. Chinese troops, using antiquated guns and cannons, and with limited naval ships, were largely ineffective against the British. Dozens of Chinese officers committed suicide when they could not repel the British marines, steamships, and merchantmen.
Figure 6: The British bombardment of Guangzhou/Canton.
The War’s Aftermath
The first Opium War ended in 1842, when Chinese officials signed, at gunpoint, the Treaty of Nanjing. The treaty provided extraordinary benefits to the British, including:
- an excellent deep-water port at Hong Kong;
- a huge indemnity (compensation) to be paid to the British government and merchants;
- five new Chinese treaty ports at Guangzhou (Canton), Shanghai, Xiamen (Amoy), Ningbo, and Fuzhou, where British merchants and their families could reside;
- extraterritoriality for British citizens residing in these treaty ports, meaning that they were subject to British, not Chinese, laws; and
- a “most favoured nation” clause that any rights gained by other foreign countries would automatically apply to Great Britain as well.
For China, the Treaty of Nanjing provided no benefits. In fact, Chinese imports of opium rose to a peak of 87,000 chests in 1879 (see Figure 1). After that, imports of opium declined, and then ended during the First World War, as opium production within China outgrew foreign production. However, other trade did not expand as much as foreign merchants had hoped, and they continued to blame the Chinese government for this. Among Chinese officials, the aftermath of the war led to a bitter political struggle between two factions: a peace faction, which was roughly aligned with the ‘users’ faction in the opium trade debate; and a ‘war’ faction, which was roughly aligned with the ‘pushers’ faction in that debate. The peace faction was in nominal control.
Figure 7: Opium War Imports into China, 1650-1880.
In addition, the Treaty of Nanjing ended the Canton System that had been in place since the 17th century. This was followed in 1844 by a system of unequal treaties between China and western powers. Through the most favoured nation clauses, these treaties allowed westerners to build churches and spread Christianity in the treaty ports. Western imperialism and free trade had its first great victory in China with this war and its resulting treaties.
When the Chinese emperor died in 1850, his successor dismissed the peace faction in favour of those who had supported Lin Zexu. The new emperor tried to bring Lin back from exile, but Lin died along the way. The Chinese court kept finding excuses not to accept foreign diplomats at the capital city of Beijing, and its compliance with the treaties fell far short of western countries’ expectations.
Second Opium War (1856–1860)
In 1856, a second Opium War broke out and continued until 1860, when the British and French captured Beijing and forced on China a new round of unequal treaties, indemnities, and the opening of 11 more treaty ports (see Map 3). This also led to increased Christian missionary work and legalization of the opium trade.
Map 3: China’s Treaty Ports, 1860.
Even though new ports were opened to British merchants after the first Opium War, the Chinese dragged their feet on implementing the agreements, and legal trade with China remained limited. British merchants pressed their government to do more, but the government’s hands were tied because the Chinese government in the capital city of Beijing restricted who it met with.
In October 1856, Chinese authorities arrested the Chinese crew of a ship operated by the British. The British used this as an opportunity to pressure China militarily to open itself up even further to British merchants and trade. France, using the execution in China of a French Christian missionary as an excuse, joined the British in the fight. Joint French-British forces captured Guangzhou before moving north to the city of Tianjin (also referred to as Tientsin). In 1858, the Chinese agreed—on paper—to a series of western demands contained in documents like the Treaty of Tientsin. But then they refused to ratify the treaties, which led to further hostilities.
In 1860, British and French troops landed near Beijing and fought their way into the city. Negotiations quickly broke down and the British High Commissioner to China ordered the troops to loot and destroy the Imperial Summer Palace, a complex and garden where Qing Dynasty emperors had traditionally handled the country’s official matters.
Shortly after that, the Chinese emperor fled to Manchuria in northeast China. His brother negotiated the Convention of Beijing, which, in addition to ratifying the Treaty of Tientsin, added indemnities and ceded to Britain the Kowloon Peninsula across the strait from Hong Kong. The war ended with a greatly weakened Qing Dynasty that was now confronted with the need to rethink its relations with the outside world and to modernize its military, political, and economic structures.
Thinking About the Opium War
In 1839, the British imposed on China their version of free trade and insisted on the legal right of their citizens (that is, British citizens) to do what they wanted, wherever they wanted. Chinese critics point out that while the British made lofty arguments about the ‘principle’ of free trade and individual rights, they were in fact pushing a product (opium) that was illegal in their own country.
There are different viewpoints on what was the main underlying factor in Britain’s involvement in the Opium Wars. Some in the west claim that the Opium Wars were about upholding the principle of free trade. Others, however, say that Great Britain was acting more in the interest of protecting its international reputation while it was facing challenges in other parts of the world, such as the Near East, India, and Latin America. Some American historians have argued that these conflicts were not so much about opium as they were about western powers’ desire to expand commercial relations more broadly and to do away with the Canton trading system. Finally, some western historians say the war was fought at least partly to keep China’s balance of trade in a deficit, and that opium was an effective way to do that, even though it had very negative impacts on Chinese society.
It is important to point out that not everyone in Britain supported the opium trade in China. In fact, members of the British public and media, as well as the American public and media, expressed outrage over their countries’ support for the opium trade.2
From China’s historical perspective, the first Opium War was the beginning of the end of late Imperial China, a powerful dynastic system and advanced civilization that had lasted thousands of years. The war was also the first salvo in what is now referred to in China as the “century of humiliation.” This humiliation took many forms. China’s defeat in both wars was a sign that the Chinese state’s legitimacy and ability to project power were weakening. The Opium Wars further contributed to this weakening. The unequal treaties that western powers imposed on China undermined the ways China had conducted relations with other countries and its trade in tea. The continuation of the opium trade, moreover, added to the cost to China in both silver and in the serious social consequences of opium addiction. Furthermore, the many rebellions that broke out within China after the first Opium War made it increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to pay its tax and huge indemnity obligations.
Present-day Chinese historians see the Opium Wars as a wars of aggression that led to the hard lesson that “if you are ‘backward,’ you will take a beating.” These lessons shaped the rationale for the Chinese Revolution against imperialism and feudalism that emerged, and then succeeded, decades later.
The Unequal Treaty
Unequal treaty is the name given by the Chinese to a series of treaties signed during the 19th and early 20th centuries, between China, (mostly referring to the Qing dynasty) various Western powers (specifically the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States, Russia), and also with Japan. The agreements, often reached after a military defeat or a threat of military invasion, contained one-sided terms, requiring China to cede land, pay reparations, open treaty ports, give up tariff autonomy, legalise opium import, and grant extraterritorial privileges to foreign citizens.
With the rise of Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism in the 1920s, both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party used the concept to characterize the Chinese experience of losing sovereignty between roughly 1840 to 1950. The term “unequal treaty” became associated with the concept of China’s “century of humiliation”, especially the concessions to foreign powers and the loss of tariff autonomy through treaty ports, although Qing China and Korea also signed treaties like the China–Korea Treaty of 1882 which granted similar privileges to China.
Japanese and Koreans also use the term to refer to several treaties that resulted in the loss of their sovereignty, to varying degrees.
China
In China, the term “unequal treaty” first came into use in the early 1920s to describe the historical treaties, still imposed on the then-Republic of China, that were signed through the period of time which the American sinologist John K. Fairbank characterized as the “treaty century” which began in the 1840s.
In assessing the term’s usage in rhetorical discourse since the early 20th century, American historian Dong Wang notes that “while the phrase has long been widely used, it nevertheless lacks a clear and unambiguous meaning” and that there is “no agreement about the actual number of treaties signed between China and foreign countries that should be counted as unequal.” However, within the scope of Chinese historiographical scholarship, the phrase has typically been defined to refer to the many cases in which China was effectively forced to pay large amounts of financial reparations, open up ports for trade, cede or lease territories (such as Outer Manchuria and Outer Northwest China (including Zhetysu) to the Russian Empire, Hong Kong and Weihaiwei to the United Kingdom, Guangzhouwan to France, Kwantung Leased Territory and Taiwan to the Empire of Japan, the Jiaozhou Bay concession to the German Empire and concession territory in Tientsin, Shamian, Hankou, Shanghai etc.), and make various other concessions of sovereignty to foreign spheres of influence, following military threats.
The Chinese-American sinologist Immanuel Hsu states that the Chinese viewed the treaties they signed with Western powers and Russia as unequal “because they were not negotiated by nations treating each other as equals but were imposed on China after a war, and because they encroached upon China’s sovereign rights … which reduced her to semicolonial status”.
The earliest treaty later referred to as “unequal” was the 1841 Convention of Chuenpi negotiations during the First Opium War. The first treaty between China and the United Kingdom termed “unequal” was the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842.
Following Qing China’s defeat, treaties with Britain opened up five ports to foreign trade, while also allowing foreign missionaries, at least in theory, to reside within China. Foreign residents in the port cities were afforded trials by their own consular authorities rather than the Chinese legal system, a concept termed extraterritoriality. Under the treaties, the UK and the US established the British Supreme Court for China and Japan and United States Court for China in Shanghai.
Chinese post-World War I resentment
After World War I, patriotic consciousness in China focused on the treaties, which now became widely known as “unequal treaties.” The Nationalist Party and the Communist Party competed to convince the public that their approach would be more effective. Germany was forced to terminate its rights, the Soviet Union surrendered them, and the United States organized the Washington Conference to negotiate them.
After Chiang Kai-shek declared a new national government in 1927, the Western powers quickly offered diplomatic recognition, arousing anxiety in Japan. The new government declared to the Great Powers that China had been exploited for decades under unequal treaties, and that the time for such treaties was over, demanding they renegotiate all of them on equal terms.
Towards the end of the unequal treaties
After the Boxer Rebellion and the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, Germany began to reassess its policy approach towards China. In 1907 Germany suggested a trilateral German-Chinese-American agreement that never materialised. Thus China entered the new era of ending unequal treaties on March 14, 1917 when it broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, thereby terminating the concessions it had given that country, with China declaring war on Germany on August 17, 1917.
As World War I commenced, these acts voided the unequal treaty of 1861, resulting in the reinstatement of Chinese control on the concessions of Tianjin and Hankou to China. In 1919, the post-war peace negotiations failed to return the territories in Shandong, previously under German colonial control, back to the Republic of China. After it was determined that the Japanese forces occupying those territories since 1914 would be allowed to retain them under the Treaty of Versailles, the Chinese delegate Wellington Koo refused to sign the peace agreement, with China being the only conference member to boycott the signing ceremony. Widely perceived in China as a betrayal of the country’s wartime contributions by the other conference members, the domestic backlash following the failure to restore Shandong would cause the collapse of the cabinet of the Duan Qirui government and lead to the May 4th movement.
On May 20, 1921, China secured with the German-Chinese peace treaty (Deutsch-chinesischer Vertrag zur Wiederherstellung des Friedenszustandes) a diplomatic accord which was considered the first equal treaty between China and a European nation.
Many of the other treaties China considers unequal were repealed during the Second Sino-Japanese War, which started in 1937 and merged into the larger context of World War II. Entering the war with the Attack on Pearl Harbor, China became a major ally in the war effort and the United States Congress was pressed to end American extraterritoriality in December 1943. Significant examples outlasted World War II: treaties regarding Hong Kong remained in place until Hong Kong’s 1997 handover, though in 1969, to improve Sino-Soviet relations in the wake of military skirmishes along their border, the People’s Republic of China was forced to reconfirm the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and 1860 Treaty of Peking.
Japan
When the US expeditionary fleet led by Matthew Perry reached Japan in 1854 to force open the island nation for American trade, the country was compelled to sign the Convention of Kanagawa under the threat of violence by the American warships. Although its historical importance has been argued by some to be limited, this event abruptly terminated Japan’s 220 years of seclusion under the Sakoku policy of 1633 under unilateral foreign pressure and consequentially, the convention has been seen in a similar light as an unequal treaty.
Another significant incident was the Tokugawa Shogunate’s capitulation to the Harris Treaty of 1858, negotiated by the eponymous U.S. envoy Townsend Harris, which, among other concessions, established a system of extraterritoriality for foreign residents. This agreement would then serve as a model for similar treaties to be further signed by Japan with other foreign Western powers in the weeks to follow.
The enforcement of these unequal treaties were a tremendous national shock for Japan’s leadership as they both curtailed Japanese sovereignty for the first time in its history and also revealed the nation’s growing weakness relative to the West through the latter’s successful imposition of such agreements upon the island nation. An objective towards the recovery of national status and strength would become an overarching priority for Japan, with the treaty’s domestic consequences being the end of the Bakufu, the 700 years of shogunate rule over Japan, and the establishment of a new imperial government.
The unequal treaties ended at various times for the countries involved and Japan’s victories in the 1894–95 First Sino-Japanese War convinced many in the West that unequal treaties could no longer be enforced on Japan.
Korea
Korea’s first unequal treaty was not with the West, but instead with Japan. The Ganghwa Island incident in 1875 saw Japan send the warship Un’yō led by Captain Inoue Yoshika with the implied threat of military action to coerce the Korean kingdom of Joseon through the show of force. After an armed clash ensued around Ganghwa Island where the Japanese force was sent, which resulted in its victory, the incident subsequently forced Korea to open its doors to Japan by signing the Treaty of Ganghwa Island, also known as the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1876.
During this period Korea also signed treaties with Qing China and the West powers (such as the United Kingdom and the United States). In the case of Qing China, it signed the China–Korea Treaty of 1882 with Korea stipulating that Korea was a dependency of China and granted the Chinese extraterritoriality and other privileges, and in subsequent treaties China also obtained concessions in Korea, notably the Chinese concession of Incheon. However, Qing China lost its influence over Korea following the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895.
As Japanese dominance over the Korean peninsula grew in the following decades, with respect to the unequal treaties imposed upon the kingdom by the West powers, Korea’s diplomatic concessions with those states became largely null and void in 1910, when it was annexed by Japan.
Taiping Rebellion
The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) was a millenarian uprising in southern China that began as a peasant rebellion and turned into an extremely bloody civil war. It broke out in 1851, a Han Chinese reaction against the Qing Dynasty, which was ethnically Manchu. The rebellion was sparked by a famine in Guangxi Province, and Qing government repression of the resulting peasant protests.
A would-be scholar named Hong Xiuquan, from the Hakka minority, had tried for years to pass the exacting imperial civil service examinations but had failed each time. While suffering from a fever, Hong learned from a vision that he was the younger brother of Jesus Christ and that he had a mission to rid China of Manchu rule and of Confucian ideas. Hong was influenced by an eccentric Baptist missionary from the United States named Issachar Jacox Roberts.
Hong Xiuquan’s teachings and the famine sparked a January 1851 uprising in Jintian (now called Guiping), which the government quashed. In response, a rebel army of 10,000 men and women marched to Jintian and overran the garrison of Qing troops stationed there; this marks the official start of the Taiping Rebellion.
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom
To celebrate the victory, Hong Xiuquan announced the formation of the “Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,” with himself as king. His followers tied red cloths around their heads. The men also grew out their hair, which had been kept in the queue style as per Qing regulations. Growing long hair was a capital offense under Qing law.
The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom had other policies that put it at odds with Beijing. It abolished private ownership of property, in an interesting foreshadowing of Mao’s communist ideology. Also, like the communists, the Taiping Kingdom declared men and women equal and abolished social classes. However, based on Hong’s understanding of Christianity, men and women were kept strictly segregated, and even married couples were prohibited from living together or having sex. This restriction did not apply to Hong himself, of course–as self-proclaimed king, he had a large number of concubines.
The Heavenly Kingdom also outlawed foot binding, based its civil service exams on the Bible instead of Confucian texts, used a lunar calendar rather than a solar one, and outlawed vices such as opium, tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and prostitution.
The Rebels
The Taiping rebels’ early military success made them quite popular with the peasants of Guangxi, but their efforts to attract support from the middle-class landowners and from Europeans failed. The leadership of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom began to fracture, as well, and Hong Xiuquan went into seclusion. He issued proclamations, mostly of a religious nature, while the Machiavellian rebel general Yang Xiuqing took over military and political operations for the rebellion. Hong Xiuquan’s followers rose up against Yang in 1856, killing him, his family, and the rebel soldiers loyal to him.
The Taiping Rebellion began to fail in 1861 when the rebels proved unable to take Shanghai. A coalition of Qing troops and Chinese soldiers under European officers defended the city, then set out to crush the rebellion in the southern provinces. After three years of bloody fighting, the Qing government had retaken most of the rebel areas. Hong Xiuquan died of food poisoning in June of 1864, leaving his hapless 15-year-old son on the throne. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom’s capital at Nanjing fell the following month after hard urban fighting, and the Qing troops executed the rebel leaders.
At its peak, the Taiping Heavenly Army likely fielded approximately 500,000 soldiers, male and female. It initiated the idea of “total war” – every citizen living within the boundaries of the Heavenly Kingdom was trained to fight, thus civilians on either side could expect no mercy from the opposing army. Both opponents used scorched earth tactics, as well as mass executions. As a result, the Taiping Rebellion was likely the bloodiest war of the nineteenth century, with an estimated 20 – 30 million casualties, mostly civilians. Around 600 entire cities in Guangxi, Anhui, Nanjing, and Guangdong Provinces were wiped from the map.
Despite this horrific outcome, and the founder’s millennial Christian inspiration, the Taiping Rebellion proved motivational for Mao Zedong’s Red Army during the Chinese Civil War the following century. The Jintian Uprising that started it all has a prominent place on the “Monument to the People’s Heroes” that stands today in Tiananmen Square, central Beijing.
Boxer Rebellion
In the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, a Chinese secret organization called the Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists led an uprising in northern China against the spread of Western and Japanese influence there. The rebels, referred to by Westerners as Boxers because they performed physical exercises they believed would make them able to withstand bullets, killed foreigners and Chinese Christians and destroyed foreign property.
From June to August, the Boxers besieged the foreign district of China’s capital city Beijing (then called Peking) until an international force that included American troops subdued the uprising. By the terms of the Boxer Protocol, which officially ended the rebellion in 1901, China agreed to pay more than $330 million in reparations.
Cause of the Boxer Rebellion
By the end of the 19th century, Western nations and Japan had forced China’s ruling Qing dynasty to accept wide foreign control over the country’s economic affairs. Throughout the Opium Wars of 1839-42 and 1856-60, popular rebellions and the Sino-Japanese War, China had fought to resist the foreigners, but it lacked a modernized military and suffered millions of casualties.
America returned the money it received from China after the Boxer Rebellion, on the condition it be used to fund the creation of a university in Beijing. Other nations involved later remitted their shares of the Boxer indemnity as well.
John Hay, the U.S. Secretary of State from 1898 to 1905, began to implement an “Open Door Policy” to exert American and European influence over Chinese trade and economic partnerships. Though his Open Door Policy was met with indifference or resistance by other players—including the Qing Empress Dowager Tzu’u Hzi—continued Western influence over domestic Chinese affairs set the stage for rebellion.
By the late 1890s, a Chinese secret group, the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists (“I-ho-ch’uan” or “Yihequan”), had begun carrying out regular attacks on foreigners and Chinese Christians. The rebels performed calisthenics rituals and martial arts that they believed would give them the ability to withstand bullets and other forms of attack. Westerners referred to these rituals as shadow boxing, leading to the Boxers nickname.
Although the Boxers came from various parts of society, many were peasants, particularly from Shandong province, which had been struck by natural disasters such as famine and flooding. In the 1890s, China had given territorial and commercial concessions in this area to several European nations, and the Boxers blamed their poor standard of living on foreigners who were colonizing their country.
The Boxer Movement
In 1900, the Boxer movement spread to the Beijing area, where the Boxers killed Chinese Christians and Christian missionaries and destroyed churches, railroad stations and other property. On June 20, 1900, the Boxers began a siege of Beijing’s Legation District (where the official quarters of foreign diplomats were located). The following day, Empress Dowager Tzu’u Hzi declared a war on all foreign nations with diplomatic ties in China.
As the Western powers and Japan organized a multinational force to crush the rebellion, the siege stretched into weeks, and the diplomats, their families and guards suffered through hunger and degrading conditions as they fought to keep the Boxers at bay.
By some estimates, several hundred foreigners and several thousand Chinese Christians were killed during this time. On August 14, after fighting its way through northern China, an international force of approximately 20,000 troops from eight nations (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) arrived to take Beijing and rescue the foreigners and Chinese Christians.
Aftermath
The Boxer Rebellion formally ended with the signing of the Boxer Protocol on September 7, 1901. By terms of the agreement, forts protecting Beijing were to be destroyed, Boxer and Chinese government officials involved in the uprising were to be punished, foreign legations were permitted to station troops in Beijing for their defense, China was prohibited from importing arms for two years and it agreed to pay more than $330 million in reparations to the foreign nations involved.
The Qing dynasty, established in 1644, was weakened by the Boxer Rebellion. Following an uprising in 1911, the dynasty came to an end and China became a republic in 1912.
Unit II
Qing Restoration and Modernization Movements
Self Strengthening
The Self-Strengthening Movement was a 19th-century push to modernise China, particularly in the fields of industry and defence. Foreign imperialism in China, its defeat in the Second Opium War (1860), the humiliating Treaty of Tientsin and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) all exposed the dynasty’s military and technological backwardness, particularly in comparison to European nations. These disasters triggered the rise of the Self-Strengthening Movement. The advocates of Self-Strengthening were not republican radicals or social reformers. They hoped to strengthen the nation by preserving Qing rule and maintaining traditional Confucian values while embracing Western military and industrial practices. As one writer explained, it was necessary to “learn barbarian [Western] methods to combat barbarian threats”. To acquire this knowledge China had to actively engage with Western nations, examine their trade and technology, encourage the study of Western languages and develop a diplomatic service to connect with foreign governments.
The sponsors of Self-Strengthening tended to be provincial leaders, who initiated projects and reforms that benefited their region. Two examples were Zeng Guofan and Zuo Zongtang, Qing military leaders who oversaw developments in ship-building and armaments production in Shanghai and Fuzhou respectively. But the most prominent and successful advocate of Self-Strengthening was Li Hongzhang, a Qing general who was more interested in the West than most of his kind. Li organised the formation and development of Western-style military academies, the construction of fortifications around Chinese ports and the overhaul of China’s northern fleet. He later oversaw the development of capitalist enterprises, funded by private business interest but with some government involvement or oversight. Some of these projects included railways, shipping infrastructure, coal mines, cloth mills and the installation of telegraph lines and stations. From the 1880s Li was also instrumental in developing a Chinese foreign policy and forging a stable and productive relationship with Western nations.
“The educated reform faction joined the Self-Strengthening Movement with the motto ‘Confucian ethics, Western science’. China, these reformers said, could acquire modern technology, and the scientific knowledge underlying it, without sacrificing the ethical superiority of its Confucian tradition. As one of their leaders stated: ‘What we have to learn from the barbarians is only one thing: solid ships and effective guns’.”
Valerie Hansen, historian
Despite their efforts, the three-decade-long Self-Strengthening Movement was generally unsuccessful. Significant figures in the Qing government were sceptical about the movement and gave it inadequate attention or resources. Xenophobes in the bureaucracy wanted nothing to do with Western methods, so some whipped up opposition to Self-Strengthening. Another significant factor in the failure of Self-Strengthening was China’s decentralised government and the weak authority of the Qing in some regions. The majority of successful Self-Strengthening projects were managed and funded by provincial governments or private business interests. A consequence of this was that new military developments – reformed armies, military installations, munitions plants, naval vessels and so on – were often loyal to, if not controlled provincial interests. This provincialism provided little or no benefit to the Qing regime or the national interest. It also contributed to disunity and warlordism after 1916, as local warlords seized control of these military assets. Most importantly, the Self-Strengthening Movement operated on the flawed premise that economic and military modernisation could be achieved without significant political or social reform.
China incurred two more costly defeats in the late 19th century (to France in 1884-85 and Japan in 1894-95). These defeats were clear evidence the Self-Strengthening Movement had failed. Defeat at the hands of Japan, a smaller Asian nation, was particularly rankling and intensified calls for change. Many wanted to learn from the victorious Japanese. Only 40 years before, Japan was an island nation of daimyo, samurai and peasant farmers, a feudal society with a medieval subsistence economy. Yet just two generations after opening its doors to the West, Japan had been radically transformed. By the 1890s the Japanese had a constitutional monarchy with an industrial economy and the strongest military in Asia. Few Chinese leaders could deny the remarkable progress in Japan – or the need for reform and modernisation in their own country. But there was considerable disagreement about how this reform should be managed, who should direct it and how far it should go. Several Chinese political clubs were formed to debate models and approaches to reform. Writers and scholars considered whether China should mimic the Meiji reforms in Japan or find its own path to modernisation. Even the Dowager Empress Cixi was herself not opposed to economic reform, though she was certainly wary of its consequences.
1. The Self-Strengthening Movement was a campaign for economic and military reform in China, inspired by the nation’s military weakness in the mid 19th century.
2. The Self-Strengthening Movement began in the 1860s and sought to acquire and utilise Western methods. “Learn barbarian methods to combat barbarian threats” was one of its mottos.
3. The movement produced some successful capitalist and military reforms, though most of these were provincially rather than nationally based. It failed to strengthen Qing rule or military power, as suggested by subsequent defeats in two wars.
4. Self-Strengthening failed due to a lack of Qing support, the decentralised nature of government and its narrow focus. Qing leaders wanted military and economic modernisation but without accompanying social or political reforms.
5. In contrast, sweeping reforms under the Meiji Emperor had transformed Japan – once as backward as China – into a modern military-industrial state, the most advanced in Asia.
Hundred Days Reform
The Hundred Days of Reform was an attempt to modernise China by reforming its government, economy and society. These reforms were launched by the young Guangxu emperor and his followers in June 1898. The need for urgent reforms in China followed the failure of the Self Strengthening Movement and defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Some intellectuals believed that for significant reform to succeed, it had to come from above. They hoped the young Qing emperor might follow the example of the reform-minded Meiji emperor, who had overseen and encouraged successful economic and military reforms in Japan. But the Hundred Days of Reform was short lived and mostly ineffective, thwarted by the actions of Dowager Empress Cixi and a cohort of conservatives in the Qing government and military. The failure of these reforms is considered a significant starting point for the Chinese Revolution.
The Guangxu Emperor (1871-1908) came to the throne as a four-year-old in 1875, at the height of the Self Strengthening Movement. During the emperor’s childhood matters of policy were dealt with by his aunt, adoptive mother and regent, the Dowager Empress Cixi. Historical accounts suggest the young Guangxu Emperor was reserved, shy and softly spoken – but he was also intelligent and curious. Though schooled in traditional Confucian values of caution, conservatism and respect for tradition, the young emperor developed a growing interest in the progress of other nations, as well as the fate of his own. Like others of the time, he was concerned that China had been overtaken by Japan, an island nation once considered China’s ‘younger brother’. Foreign imperialism also jeopardised China’s sovereignty and the existence of the Qing government. The Guangxu Emperor came to believe that both his dynasty and his country may not survive without significant reform.
One significant figure who shaped the emperor’s views was a young writer named Kang Youwei. Kang was no radical republican: he was a neo-Confucianist who was loyal to the emperor and the Qing dynasty. But Kang was also acutely aware of the dangers that confronted China. In the 1890s Kang published literature that offered a new interpretation of Confucianism. He suggesting it was not only about conserving the status quo but could also be an agent for progress and reform. Beginning in 1890, Kang submitted several memorials to the Guangxu emperor, urging him to consider political and social reforms. These had little impact until January 1898 when Kang Youwei was admitted to the Forbidden City, apparently at the behest of Weng Tonghe, one of the Guangxu Emperor’s tutors. There is some historiographical debate about whether Kang Youwei changed the emperor’s views or simply reinforced them. Whatever the case, Kang was certainly consulted about reform and invited to submit a package of detailed proposals. Kang’s proposed reforms, submitted to the emperor in May 1898, were quite radical. They called not just for superficial changes but a fundamental constitutional overhaul – including the destruction and replacement of government ministries and bureaucracies. In his May 1898 memorial Kang told the emperor:
“Our present trouble lies in our clinging to old institutions without knowing how to change… Nowadays the court has been undertaking some reforms, but the action of the emperor is obstructed by the ministers, and the recommendations of the able scholars are attacked by old-fashioned bureaucrats. If the charge is not “using barbarian ways to change China” then it is “upsetting the ancestral institutions.” Rumours and scandals are rampant, and people fight each other like fire and water. To reform in this way is as ineffective as attempting a forward march by walking backwards. It will inevitably result in failure. Your Majesty knows that under the present circumstances reforms are imperative and old institutions must be abolished.”
Kang’s proposal went on to detail some specific reforms: the drafting and adoption of a constitution, the creation of a national parliament, a review of the imperial examination system and sweeping changes to provincial government and the bureaucracy. In mid-June 1898, the Guangxu emperor gave an audience where he unveiled dozens of broadly-worded edicts, each ordering the reform of a particular branch of government or policy: from the military to money, from education to trade. Over the following 100 days, the emperor issued even more reform edicts, more than 180 altogether. The English language newspaper The Peking Press gave point-form summaries of these reform edicts as they were handed down. The emperor also summoned ministers, generals and officials to the Forbidden City, to receive his edicts and to discuss how reform might be developed and implemented within their respective departments.
As might be expected, many conservatives viewed these sweeping reforms as rushed, panicked and dangerous. The Guangxu Emperor’s decrees outraged traditionalist Confucian scholars, who considered them impetuous and believed they tried to do too much too soon. The reforms also threatened the position of powerful ministers and bureaucrats and created much work and disruption for others. The response was a widespread but potent campaign of whispers and intrigues against the Guangxu emperor. Much of this talk focused on the likely response of the Dowager Empress. Would she move to quash the emperor’s ambitious reforms and perhaps force his abdication? Or if she chose not to act, would the emperor be replaced by a coup d’etat orchestrated by conservative military leaders?
“Some historians said that if the emperor had implemented his changes one at a time, allowing the reactions to flare up and cool down, rather than bombarding the country with reforms, the history of China might have been different. Russian rulers have always taken the approach that one cannot cross a chasm by small steps, and they have wrenched their country out of medieval obscurity through sweeping reforms. But then they did not have an empress dowager at the helm.”
X. L. Woo, historian
In the end, both things occurred. Within days of the first edicts, Cixi was working to thwart the emperor and his reforms. The Dowager Empress ordered the removal of Weng Tonghe, the emperor’s closest advisor and strongest ally, from the Forbidden City. She ordered the appointment of Ronglu, one of her allies, as war minister and commander of the army protecting Beijing; and recruited the support of Yuan Shikai, another powerful general. Cixi now had the tools to remove the emperor – but like a skilled chess player, she waited, allowing the emperor’s own actions to justify her response. The trigger came in September when the Guangxu emperor appointed two foreigners – one English, one Japanese – to his advisory council. Fearing a Qing government influenced or even controlled by foreigners, conservatives urged Cixi to move. She did so on September 21st, entering the emperor’s residence and ordering he sign a document abdicating state power in her favour. Isolated and opposed by conservative military commanders, the young emperor had little choice but to agree.
Shortly after, Yuan Shikai led troops into the Forbidden City and placed the emperor under house arrest. The gates of Beijing were locked as the army hunted down reformists and their supporters. Dozens were captured and executed or thrown into prison; the more fortunate sought refuge in embassies or escaped to exile. Kang Youwei, who had become the figurehead of the reform movement, managed to evade capture and fled to Japan. He was later sentenced in absentia to the notorious ling chi (‘slow slicing’ or ‘death by a thousand cuts’). Within days of regaining power Cixi repealed most of the emperor’s edicts of June-September, allowing some of his milder or less significant reforms to proceed. The imperial examinations were restored, as were several positions and departments abolished by the emperor’s decrees. Newspapers which had actively supported the reforms were shut down. Scholars and writers were ordered to cease submitting memorials on political matters unless they held a government position that entitled them to do so.
The suppression of the Hundred Days reforms surprised few in China. The Western press, which had given only passing attention to the reforms, seethed with indignation about the emperor’s betrayal. One newspaper in Boston, United States described the restoration of Cixi’s authority as “returning darkness” and “a lapse to barbarism in that country”. Many historians have since echoed this position, suggesting the failure of the reforms was a sign of the Qing regime’s unwillingness and inability to adapt and progress. Others have taken a more nuanced view, arguing the reforms failed because they abandoned gradualism, attempted too much in too narrow a timeframe and were unacceptable for the conservative Qing bureaucracy and military. The Guangxu Emperor’s reforms may have failed at large, however, some were permitted to proceed or were adopted later. Beijing University, formed in an edict of July 3rd, continued and became an important source of revolutionary ideas and activity. Some political and educational reforms annulled by Cixi in 1898 were adopted during the last decade of the regime.
1. The Hundred Days of Reform was an attempt by the Guangxu Emperor and his supporters, particularly the writer Kang Youwei, to force rapid modernisation on Chinese government and society.
2. This urgency for reform followed the failure of the Self Strengthening Movement and China’s 1895 defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War.
3. Between June and September 1898 the Guangxu Emperor issued more than 180 reformist edicts, making sweeping changes in areas including government, the bureaucracy, education and the military.
4. The dimensions and the pace of these reforms angered and threatened conservative ministers, bureaucrats and military officers. Some of them lobbied for action from Dowager Empress Cixi.
5. On September 21st, Cixi acted. Backed by conservative military leaders, she forced the emperor to abdicate all state power in her favour. The emperor was held under house arrest and most of his reforms were either abolished and wound back.
Expansion of Foreign Powers and "Scramble for Concessions"
The expansion of foreign powers in China has a complex and multifaceted history, marked by periods of imperialistic endeavors, colonization, and spheres of influence. This narrative spans several centuries, involving Western powers, Japan, and other foreign actors. The interactions were shaped by economic interests, geopolitical rivalries, and the broader context of global power dynamics. Here’s a detailed exploration of the expansion of foreign powers in China:
Early Contacts and Trade (Pre-19th Century):
1. Silk Road and Early Trade:
- China has a long history of trade along the Silk Road, connecting it with various cultures and civilizations. Chinese goods such as silk and porcelain were highly sought after.
2. Mongol Rule and Yuan Dynasty:
- During the Mongol-led Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368), foreign influence increased. Marco Polo’s travels introduced China to the Western world.
Opium Wars and Unequal Treaties (19th Century):
3. Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860):
- The Opium Wars, sparked by disputes over trade imbalances and the British opium trade, resulted in China’s defeat. The Treaty of Nanking (1842) ceded Hong Kong and opened several ports to foreign trade.
4. Treaty Ports and Extraterritoriality:
- Subsequent treaties (Treaty of Tianjin, 1856) expanded foreign presence in China through the establishment of treaty ports, extraterritorial rights, and foreign-controlled areas within Chinese cities.
5. Spheres of Influence:
- Foreign powers, including Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan, established spheres of influence in China during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These regions granted exclusive economic and political privileges to the respective foreign powers.
Early 20th Century and World War I:
6. Twenty-One Demands (1915):
- Japan presented the Twenty-One Demands to China during World War I, seeking to further extend its influence in China. While some demands were withdrawn, Japan still gained significant concessions.
7. May Fourth Movement (1919):
- The May Fourth Movement, triggered by the Treaty of Versailles, marked a turning point. Chinese intellectuals and students protested against foreign influence, leading to a surge in nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiments.
World War II and Japanese Occupation:
8. Japanese Invasion (1937–1945):
- During World War II, Japan invaded and occupied large parts of China. The brutal occupation had profound social, economic, and political consequences for China.
Post-World War II:
9. Civil War and Communist Victory (1945–1949):
- After World War II, the Chinese Civil War resumed between the Nationalists (Kuomintang) and the Communists (CCP). The Communists, led by Mao Zedong, emerged victorious in 1949.
10. Formation of the People’s Republic of China (1949):
- The establishment of the People’s Republic of China marked the end of foreign imperialist control, and China began asserting its sovereignty.
Modern Era:
11. Economic Reforms and Foreign Investment (Late 20th Century):
- China’s economic reforms, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 20th century, opened the country to foreign investment. Special Economic Zones attracted international businesses, contributing to China’s economic growth.
12. Hong Kong and Macau Handovers (1997, 1999):
- The handovers of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999) marked the end of foreign colonial rule in these regions, symbolizing China’s assertion of control over its territories.
13. Current Global Economic Influence:
- China has become a major player in the global economy, attracting foreign investment and participating in international trade and diplomacy. The Belt and Road Initiative exemplifies China’s expanding global influence.
Scramble for Concessions
China’s defeats in the so-called Opium Wars brought on the unequal treaty system. Its main features, extraterritoriality and the 5 percent ad valorem tariff, clearly reflected imperialist imposition on China’s integrity and the decline of the Qing dynasty. Still, led by Great Britain, and perhaps best symbolized by Sir Robert Hart and the China Maritime Customs Service, these efforts led to an informal empire, China’s semi-colonial status, and rule, in a way, by missionaries and merchants, defended when necessary by military force.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century the situation changed greatly. In 1884–1885, France easily defeated China and took control of Indochina, a peripheral part of the traditional empire. Matters worsened when, in 1894–1895, Japan equally easily defeated Qing forces and demanded a series of territorial concessions including the island of Formosa, the nearby Pescadore Islands, Korea, and the Liaotung Peninsula in southern Manchuria.
The “triple intervention” in which France and Germany joined with Russia temporarily halted Japanese expansion onto the Asian mainland. Russia demanded a reward for keeping Japan from taking southern Manchuria, and used construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway to gain approval for a shortcut across Manchuria. This shortcut, the Chinese Eastern Railway, saved 1,036 square kilometers (400 square miles) on the 12,949-square-kilometer (5,000-square-mile) trip from Moscow to Vladivostok, and became a vehicle for Russian expansion into Manchuria. Similarly, Germany demanded a concession in eastern Shandong. France also used railway construction to move from Indochina into the Chinese provinces, Yunnan and Guangxi, along the border. Japan sought control over Fujian and Zhejiang provinces that faced Formosa across the Taiwan Straits. And Great Britain, not wanting to lose out as its informal empire gradually collapsed, sought control of Guangdong province adjacent to its leasehold in Hong Kong and Kowloon as well as territory along the lower Yangtze River.
Indeed, many Chinese feared that China would soon go the way of sub-Saharan Africa, and that the Middle Kingdom would disappear from world maps. This hatred of foreign imperialism and the Chinese who, in converting to Christianity, seemed to turn their back on tradition, led to the rise of a secret society, the Righteous and Harmonious Fists, the so-called Boxers that conservative elements of the Qing dynasty encouraged to throw off the foreign yoke. The resulting rebellion surged to Beijing in 1900 and besieged the foreign embassies and the Chinese Christian converts hiding in the legations; a relief expedition advanced to Beijing and rescued the besieged.
For the United States, the scramble for concessions was troubling. After the 1890s depression and America’s new empire after war with Spain and the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, American business wanted markets for surplus production, and the China market was tempting. The U.S. secretary of state, John Hay, with encouragement from the British government, issued two “Open Door” notes in which he called on the imperial powers not to cut China to pieces and not to incorporate those pieces into mercantile empires closed to American business. Most of the foreign powers ignored Hay, and the situation in China devolved as the Qing dynasty collapsed, and Yuan Shikai seized control and the world moved to World War I (1914–1918). Thereafter, in the 1920s and 1930s, Japan and China began to move down the road to war.
Unit III
Search for New Solutions
Revolution of 1911
The 1911 Revolution was the spontaneous but popular uprising that ended the long reign of the Qing dynasty. It is also known as the Xinhai Revolution, after the Chinese calendar year in which it occurred. The 1911 Revolution had apparently benign origins, beginning with disputes and protests over railway ownership in Sichuan province and surrounding areas. The flashpoint for revolution came in October when a republican-minded army unit mutinied in Wuchang, Hubei province. Their rebellious spirit spread to surrounding regions, igniting a tinderbox of revolutionary sentiment. By the end of 1911, nationalist revolutionaries were assembling to form a new government. These men, led by Sun Yixian, were determined to create a Chinese republic – but they lacked the means to force the Qing to surrender power. In the end, Sun Yixian reached a compromise with powerful military leader Yuan Shikai, whose intervention forced the abdication of infant emperor Puyi. This deal, however, placed power in the hands of Shikai, who was more interested in his own ambitions than furthering Chinese republicanism.
The collapse of the Qing dynasty came a decade after the failed Boxer Rebellion. In September 1901 the Qing government, represented by foreign minister Li Hongzhang, ratified the Boxer Protocol. For its role in supporting the Boxer movement and failing to protect foreigners in China, foreign powers hit the Qing state with punitive measures and costly reparations. The Boxer Protocol humiliated and greatly weakened the Qing regime, however, the Qing maintained their tenuous grip on power. In early 1902 Dowager Empress Cixi and her nephew, the politically impotent Guangxu Emperor, were permitted to return to Beijing. But the once fiercely conservative Dragon Lady was now a more compliant figure, ready to accommodate change if it meant prolonging her dynasty.
In her final years, Cixi authorised a raft of political and social reforms, some just as radical as reforms she had quashed in 1898. In 1905 Cixi approved a commission for the study of foreign political systems, a precursor to constitutional reform in China. The Qing bureaucracy was overhauled and new departments were set up to oversee the police, commerce, communications, foreign affairs, education and law. The imperial examination system was abandoned and steps were taken toward establishing a modern school system. There were economic reforms aimed at encouraging capitalist ventures. A more Westernised criminal code was adopted. Prohibitions on Manchu-Han marriage were lifted. Social evils like slavery, foot-binding and opium smoking were all banned. As radical as these late Qing reforms appeared to be, they were too insincere, too poorly implemented and came much too late to save the ailing dynasty. On November 15th 1908 Dowager Empress Cixi died in her sleep, a fortnight short of her 73rd birthday. Her demise came a day after the death of the 37-year-old Guangxu Emperor, who was almost certainly poisoned with arsenic, probably on Cixi’s orders. The Qing dynasty effectively died with Guangxu and his overbearing aunt. The imperial throne passed to the infant Puyi, leaving China in the hands of a two-year-old boy and his politically inexperienced father, at a time when it needed strong and decisive leadership.
“The Qing government was overthrown not by a single rebellion but by a decentralised movement that devolved power to the provinces. However it proved extremely difficult to replace it with a government that was acceptable to all the provinces and regional economic and political interests that had been involved in the struggle to bring down the Manchus. Support for a constitutional monarchy had ebbed away and there was broad agreement among political activists that China needed a republican government – but there was no common understanding of what that would involve in practice, how it should be implemented and, of more immediate importance, who should be in power.”
Michael Dillon, historian
When the anti-Qing revolution came it began spontaneously, rather than at the command of Sun Yixian. The catalyst was a Qing decision to nationalise two privately-owned railways in central China, a policy designed to fund the government’s Boxer Protocol reparations. When announced in May 1911 this policy created a firestorm of protest, particularly in Sichuan province, where a number of local businessmen had invested their own money in the railway. Facing considerable losses if the government seized the railways, these investors created the Railway Protection Movement. This small but busy group organised strikes and protests in Chengdu, the Sichuan capital. In early September the Qing governor in Sichuan trie to short circuit the protest by sending in troops and arresting dissident leaders. This only worsened the situation and brought about the deaths of least 40 protestors. Beijing eventually backed down, replacing the governor and offering to better compensate those affected by the takeover of privately owned railways – but the situation in Sichuan had become dangerously inflamed.
The Qing government, fearing further unrest, began to mobilise New Army regiments in neighbouring Hubei province. But these military units were themselves compromised by republicans and their sympathisers. A significant number of military personnel in Hubei, both officers and soldiers, had become members of secretive literary societies, meeting to read and discuss subversive political literature. By September 1911 these literary societies claimed more than 2,000 members. They had also connected with radical student and workers’ groups in Wuchang and other Hubei towns. This revolutionary coalition had been planning an uprising against the Qing and had been stockpiling weapons and munitions since early 1911. Their hand was forced by the accidental explosion of a bomb on October 9th. The bomb detonated in a Hankou building being used by dissident soldiers, leading to an investigation and exposure of their subversive activities. Facing arrest, the Wuchang regiment mutinied the following day (October 10th or ‘Double-Ten Day’). The rebel soldiers stormed government buildings, arrested loyalist soldiers and seized control of the city. On October 11th the rebels declared a republican government in Hubei province. There they hoisted a flag containing 18 connected stars, representing the unification of China’s 18 provinces.
The successful uprising in Wuchang kickstarted a wave of similar rebellions around China. Over the next six weeks, there were at least 22 different uprisings from Changsha to Jiangsu, from Shanghai to Shandong. In every location, rebels wrestled control from provincial politicians or bureaucrats and proclaimed their independence from the Qing. It was achieved with minimal violence for the most part, though some areas saw heavy fighting and considerable bloodshed. In Xi’an, Shaanxi province, the city’s Manchu population was protected for a time by loyalist Hui Muslims. When the defences fell in late October, around 10,000 Manchus were captured and indiscriminately slaughtered. Government forces also hit back against the rebels, recapturing several cities, including Wuchang itself. November saw the return of Sun Yixian, the nationalist writer and founder of the Tongmenghui, who had spent the last 15 years of his life calling for an end to Qing rule. Many considered Sun the only man capable of managing the difficult transition from monarchy to Chinese republic.
For all its optimism the new government, based in Nanjing, still had to find a way to rid China of the ailing Qing dynasty. Without a military force, it had no means to achieve this. One man who did was Yuan Shikai, who quickly became the figure on whom China’s future hinged. The Qing had attempted to secure Shikai’s loyalty on November 1st by appointing him as prime minister. Shikai, however, was more motivated by what he could acquire for himself than what he could do for his country. By December the new Qing prime minister was negotiating with republican agents about the creation of a new government – with Shikai himself as president. Meanwhile, on December 29th, the first assembly of the provisional republican government in Nanjing elected Sun Yixian as its president. China now had a choice of two republican presidents: one a well-credentialed nationalist who had dedicated his life to political modernisation, the other a self-serving military officer whose only credentials were his control of the army. The struggle between Sun Yixian and Yuan Shikai would shape the first years of the new Chinese republic.
1. The 1911 Revolution was a spontaneous nationwide rebellion that erupted across China in late 1911 and led to the abdication of the Qing dynasty.
2. The catalyst for the 1911 Revolution was the Railway Protection Movement that emerged in Sichuan in mid-1911, followed by the mobilisation of New Army units in Hubei.
3. The accidental detonation of a bomb in Wuchang threatened the exposure of hundreds of republican soldiers. Pre-empting their arrest, the soldiers mutinied, took control of Wuchang and formed a rebel government.
4. Dissatisfaction with the Qing and the success of the Wuchang uprising inspired rebellions in a multitude of cities and regions around China. By the end of 1911, the nation was in chaos.
5. Republicans led by the newly returned Sun Yixian formed a nationalist government in Nanjing- but they had to broker a deal to obtain the military backing of General Yuan Shikai.
Sun Yat Sen and his Contribution
Sun Yat-sen (November 12, 1866–March 12, 1925) holds a unique position in the Chinese-speaking world today. He is the only figure from the early revolutionary period who is honored as the “Father of the Nation” by people in both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan).
Early Life
Sun Yat-sen was born Sun Wen in Cuiheng village, Guangzhou, Guangdong Province on November 12, 1866, one of six children born to tailor and peasant farmer Sun Dacheng and his wife Madame Yang. Sun Yat-sen attended elementary school in China, but he moved to Honolulu, Hawaii at the age of 13 where his elder brother Sun Mei had lived since 1871.
In Hawaii, Sun Wen lived with his brother Sun Mei and studied at the Iolani School, earning his high school diploma in 1882, and then spent a single semester at Oahu College before his older brother abruptly sent him back to China at the age of 17. Sun Mei feared that his brother was going to convert to Christianity if he stayed longer in Hawaii.
Christianity and Revolution
Sun Wen had already absorbed too many Christian ideas, however. In 1883, he and a friend broke the Beiji Emperor-God statue in front of his home village’s temple. In 1884, his parents arranged for his first marriage to Lu Muzhen (1867–1952), the daughter of a local merchant. In 1887, Sun Wen left for Hong Kong to enroll in the college of medicine and left his wife behind. They would have three children together: son Sun Fo (b. 1891), daughter Sun Jinyuan (b. 1895), daughter Sun Jinwan (b. 1896). He would go on to marry twice more and take a long-term mistress, all without divorcing Lu.
In Hong Kong, Sun received a medical degree from the Hong Kong College of Medicine (now the University of Hong Kong). During his time in Hong Kong, the young man converted to Christianity (to his family’s chagrin). When he was baptized, he received a new name: Sun Yat-sen. For Sun Yat-sen, becoming Christian was a symbol of his embrace of “modern,” or Western, knowledge and ideas. It was a revolutionary statement at a time when the Qing Dynasty was trying desperately to fend off westernization.
By 1891, Sun had given up his medical practice and was working with the Furen Literary Society, which advocated the overthrow of the Qing. He also began a 20-year relationship with a Hong Kong woman named Chen Cuifen. He went back to Hawaii in 1894 to recruit Chinese ex-patriots there to the revolutionary cause in the name of the Revive China Society.
The 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War was a disastrous defeat for the Qing government, feeding into calls for reform. Some reformers sought a gradual modernization of imperial China, but Sun Yat-sen called for the end of the empire and the establishment of a modern republic. In October 1895, the Revive China Society staged the First Guangzhou Uprising in an attempt to overthrow the Qing; their plans leaked, however, and the government arrested more than 70 society members. Sun Yat-sen escaped into exile in Japan.
Exile
During his exile in Japan, Sun Yat-sen met Kaoru Otsuki and asked for her hand in marriage in 1901. Since she was only 13 at the time, her father forbade their marriage until 1903. They had a daughter named Fumiko who, after Sun Yat-sen abandoned them in 1906, was adopted by a family named Miyagawa.
It was also during his exile in Japan and elsewhere that Sun Yat-sen made contacts with Japanese modernizers and advocates of pan-Asian unity against Western imperialism. He also helped supply weapons to the Filipino Resistance, which had fought its way free from Spanish imperialism only to have the new Republic of the Philippines crushed by the Americans in 1902. Sun had been hoping to use the Philippines as a base for a Chinese revolution but had to give up that plan.
From Japan, Sun also launched a second attempted uprising against the government of Guangdong. Despite help from the organized crime triads, on October 22, 1900, the Huizhou Uprising also failed.
Throughout the first decade of the 20th century, Sun Yat-sen called for China to “expel the Tatar barbarians”—meaning the ethnic-Manchu Qing Dynasty—while gathering support from overseas Chinese in the US, Malaysia, and Singapore. He launched seven more attempted uprisings, including an invasion of southern China from Vietnam in December 1907, called the Zhennanguan Uprising. His most impressive effort to date, Zhennanguan ended in failure after seven days of bitter fighting.
The Republic of China
Sun Yat-sen was in the United States when the Xinhai Revolution broke out at Wuchang on October 10, 1911. Caught off guard, Sun missed the rebellion that brought down the child emperor, Puyi, and ended the imperial period of Chinese history. As soon as he heard that the Qing Dynasty had fallen, Sun raced back to China.
A council of delegates from the provinces elected Sun Yat-sen to be the “provisional president” of the new Republic of China on December 29, 1911. Sun was chosen in recognition of his unflagging work raising funds and sponsoring uprisings over the previous decade. However, the northern warlord Yuan Shi-kai had been promised the presidency if he could pressure Puyi into formally abdicating the throne.
Puyi abdicated on February 12, 1912, so on March 10, Sun Yat-sen stepped aside and Yuan Shi-kai became the next provisional president. It soon became clear that Yuan hoped to establish a new imperial dynasty, rather than a modern republic. Sun began to rally his own supporters, calling them to a legislative assembly in Beijing in May of 1912. The assembly was evenly divided between supporters of Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shi-kai.
At the assembly, Sun’s ally Song Jiao-ren renamed their party the Guomindang (KMT). The KMT took many legislative seats in the election, but not a majority; it had 269/596 in the lower house, and 123/274 in the senate. Yuan Shi-kai ordered the assassination of KMT leader Song Jiao-ren in March of 1913. Unable to prevail at the ballot box and fearful of Yuan Shi-kai’s ruthless ambition, Sun organized a KMT force to challenge Yuan’s army in July 1913. Yuan’s 80,000 troops prevailed, however, and Sun Yat-sen once more had to flee to Japan in exile.
Chaos
In 1915, Yuan Shi-kai briefly realized his ambitions when he proclaimed himself the Emperor of China (r. 1915–16). His proclamation as emperor sparked a violent backlash from other warlords—such as Bai Lang—as well as a political reaction from the KMT. Sun Yat-sen and the KMT fought the new “emperor” in the Anti-Monarchy War, even as Bai Lang led the Bai Lang Rebellion, touching off China’s Warlord Era. In the chaos that followed, the opposition at one point declared both Sun Yat-sen and Xu Shi-chang as the President of the Republic of China. In the midst of the chaos, Sun Yat-sen married his third wife, Soong Ching-ling (m. 1915–1925), whose sister May-ling would later marry Chiang Kai-shek.
To bolster the KMT’s chances of overthrowing Yuan Shi-kai, Sun Yat-sen reached out to local and international communists. He wrote to the Second Communist International (Comintern) in Paris for support, and also approached the Communist Party of China (CPC). Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin praised Sun for his work and sent advisers to help establish a military academy. Sun appointed a young officer named Chiang Kai-shek as the commandant of the new National Revolutionary Army and its training academy. The Whampoa Academy officially opened on May 1, 1924.
Preparations for the Northern Expedition
Although Chiang Kai-shek was skeptical about the alliance with the communists, he went along with his mentor Sun Yat-sen’s plans. With Soviet aid, they trained an army of 250,000, which would march through northern China in a three-pronged attack, aimed at wiping out the warlords Sun Chuan-fang in the northeast, Wu Pei-fu in the Central Plains, and Zhang Zuo-lin in Manchuria.
This massive military campaign would take place between 1926 and 1928, but would simply realign power among the warlords rather than consolidating power behind the Nationalist government. The longest-lasting effect was probably the enhancement of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s reputation—but Sun Yat-sen would not live to see it.
Death
On March 12, 1925, Sun Yat-sen died at the Peking Union Medical College from liver cancer. He was just 58 years old. Although he was a baptized Christian, he was first buried at a Buddhist shrine near Beijing called the Temple of Azure Clouds.
In a sense, Sun’s early death ensured that his legacy lives on in both mainland China and Taiwan. Because he brought together the Nationalist KMT and the Communist CPC, and they were still allies at the time of his death, both sides honor his memory.
The May Fourth Movement and its Significance
The May Fourth Movement was an intellectual and reformist movement that reached its peak in 1919. The movement was initiated mainly by university students, who were angry at China’s treatment at the hands of Western powers after World War I. Specifically, they were outraged by the passing of German imperial interests in Shandong province over to the Japanese. The May Fourth Movement was anti-imperialist and demanded the restoration of Chinese independence and sovereignty. Its leaders also wanted socio-political reform, namely the eradication of Confucian values and a society based on democratic government, liberal individualism, science and industry. The movement peaked on May 4th 1919, when thousands of students rallied in Beijing to protest against China’s treatment in the Treaty of Versailles. Their protest was supported by students and striking workers across China. These events radicalised political movements in China and contributed to the rise of groups like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was formed two years later.
Reformist ideas and movements were not uncommon in late imperial China. The supporters of the Self Strengthening Movement of the 1800s endorsed limited economic and educational reforms. Kang Youwei, the main architect of the Hundred Days’ reforms of 1898, reinterpreted Confucianism to allow for political and social reform. The failure of the early republic and the descent into warlordism led intellectuals to examine the relationship between past and present in China. At the forefront of this was the New Culture Movement, a broad collection of scholars, writers and intellectuals, based mainly in Beijing and Shanghai. Beginning in the mid 1910s they argued that Confucianism and classical philosophy had little relevance or value in 20th century China. For China to survive and prosper, it had to adapt and embrace modern ideas and values.
The New Culture Movement launched withering attacks on Confucianism, which had sustained the Qing dynasty beyond its usefulness and reinforced outdated social values like hierarchy, paternalism, obedience and unquestioning respect. New Culture writers supported the introduction of Western social and political concepts and values, including democracy, republicanism, self determination, equality and individual liberties. But New Culture advocates recognised these things were not achievable without a significant cultural shift among the Chinese. There could never be a democratic China, they argued, while political authority was reinforced by Confucian teachings, while tradition consistently blocked progress and while patriarchal family structures impeded individual freedoms and the rights of women. Writing in 1916 a Beijing professor said:
“A constitutional republic cannot be conferred by the government, cannot be maintained by one party or one group, and certainly cannot be carried on the backs of a few dignitaries and influential elders. A constitutional republic that does not derive [its authority] from the … majority of the people is a bogus republic and bogus constitutionalism. It is political window-dressing, in no way like the republican constitutionalism of the countries of Europe and America, because there has been no change in the thought or the character of the people.”
The May Fourth Movement that erupted in 1919 was a show of youthful support for the New Culture Movement, as well as a surge of Chinese nationalism. It was triggered by the publication of the draft Treaty of Versailles, the peace agreement that formally ended World War I. Yuan Shikai’s government had supported the Allies in the war, on the condition that foreign spheres of influence in China be abolished. But by 1919 China had no effective national government, so Chinese negotiators in France found it difficult to push their claims. Chinese interests were consequently overlooked in the Versailles treaty, which handed Germany’s sphere of influence in Shandong over to the Japanese. Angered by China’s shoddy treatment in Paris, and encouraged and supported by many of their professors, radical students at Beijing University began to mobilise. They drafted a manifesto condemning the Versailles treaty and the government representatives who failed to prevent it:
“Japan’s demand for the possession of Qingdao and other rights in Shandong is now going to be acceded to in the Paris Peace Conference. Her diplomacy has secured a great victory – and ours has led to a great failure… This is the last chance for China in her life and death struggle. Today we swear two solemn oaths with all our fellow countrymen. First, China’s territory may be conquered, but it cannot be given away. Second, the Chinese people may be massacred but they will not surrender. Our country is about to be annihilated. Up, brethren!”
On May 4th 1919 students from Beijing University and 12 other schools and universities gathered in the capitol. They drafted resolutions calling for a mass uprising to oppose the Japanese occupation of Shandong. More than 3,000 protestors assembled in Tiananmen Square, chanting nationalist slogans and urging the Beiyang government not to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The government responded by dispersing the protestors and arresting almost three dozen of its leaders. The following day Beijing students went on strike, an action quickly replicated by students in other parts of China. In early June up to 100,000 industrial workers in Shanghai declared a week-long general strike, angry at the government’s suppression of students in Beijing and the ongoing detention of student leaders. To the grievances of the students these striking workers added their own, demanding higher wages, better conditions and an end to exploitation. What began as a demonstration by students from one university had become a more expansive national movement involving students, organised labour and political groups. Tensions only eased after the government released student prisoners, sacked several key ministers and instructed its negotiators in Europe not to sign the Versailles treaty.
“May Fourth has become an extremely important but ambiguous notion in all discussions of modern Chinese history. The Communists have sometimes gone so far as to trace the origins of their Party to May Fourth – they saw May Fourth as representing progressive, patriotic elements, as marking the emergence of the working class and as leading to ‘cultural revolution’ – then they treated May Fourth as the necessary condition for the appearance of the CCP. The Nationalists held ambivalent feelings about May Fourth, but the more reformist elements of the GMD identified with its themes of ‘enlightenment’.”
Peter Gue Zarrow, historian
The May Fourth Movement consequently achieved many of its objectives, however it failed to halt the Japanese takeover of Shandong. The cultural and ideological effects of May Fourth proved more telling. Before the events of 1919, many Chinese reformists had placed their faith in Western models of government and the promises of Chinese independence and self determination made by Western political leaders – but these promises had been broken in Paris. The Treaty of Versailles demonstrated clearly that China could not wait for Western nations to guide it into modernity. China was responsible for its own political development and its own fate. As a consequence, the May Fourth Movement energised and radicalised Chinese political movements. The Chinese Communist Party traces its origins back to the tumultuous weeks of mid-1919. Several notable CCP leaders, including party founder Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong himself, were involved in or affected by the May Fourth Movement.
1. The May Fourth Movement was a protest by thousands of students in May 1919, in response to China’s treatment in the Treaty of Versailles and the cession of Shandong to the Japanese.
2. The intellectual origins of this movement can be found in the New Culture Movement, a campaign of the 1910s that challenged the role of Confucianism and traditionalism in 20th century China.
3. The writers of the New Culture Movement argued that China could not modernise by clinging to Confucian values and old hierarchies. It had to embrace liberalism, democracy and science.
4. The May Fourth Movement of 1919 started as student protests against the terms of the Versailles treaty. It quickly expanded into a series of nationwide protests and strikes, leading to a backdown by the Beiyang government.
5. The New Culture and May Fourth Movements had a significant impact on Chinese political movements, which stopped looking for Western guidance and became more radical in their outlook and methods.
Unit IV
Nationalism and Revolution
Rise of Communist Party and KMT
The rise of the Chinese Communist Party
In the 1930s and 40s the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) clawed its way back from near obliteration to become the dominant party in China. It is now the second largest political party in the world. But how did it do it?
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), second in size only to the Indian People’s Party, has shaped modern politics. Whether seen as a challenge to Western democracy or as a mechanism to rejuvenate the world order, there is no denying it has established itself as a dominant global power.
But it wasn’t always this way.
In the mid-1930s, the CCP was fighting for survival as the smaller of two political parties in China. What happened to turn the fate of the party around?
At the Crafts Lecture 2023, James Kai-Sing Kung (University of Hong Kong) shared his findings on the dramatic fall and rise of the party in the 1930s and 40s. His data, collected with co-author Ting Chen, tells a story of violent circumstance and the rise of nationalism.
The tussle for power in 1930s China
The CCP started out as an urban movement. Strongly influenced by the Communism of the Soviets, its leaders sought to attract membership from labour unions and industrial workers.
But competition for the hearts and minds of these groups was fierce. While the CCP managed to gain some new members, especially from student audiences, it couldn’t match the strength of the dominant political party of the era, the Kuomintang, or KMT.
The KMT was, however, unsettled enough by the rising membership of the CCP to seek to silence it. From 1927 an intermittent civil war between the KMT-led government and the CCP broke out, driving the CCP first out of urban areas into rural towns and villages, then much further across the country.
The CCP’s retreat to rural areas forced it to re-evaluate its approach. In terms of numbers, the opportunity for expansion was good. While there were 2 million workers in urban areas, there were around 200 million peasants in the countryside. And as the CCP worked to establish itself in rural areas – ‘encircling the city with the countryside’ – it came to realise their importance for the cause.
It was after connecting with rural civilians that Mao Zedong, who had started to rise to prominence in the CCP, began to understand the complex ‘agrarian problem’: Most rural peasants were poor, but their landlords were not wealthy, so redistribution (to meet the ideals of communism) would not be simple. Mao also realised that hurting rich peasants could easily backfire, and that poor peasants would not invest in land they did not own.
The effort to understand the plight of rural peasants had some success. Between 1927 and 1934 CCP membership grew from around 40,000 to 400,000 members.
But success was short lived. In 1934, the KMT pushed the CCP back further still, forcing the famous Long March – a retreat of over 9000km across China.
CCP membership plummeted by 90%. The future of the party looked bleak.
Yet, in 1937, another bloody change of circumstance unexpectedly altered the fate of the CCP. Japan’s invasion of China (triggering the Second Sino-Japanese War) changed the balance of power between the KMT and the CCP, and set up the context for a meteoric rise in CCP membership.
Figure 1: Membership of the CCP grew rapidly at the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War
Japanese invasion, 1938
The invasion of Japan was fierce and bloody. Around 7.5 million civilians were killed (1.4% of the total population in 1934) and 2.2 million women were raped by Japanese forces.
The Japanese met government-led KMT forces head on, swiftly taking territory in the North of China and pushing the KMT south. The CCP on the other hand, already diminished from confrontation with the KMT, was not directly confronted by the Japanese. From locations dotted across the country it led guerrilla resistance. As the Japanese advanced, many CCP strongholds were enveloped inside Japanese occupied territory.
Kung and Chen show that this unique position behind the enemy lines made a big difference to membership of the CCP. They analyse three measures to understand the growth in CCP membership in the period 1937–45: the density of CCP middle to upper rank officials, the density of CCP martyr soldiers and the number of soldiers living in a CCP guerrilla base in 1940.
They find membership of the CCP grew incredibly quickly in the first three years of the Sino–Japanese war, from 40,000 to 800,000 members. But this growth was particularly concentrated in areas inside occupied territory.
Figure 2: The boundary of Japanese occupied territory and the location of KMT and CCP groups
Nationalism and the rise of the CCP
Kung and Chen suggest that the location of CCP forces in occupied territory created the context through which the CCP could win the support of the peasantry: by appealing to ideals of nationalism.
Nationalism had already gained interest among Chinese intellectuals after China’s defeat by the Japanese in 1894–5. It was an ideal Mao Zedong adopted throughout his political career. But before 1934, rural civilians were less engaged. For many poor peasants, day-to-day life was a more pressing concern than ideals of nationhood.
The Second Sino-Japanese war changed that. The shock of the invasion, and the fierce treatment of Chinese civilians by invading forces put rural civilians under new pressure. The situation made it easier for the CCP to promote Mao Zedong’s vision of nationalism: that the fate of the individual was bound up with the fate of the nation.
Kung and Chen’s data supports this theory. They find that the CCP gained strength in areas occupied by Japanese forces, which were suffering particularly from the effects of war. Significantly, war suffering (rape cases and deaths) had no effect on the rise of the CCP outside Japanese territory. This suggests that the presence of external Japanese forces made the CCP’s ideals of nationhood more appealing.
The effect of CCP local party building was stronger in Japanese-held territory too. The CCP has been characterised by many scholars as a group that was able to mobilise the people to support its anti-Japan cause. Kung and Chen’s data on the development of party groups, branches and committees shows that they were much more successful at mobilising the people within occupied territory.
The CCP also grew faster in areas governed by puppet troops. Having acquired a large territory in the North of China, the Japanese struggled to govern it effectively. They made use of 600,000 puppet troops (made up of KMT captive soldiers and remnants of local warlords) to maintain control. In occupied areas governed by these troops – where the invading army had a less forceful presence – the CCP grew rapidly. Interestingly, CCP growth was compromised in areas where the KMT was still present. It was the combination of invading forces and a dearth of other national parties that allowed the CCP to grow.
The persistence of Chinese nationalism
The results strongly suggest that the Japanese invasion of China offered the opportunity for the CCP to rise to power. The CCP’s nationalist sentiment and its ability to work within rural areas appealed to an embattled peasantry in occupied areas.
As a final test, Kung and Chen also consider the persistent effects of nationalism today. Taking data from six different attitude surveys collected across China, they find that nationalistic attitudes remain strongest in areas previously occupied by Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese war.
Figure 3: Nationalistic sentiment remains stronger in areas of China previously occupied by Japan
KMT
The Kuomintang (KMT) is a Chinese political party that ruled mainland China from 1927 to 1949 prior to its relocation to Taiwan as a result of the Chinese Civil War. The name of the party translates as “China’s National People’s Party” and was historically referred to as the Chinese Nationalists. The Party was initially founded on 23 August 1912, by Sun Yat-sen but dissolved in November 1913. It reformed on October 10, 1919, again led by Sun Yat-sen, and became the ruling party in China. After Sun’s death, the party was dominated from 1927 to 1975 by Chiang Kai-shek. After the KMT lost the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, the party retreated to Taiwan and remains a major political party of the Republic of China based in Taiwan.
Founded in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen, the KMT helped topple the Qing dynasty and promoted modernization along Western lines. The party played a significant part in the first Chinese first National Assembly where it was the majority party. However the KMT failed to achieve complete control. The post of president was given to Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) as reward for his part in the revolution. Yuan Shikai abused his powers, overriding the constitution and creating strong tensions between himself and the other parties. In July 1913, the KMT staged a ‘Second Revolution’ to depose Yuan. This failed and the following crack down by Yuan led to the dissolution of the KMT and the exile of its leadership, mostly to Japan. Subsequently, Yuan Shikai had himself made Emperor of China.
In exile, Sun Yat-sen and other former KMT members founded several revolutionary parties under various names but with little success. These parties were united by Sun in 1919 under the title “The Kuomintang of China”. The new party returned to Guangzhou in China in 1920 where it set up a government but failed to achieve control of all of China. After the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916, China fractured into many regions controlled by warlords. To strengthen the party’s position, it accepted aid and support from the Soviet Union and its Comintern. The fledgling Chinese Communist Party was encouraged to join the KMT and thus formed the First United Front. The KMT gradually increased its sphere of influence from its Guangzhou base. Sun Yat-sen died in 1925 and Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) became the KMT strong man. In 1926 Chiang led a military operation known as the Northern Expedition against the warlords that controlled much of the country. In 1927, Chiang instigated the April 12 Incident in Shanghai in which the Chinese Communist Party and Communist elements of the KMT were purged. The Northern Expedition proved successful and the KMT party came to power throughout China (except Manchuria) in 1927 under the leadership of Chiang. The capital of China was moved to Nanjing in order to be closer to the party’s strong base in southern China.
The party was always concerned with strengthening Chinese identity at the same time it was discarding old traditions in the name of modernity. In 1929, the KMT government suppressed the textbook Modern Chinese History, widely used in secondary education. The Nationalists were concerned that, by not admitting the existence of the earliest emperors in ancient Chinese history, the book would weaken the foundation of the state. The case of the Modern Chinese History textbook reflects the symptoms of the period: banning the textbook strengthened the Nationalists’ ideological control but also revealed their fear of the New Culture Movement and its more liberal ideological implications. The KMT tried to destroy the Communist party of Mao Zedong, but was unable to stop the invasion by Japan, which controlled most of the coastline and major cities, 1937–1945. Chiang Kai-shek secured massive military and economic aid from the United States, and in 1945 became one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, with a veto. The KMT governed most of China until it was defeated in the civil war by the Communists in 1949.
The leadership, the remaining army, and hundreds of thousands of businessmen and other supporters, two million in all, fled to Taiwan. They continued to operate there as the “Republic of China” and dreamed of invading and reconquering what they called “mainland China”. The United States, however, set up a naval cordon after 1950 that has since prevented an invasion in either direction. The KMT kept the island under martial law for 38 years under rule by Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (1910–1988). As the original leadership died off, it made a peaceful transition to democracy, with full election of parliament in the early 1990s and first direct presidential election in 1996. After a defeat by the Democratic Progressive Party in 2000, the KMT returned to power in the elections of 2008 and 2012.
Early years
The Kuomintang traces its roots to the Revive China Society, which was founded in 1895 and merged with several other anti-monarchist societies as the Revolutionary Alliance in 1905. After the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution and the founding of the Republic of China, the Kuomintang was formally established on 25 August 1912 at the Huguang Guild Hall in Beijing where the Revolutionary Alliance and several smaller revolutionary groups joined to contest the first National Assembly elections. Sun Yat-sen, who had just stepped down as provisional president of the Republic of China, was chosen as its overall leader under the title of premier, and Huang Xing was chosen as Sun’s deputy. However, the most influential member of the party was the third ranking Song Jiaoren, who mobilized mass support from gentry and merchants for the KMT on a platform of promoting constitutional parliamentary democracy. Though the party had an overwhelming majority in the first National Assembly, President Yuan Shikai started ignoring the parliamentary body in making presidential decisions, counter to the Constitution, and assassinated its parliamentary leader Song Jiaoren in Shanghai in 1913. Members of the KMT led by Sun Yat-sen staged the Second Revolution in July 1913, a poorly planned and ill-supported armed rising to overthrow Yuan, and failed.
Yuan dissolved the KMT in November (whose members had largely fled into exile in Japan) and dismissed the parliament early in 1914. Yuan Shikai proclaimed himself emperor in December 1915. While exiled in Japan in 1914, Sun established the Chinese Revolutionary Party, but many of his old revolutionary comrades, including Huang Xing, Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and Chen Jiongming, refused to join him or support his efforts in inciting armed uprising against Yuan Shikai. In order to join the Chinese Revolutionary Party, members must take an oath of personal loyalty to Sun, which many old revolutionaries regarded as undemocratic and contrary to the spirit of the revolution. Thus, many old revolutionaries did not join Sun’s new organization, and he was largely sidelined within the Republican movement during this period. Sun returned to China in 1917 to establish a rival government in Guangzhou, but was soon forced out of office and exiled to Shanghai. There, with renewed support, he resurrected the KMT on 10 October 1919, but under the name of the Chinese Kuomintang, as the old party had simply been called the Kuomintang. In 1920, Sun and the KMT were restored in Guangdong. In 1923, the KMT and its government accepted aid from the Soviet Union after being denied recognition by the western powers. Soviet advisers – the most prominent of whom was Mikhail Borodin, an agent of the Comintern – began to arrive in China in 1923 to aid in the reorganization and consolidation of the KMT along the lines of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, establishing a Leninist party structure that lasted into the 1990s. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was under Comintern instructions to cooperate with the KMT, and its members were encouraged to join while maintaining their separate party identities, forming the First United Front between the two parties.
Soviet advisers also helped the Nationalists set up a political institute to train propagandists in mass mobilization techniques, and in 1923 Chiang Kai-shek, one of Sun’s lieutenants from the Tongmenghui days, was sent to Moscow for several months’ military and political study. At the first party congress in 1924, which included non-KMT delegates such as members of the CCP, they adopted Sun’s political theory, which included the Three Principles of the People – nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood.
War with communists
Following the death of Sun Yat-sen, General Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the KMT leader and launched the Northern Expedition in 1926 to defeat the northern warlords and unite China under the party. He halted briefly in Shanghai in 1927 to purge the Communists who had been allied with the KMT, which sparked the Chinese Civil War. When Kuomintang forces took Beijing, as the city was the de jure internationally recognized capital, though previously controlled by the feuding warlords, this event allowed the Kuomintang to receive widespread diplomatic recognition in the same year. The capital was moved from Beijing to Nanjing, the original capital of the Ming Dynasty, and thus a symbolic purge of the final Qing elements. This period of KMT rule in China between 1927 and 1937 became known as the Nanjing decade.
In sum, the KMT began as a heterogeneous group advocating American-inspired federalism and provincial independence. However, after its reorganization along Soviet lines, the party aimed to establish a centralized one-party state with one ideology – Three Principles of the People. This was even more evident following Sun’s elevation into a cult figure after his death. The control by one single party began the period of “political tutelage,” whereby the party was to control the government while instructing the people on how to participate in a democratic system. After several military campaigns and with the help of German military advisors (German planned fifth “extermination campaign”), the Communists were forced to withdraw from their bases in southern and central China into the mountains in a massive military retreat known famously as the Long March, an undertaking which would eventually increase their reputation among the peasants. Out of the 86,000 Communist soldiers that broke out of the pocket, only 20,000 would make the 10,000 km march to Shaanxi province. The Kuomintang continued to attack the Communists. This was in line with Chiang’s policy of solving internal conflicts (warlords and communists) before fighting external invasions (Japan). However, Zhang Xueliang, who believed that the Japanese invasion constituted the greater prevailing threat, took Chiang hostage during the Xi’an Incident in 1937 and forced Chiang to agree to an alliance with the Communists in the total war against the Japanese. The Second Sino-Japanese War had officially started, and would last until the Japanese surrender in 1945. However, in many situations the alliance was in name only; after a brief period of cooperation, the armies began to fight the Japanese separately, rather than as coordinated allies. Conflicts between KMT and communists were still common during the war, and documented claims of Communist attacks upon the KMT forces, and vice versa, abound.
In these incidents, the KMT armies typically utilized more traditional tactics while the Communists chose guerilla tactics, leading to KMT claims that the Communists often refused to support the KMT troops, choosing to withdraw and let the KMT troops take the brunt of Japanese attacks. These same guerilla tactics, honed against the Japanese forces, were used to great success later during open civil war, as well as the Allied forces in the Korean War and the U.S. forces in the Vietnam War.
1945–49
Full-scale civil war between the Communists and KMT resumed after the defeat of Japan. The Communist armies, previously a minor faction, grew rapidly in influence and power due to several errors on the KMT’s part: first, the KMT reduced troop levels precipitously after the Japanese surrender, leaving large numbers of able-bodied, trained fighting men who became unemployed and disgruntled with the KMT as prime recruits for the Communists.
Second, the collapse of the KMT regime can in part be attributed to the government’s economic policies, which triggered capital flight among the businessmen who had been the KMT’s strongest supporters. The cotton textile industry was the leading sector of Chinese industry, but in 1948, shortages of raw cotton plunged the industry into dire straits. The KMT government responded with an aggressive control policy that directly procured cotton from producers to ensure a sufficient supply and established a price freeze on cotton thread and textiles. This policy failed because of resistance from cotton textile industrialists, who relocated textile facilities and capital to Hong Kong or Taiwan around the end of 1948 and early 1949 when prices soared and inflation spiraled out of control. Their withdrawal of support was a shattering blow to the morale of the KMT.
Among the most despised and ineffective efforts it undertook to contain inflation was the conversion to the gold standard for the national treasury and the Gold Standard Script in August 1948, outlawing private ownership of gold, silver, and foreign exchange, collecting all such precious metals and foreign exchange from the people and issuing the Gold Standard Script in exchange. The new script became worthless in only ten months and greatly reinforced the nationwide perception of KMT as a corrupt or at best inept entity. Third, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his forces to defend the urbanized cities. This decision gave the Communists a chance to move freely through the countryside. At first, the KMT had the edge with the aid of weapons and ammunition from the United States. However, with hyperinflation and other economic ills, widespread corruption, the KMT continued to lose popular support. At the same time, the suspension of American aid and tens of thousands of deserted or decommissioned soldiers being recruited to the Communist cause tipped the balance of power quickly to the Communist side, and the overwhelming popular support for the Communists in most of the country made it all but impossible for the KMT forces to carry out successful assaults against the Communists. By the end of 1949, the Communists controlled almost all of mainland China, as the KMT retreated to Taiwan with a significant amount of China’s national treasures and 2 million people, including military forces and refugees. Some party members stayed in the mainland and broke away from the main KMT to found the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, which still currently exists as one of the eight minor registered parties in the People’s Republic of China.
After 1949
In the early 1950s, defeated KMT forces entered Burma, retreating into the hills of the Wa region. Communist forces pursued them. With support from the United States, the Nationalist forces reorganized and from 1950 to 1952, launched unsuccessful attacks into Yunnan, China. In 1953, Burma’s government raised this violation of its sovereignty by the Chinese Nationalists to the United Nations.
After the KMT guerillas treated into the Kokang region, the Burmese government obtained the assistance of Olive Yang and the Kokang Kakweye to force the guerillas out of Kokang. Yang and the Kokang Kakweye succeeded in 1953, but then collaborated with the Kuomintang in trafficking opium to Thailand throughout the 1950s; the KMT continued to use these opium routes for decades.
Establishment of First united Front
The First United Front (a.k.a. the KMT–CPC Alliance) of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) was formed in 1922 as an alliance to end warlordism in China. Together, they formed the National Revolutionary Army and set out in 1926 on the Northern Expedition. The CPC joined the KMT as individuals, making use of KMT’s superiority in numbers to help spread communism. The KMT, on the other hand, wanted to control the communists from within. Both parties had their own aims and the Front was unsustainable. In 1927, Nationalist Field Marshal (Generalissimo) Chiang Kai-shek purged the Communists from the Front while the Northern Expedition was still half-complete. This initiated a civil war between the two parties which lasted until the Second United Front was formed in 1936 to prepare for the coming Second Sino-Japanese War.
The resurrection of Kuomintang
During the time of warlords Sun Yat-sen kept the idea of a united Chinese republic alive. Sun’s goal was to establish a rival government in Guangzhou, southern China, and go from there to fight against the warlords in the North and their Beiyang government. Upon his return from exile in 1917, Sun revived his banned nationalist party, the Kuomintang, but this time he gave it the new name, the Kuomintang of China. His plan was that after defeating the warlords the party would guide China until the country would be ready to move to democracy. The rival government led by Sun, however, was at a disadvantage against the warlords from a military point of view. Despite his requests for aid from the West, the badly needed financial and arm support never arrived in the country. In the 1920s the Kuomintang eventually received helped from a surprising source: the Russian Bolsheviks. Material aid from Russia was good enough for Sun, who had previously shown flexibility when the question was about the promotion of the republic. He had neither sympathy towards Marxism, nor did he see communism as a solution to China’s problems. In Sun’s view China was not of the rich and the poor, rather, it was the country of the poor and the poorer. The guidelines of the Kuomintang were based on Sun’s “three principles of the people”: nationalism, democracy and public welfare.
The Kuomintang gradually became a powerful and disciplined party under Russian guidance. The decisive factor was the Bolshevik assistance to the Kuomintang in the formation of its own army, the National Revolutionary Army. In order to train the army the Whampoa Military Academy was established near Guangzhou. As its director, Sun appointed his loyal supporter, Chiang Kai-shek, who received his military and political education in Moscow. Financially the Whampoa Military Academy operated with the support of the Soviet Union. The quality of education was guaranteed by regularly visiting Russian officers. Many of the leaders of both the Kuomintang and the Chinese communist party graduated from the academy. Also, the chief commander of the People’s Liberation Army, Lin Biao graduated from Whampoa. Zhou Enlai, who later became prime minister had worked for the academy as well.
Together against the warlords and imperialists
The Soviet Union had its own interests in supporting the Kuomintang. The Bolsheviks, in exchange for the help, demanded the Kuomintang to form an alliance with the Chinese communists. Moscow was not convinced that the communist party alone would be able to complete the revolution in the country, which was thought to be ready for communism right after the bourgeoisie felled the old Chinese dynastic system. China’s newly founded communist party had only a few hundred members at the beginning of the 1920s, whereas the Kuomintang had over fifty thousand. The idea was, that the communists would gain broader support by joining the common front with the nationalists, after which they would eventually take over from the Kuomintang. At the request of the Russians, the Chinese communists – among them Mao Zedong – became the members of the Kuomintang, and thus the first coalition of the two parties was born.
With the help of the Soviet Union the Kuomintang did succeed in gaining more support and with renewed vehemence it continued to vigorously pursue its goal, the foundation of the republic. Securing its strong hold on Southern China, the Kuomintang was ready to unite the country by launching a military campaign against the North. The coalition with the communists, however, was a forced union, held together only by their common enemies – the warlords and imperialism. After the death of Sun Yatsen in 1925 the cooperation began to weaken, and the right wing of the Kuomintang soon put an end to the brotherhood with the Soviet Union and the Chinese communists.
Fall
The First United Front was formed so the KMT and the CCP could join together to help China. The initial aim was to help defeat the warlord threat (through the northern expedition, 1926–28), but both parties actually had ulterior motives with this alliance. The CCP formed it mainly so they could spread Communism through the KMT’s numbers, whilst Chiang’s aim for this formation was to help control the Communist party from the inside. Having said that, Chiang was also the main reason the relationship fell apart due to his desire to control the Communist party, ultimately leading to the disintegration of the United Front. All of this was further by Chiang’s decision to kill a large amount of Communist forces in mid-1927, which is aptly called the Shanghai massacre. The Shanghai massacre was considered a purge initiated by Chiang, which was also halfway through the Northern Expedition. Chiang wanted to control all of China, controlling the Communist party would make this a lot easier for him. Also, note that this United Front was first formed when Sun Yat-sen was still alive, in 1923 (died March 1925). Sun mainly agreed to this so he could receive aid from the Soviet Union. But Chiang ultimately ruined this by purging the communists, which resulted in a civil war that ended when they formed the Second United Front to combat the Japanese.
Chiang Kai Shek and KMT
Chinese military and political leader Chiang Kai-shek joined the Chinese Nationalist Party (known as the Kuomintang, or KMT) in 1918. Succeeding party founder Sun Yat-sen as KMT leader in 1925, he expelled Chinese communists from the party and led a successful unification of China. Despite a professed focus on reform, Chiang’s government concentrated on battling Communism within China as well as confronting Japanese aggression. When the Allies declared war on Japan in 1941, China took its place among the Big Four. Civil war broke out in 1946, ending in a victory by Mao Zedong’s Communist forces and the creation of the People’s Republic of China. From 1949 until his death, Chiang led the KMT government in exile in Taiwan, which many countries continued to recognize as China’s legitimate government.
Chiang Kai-shek’s Early Life and Career
Born in the coastal province of Chekiang on October 31, 1887, Chiang ran away from home after his father died and joined the provincial army. He received formal military training at the Paoting Military Academy in northern China, and later in Japan. When uprisings against the ruling Qing (Manchu) dynasty broke out in China in 1911, Chiang returned home and joined the struggle, which ended in the overthrow of the Manchus and the formation of a Chinese republic. In 1918, he joined the Nationalist Party (known as the Kuomintang, or KMT), founded by Sun Yat-sen.
Chiang Kai-shek’s second wife, Soong Mei-ling, became a significant political figure in her own right. In addition to her address of Congress in 1943, the Wellesley-educated “Madame Chiang” wrote many articles on China for the American press.
With Sun’s support, Chiang founded a military academy at Whampoa, near Canton, in 1924. He began to build up the Nationalist army, based on methods Chiang observed during a visit to the Soviet Union. During this same time, Chinese Communists were admitted into the KMT; after Sun’s death in 1925, they began to clash with more conservative party elements. As Sun’s successor, Chiang led a successful military campaign against local warlords in northern China and consolidated control within his own party by expelling the Communists in a brutal coup in 1927. In 1928, he formed a new central government out of Nanking, with himself as head of state.
Chiang Kai-Shek: Internal and External Conflict in China
Chiang sought to institute a modest program of reforms, including financial and educational reforms, infrastructure improvements and a revival of Confucianism, supported by the “New Life Movement” campaign. The bulk of his government’s energies and resources, however, were focused on threats to its own stability from within and outside of China. The Communists were operating their own opposition government from rural strongholds, while war with Japan–which seized Manchuria in 1931–seemed imminent. Chiang initially focused on the communist threat rather than confront Japan directly, a choice that angered many of his supporters. In the Sian (Xian) Incident of December 1936, one of his generals seized Chiang and held him captive for two weeks until he agreed to ally with Mao Zedong’s Communist forces against Japan.
Japan invaded China the following year, sparking the Sino-Japanese War. China fought Japan on its own for more than four years, until the Allies (with the exception of the Soviet Union) declared war on Japan in 1941. For its efforts, China earned inclusion among the Big Four powers, and Chiang’s international reputation skyrocketed. In 1943, his Western-educated wife, Soong Mei-ling, became the first Chinese and only the second woman to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress, when she asked for increased U.S. aid for China in the Sino-Japanese War. At the same time, however, Chiang’s government was losing a good deal of support within the country itself, thanks to his relative passivity toward Japan and increasingly conservative policies that favored landowners and mercantile interests and alienated peasants (who made up nearly 90 percent of the Chinese population).
Chiang Kai-Shek: Civil War and Government in Exile
In 1946, a year after Japan’s surrender, civil war broke out in China between KMT and Communist forces. With the Communist victory in mainland China in 1949, Mao declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Upon his defeat, Chiang fled with the remnants of his Nationalist government to Taiwan, which had been turned over to the Nationalist government after the defeat of Japan according to terms agreed upon in Cairo in 1943. Backed by American aid, Chiang launched Taiwan on the path of economic modernization, and in 1955 the United States signed an agreement guaranteeing Taiwan’s defense. Many countries continued to recognize Chiang’s government in exile as the legitimate Chinese government, and it would control China’s seat in the United Nations until Chiang’s death.
From 1972 onward, however, Taiwan’s preferred status (especially in relation to the United States) was threatened by improving U.S.-China relations. In 1979, four years after Chiang died, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established full relations with the People’s Republic of China.
The Nanjing Decade 1928-37
The Nanjing Decade refers to a period of relatively stable government in China between 1928 and 1937. During this time China was reunified, at least in name, and most of the nation was governed by Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang. Jiang’s government attempted to construct and consolidate a second Chinese republic, with a more durable political system and policies to facilitate national development. But the Nationalist government faced several challenges, some of them exceedingly difficult. The first years of its rule were marred by continued internecine violence, as Jiang struggled to subdue hostile warlords. Attempts to create a modern state were hindered by the government’s continued lack of authority and control in many parts of China. Because of this, Jiang’s program of state-building, political tutelage and economic reform achieved only patchy results, while both the government and the Guomindang became increasingly militaristic. To outsiders in the West, the dapper and well-spoken Jiang Jieshi and his party seemed to embody the new China: civilised, progressive and willing to embrace modern political and economic values. But beneath the facade and outside the Guomindang-controlled cities, there was only limited change.
Though the National Revolutionary Army is often credited with unifying China in 1928, this unity was relative rather than absolute. The Northern Expedition was hailed by Guomindang propaganda as an unmitigated success. In some regions, however, the government’s influence ranged from patchy to almost non-existent. In the northern provinces, the Nationalist government relied on alliances Jiang had forged with warlords like Feng Yuxiang (Zhili) and Zhang Xueliang (Manchuria). But within a year Feng, Zhang and other warlords were bickering with Jiang over issues of political control and military organisation. By early 1930 several warlords had formed a clique that demanded Jiang’s resignation as president of China. In May 1930 these tensions led to the outbreak of the Central Plains War. Jiang’s 600,000-strong Nationalist army, equipped with Western-supplied aircraft and artillery, marched into central and northern China. Outnumbered and outgunned, the warlord coalition was defeated in less than six months. The Central Plains War was a victory for Jiang but it took a toll on his government, draining it of money and resources. It also distracted Jiang from taking more decisive action against the communist Soviet taking shape in Jiangxi. The Central Plains War exposed the fragility of Chinese unification and Guomindang authority. Another side effect of Jiang’s victory was that warlord armies in Manchuria were weakened or dispersed, removing an obstacle to Japanese infiltration and invasion there during the mid-1930s.
China’s political development under the Guomindang was to follow a model outlined by Sun Yixian in the early 1920s. According to Sun, the new republic would transition through three distinct stages. In the first stage, republican government would require several years of military rule to suppress warlordism, consolidate national unity and strengthen authority. The second phase, called political tutelage, would be a period of one-party rule under the Guomindang. During this period the party would govern autocratically while educating and preparing the people for participation in democratic elections and self-government. Sun believed the program of political tutelage would take approximately six years to complete, after which China would become a constitutional democracy, its third and final stage.
The Guomindang announced the formal commencement of political tutelage in 1929, however, this program was never fully completed. Continued opposition from hostile warlords, from communists and later from the Japanese prolonged military rule into the late 1930s. Both the Guomindang party structure and the government itself became increasingly militarised, a culture shift not helped by Jiang Jieshi’s own fascination with militarism and fascism. In 1934 the Guomindang government introduced censorship of the press, books and films; at least two newspaper editors were murdered for criticising Jiang’s government. Under the auspices of political tutelage, the Nationalists frequently trammelled on freedom of expression and other civil liberties. Guomindang ideologues tried to justify this by arguing that Chinese history, unlike the West, had no precedent or tradition of human rights. The rights of individuals, they claimed, were subordinate to the development of the nation.
The Nanjing Decade was also marked by attempts to facilitate economic development and modernisation. The Nationalists introduced policies to stimulate economic growth, industrialisation and private investment. In most cases, however, the government lacked the resources, authority and political will to achieve signification economic reforms. Some more successful changes included the formation of a reserve bank, the Central Bank of China, established in 1928. The government also moved to standardise currency values by issuing a national currency, based on paper banknotes rather than silver coins. In some regions, the government spent heavily on infrastructure, including highways, railways, public buildings, electrification, sewers, water storages and conduits and street lighting. But Nanjing’s refusal to impose a Western-style taxation system and levy corporate or income taxes meant it was chronically short of cash. By the mid-1930s, government revenue was barely three per cent of the gross national product – and a good portion of this revenue was derived from duties on opium sales. Approximately 47 per cent of revenue collected by the Guomindang was used to fund and supply the military, purchase foreign weapons or pay off warlord allies. In contrast, less than five per cent was spent on education programs and almost nothing on social welfare. Corruption was rife in all levels of the Nanjing government and its bureaucracy. There were thousands of accounts of bribery, extortion and ‘skimming’.
Jiang Jieshi attempted to support his political, military and economic policies by manipulating social and cultural attitudes. In early 1934 Jiang, supported by his wife Soong Mei-Ling, initiated Xinshenghuo Yundong, or the New Life Movement. He called for the “social regeneration” of the nation to combat the “twin evils” of communism and corruption. The new republic would flourish, said Jiang, if its citizens adhered to conservative values that emphasised individual morality, responsibility, propriety, righteousness and honesty. In essence, the New Life Movement was an attempt to revive traditional Confucian values and give them some legitimacy in a modern context. It also reflected Jiang’s interest in European fascism and militarism (some later dubbed it ‘Confucian fascism’). Like European fascism, the New Life Movement sought to reinforce Jiang’s authority by fostering loyalty and obedience to a single leader. During 1934-35 the New Life Movement was integrated into government policy and propaganda. The Guomindang pushed the movement and its values extensively in printed material, public rallies and parades and changes to school curricula. But despite this government backing, the New Life Movement failed to gain widespread public support. Within government-controlled regions many recognised the New Life Movement for what it was; outside these regions, it was mostly ignored.
“During the Nanjing Decade, building a modern state seemed impossible, as the government was trapped in practices that had characterised the warlord years and, before that, the imperial government. Militarism and its control over finances were hard to overcome. At the same time, the relationship between state and private economy appeared to be following patterns developed in the late Qing Self-Strengthening period, when reforms had been implemented by informal networks of officials and private entrepreneurs.”
Margherita Zanasi, historian
Another enduring problem during the Nanjing Decade was the revival of the opium trade. During the Warlord Era the weak Beiyang government declared a token ban on the narcotic, however, opium was far too lucrative for powerful warlords to ignore, so its manufacture and trade flourished. By the mid-1920s, China was the world’s largest source of opium, producing more than 80 per cent of the world’s supply. Both Sun Yixian and Jiang Jieshi condemned the opium trade, describing it as a national economic addiction on top of a social-physiological addition. The Nationalist government backed anti-opium movements and rallies and in 1929 launched the Six-Year Opium Suppression Campaign. Jiang later became head of this campaign, while his New Life Movement also preached against opium use.
But while Jiang and the Nationalists were free with their condemnations of opium, behind the scenes many Nationalists encouraged, supported and benefited from the opium trade. Nanjing itself was too addicted to opium-derived revenue. Unofficial estimates suggest the opium trade yielded as much as $US100 million in government income each year. The Nationalist government did conduct numerous raids and crackdowns on opium farming and selling – but most of these campaigns targeted opium growers and traders operating outside government control. In other words, they were carried out to eliminate opposition and enforce a state monopoly on the opium trade, not to halt it altogether. During the Nanjing Decade, widespread opium production continued in the remote south-western provinces of Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan, with some high growth pockets in Manchuria, Fujian, Shaanxi and western Hunan.
1. The Nanjing Decade describes a period of relative unity and government stability, under Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang, between 1928 and 1937.
2. After the success of the Northern Expedition, Jiang’s military campaign to reunify China, Jiang and the Nationalists established a national government with a capital in Nanjing.
3. In line with the writings of Sun Yixian, the Nanjing Decade was considered a period of transition, beginning with military dictatorship followed by a period of political tutelage.
4. The Nationalist government attempted reforms to facilitate industrial growth and economic modernisation. These were only partly successful.
5. The Nanjing government was hindered by a lack of government authority across China, resource shortages and internal problems such as widespread corruption and opium trading.
Mao Zedong and CPC
Mao Zedong (Dec. 26, 1893–Sept. 9, 1976), the father of modern China, is not only remembered for his impact on Chinese society and culture but for his global influence, including on political revolutionaries in the United States and the Western world in the 1960s and 1970s. He is widely considered one of the most prominent communist theoreticians. He was also known as a great poet.
Fast Facts: Mao Zedong
- Known For: Founding father of the People’s Republic of China, ruling the country as Chairman of the Communist Party of China from 1949 until 1976
- Also Known As: Mao Tse Tung, Mao Zedong, Chairman Mao
- Born: Dec. 26, 1893 in Shaoshan, Hunan Province, China
- Parents: Mao Yichang, Wen Qimei
- Died: Sept. 9, 1976 in Beijing, People’s Republic of China
- Published Works: The Warlords Clash (poem, 1929), The Tasks of the Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan (1937), Mao’s Little Red Book (1964–1976)
- Spouse(s): Luo Yixiu, Yang Kaihui, He Zizhen, Jiang Qing
- Children: Mao Anying, Mao Anqing, Mao Anlong, Yang Yuehua, Li Min, Li Na
- Notable Quote: “Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.”
Early Life
On Dec. 26, 1893, a son was born to the Mao family, wealthy farmers in Shaoshan, Hunan Province, China. They named the boy Mao Zedong.
The child studied Confucian classics at the village school for five years but left at the age of 13 to help out full-time on the farm. Rebellious and probably spoiled, young Mao had been expelled from several schools and even ran away from home for several days.
In 1907, Mao’s father arranged a marriage for his 14-year-old son. Mao refused to acknowledge his 20-year-old bride, even after she moved into the family home.
Education and Introduction to Marxism
Mao moved to Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province, to continue his education. He spent six months in 1911 and 1912 as a soldier in the barracks at Changsha, during the revolution that overthrew the Qing Dynasty. Mao called for Sun Yatsen to be president and cut off his long braid of hair (queue), a sign of anti-Manchu revolt.
Between 1913 and 1918, Mao studied at the Teachers’ Training School, where he began to embrace ever more revolutionary ideas. He was fascinated by the 1917 Russian Revolution, and by the 4th century BCE Chinese philosophy called Legalism.
After graduation, Mao followed his professor Yang Changji to Beijing, where he took a job at the Beijing University library. His supervisor, Li Dazhao, was a co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party and greatly influenced Mao’s developing revolutionary ideas.
Gathering Power
In 1920 Mao married Yang Kaihui, the daughter of his professor, despite his earlier marriage. He read a translation of The Communist Manifesto that year and became a committed Marxist.
Six years later, the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang, under Chiang Kai-shek massacred at least 5,000 communists in Shanghai. This was the start of China’s Civil War. That fall, Mao led the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Changsha against the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT crushed Mao’s peasant army, killing 90% of them and forcing the survivors out into the countryside, where they rallied more peasants to their cause.
In June 1928, the KMT took Beijing and was recognized as the official government of China by foreign powers. Mao and the Communists continued to set up peasant Soviets in the southern Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces, however. He was laying the foundations of Maoism.
The Chinese Civil War
A local warlord in Changsha captured Mao’s wife, Yang Kaihui, and one of their sons in October 1930. She refused to denounce communism, so the warlord had her beheaded in front of her 8-year-old son. Mao had married a third wife, He Zizhen, in May of that year.
In 1931, Mao was elected chairman of the Soviet Republic of China, in Jiangxi Province. Mao ordered a reign of terror against landlords; perhaps more than 200,000 were tortured and killed. His Red Army, made up mostly of poorly armed but fanatical peasants, numbered 45,000.
Under increasing KMT pressure, Mao was demoted from his leadership role. Chiang Kai-shek’s troops surrounded the Red Army in the mountains of Jiangxi, forcing them to make a desperate escape in 1934.
The Long March and Japanese Occupation
About 85,000 Red Army troops and followers retreated from Jiangxi and started walking the 6,000-kilometer arc to the northern province of Shaanxi. Beset by freezing weather, dangerous mountain paths, unbridged rivers, and attacks by warlords and the KMT, only 7,000 of the communists made it to Shaanxi in 1936.
This Long March cemented Mao Zedong’s position as leader of the Chinese communists. He was able to rally the troops despite their dire situation.
In 1937, Japan invaded China. The Chinese Communists and the KMT halted their civil war to meet this new threat, which lasted through Japan’s 1945 defeat in World War II.
Japan captured Beijing and the Chinese coast, but never occupied the interior. Both of China’s armies fought on; the communists’ guerrilla tactics were particularly effective. Meanwhile, in 1938, Mao divorced He Zizhen and married the actress Jiang Qing, later known as “Madame Mao.”
Civil War Resumes and the Founding of the PRC
Even as he led the fight against the Japanese, Mao was planning to seize power from his erstwhile allies, the KMT. Mao codified his ideas in a number of pamphlets, including On Guerrilla Warfare and On Protracted War. In 1944, the United States sent the Dixie Mission to meet Mao and the communists; the Americans found the communists better organized and less corrupt than the KMT, which had been receiving western support.
After World War II ended, the Chinese armies started to fight again in earnest. The turning point was the 1948 Siege of Changchun, in which the Red Army, now called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), defeated the Kuomintang’s army in Changchun, Jilin Province.
By October 1, 1949, Mao felt confident enough to declare the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. On December 10, the PLA besieged the final KMT stronghold at Chengdu, Sichuan. On that day, Chiang Kai-shek and other KMT officials fled the mainland for Taiwan.
Five Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward
From his new home next to the Forbidden City, Mao directed radical reforms in China. Landlords were executed, perhaps as many as 2-5 million across the country, and their land was redistributed to poor peasants. Mao’s “Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries” claimed at least 800,000 additional lives, mostly former KMT members, intellectuals, and businessmen.
In the Three-Anti/Five-Anti Campaigns of 1951-52, Mao directed the targeting of wealthy people and suspected capitalists, who were subjected to public “struggle sessions.” Many who survived the initial beatings and humiliation later committed suicide.
Between 1953 and 1958, Mao launched the First Five-Year Plan, intending to make China an industrial power. Buoyed by his initial success, Chairman Mao launched the Second Five-Year Plan, called the “Great Leap Forward,” in January 1958. He urged farmers to smelt iron in their yards, rather than tending the crops. The results were disastrous; an estimated 30-40 million Chinese starved in the Great Famine of 1958-60.
Foreign Policies
Shortly after Mao took power in China, he sent the “People’s Volunteer Army” into the Korean War to fight alongside the North Koreans against the South Koreans and United Nations forces. The PVA saved Kim Il-Sung’s army from being overrun, resulting in a stalemate that continues to this day.
In 1951, Mao also sent the PLA into Tibet to “liberate” it from the Dalai Lama’s rule.
By 1959, China’s relationship with the Soviet Union had deteriorated markedly. The two communist powers disagreed on the wisdom of the Great Leap Forward, China’s nuclear ambitions, and the brewing Sino-Indian War (1962). By 1962, China and the USSR had cut off relations with one another in the Sino-Soviet Split.
Fall From Grace
In January 1962, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held a “Conference of the Seven Thousand” in Beijing. Conference chair Liu Shaoqi harshly criticized the Great Leap Forward, and by implication, Mao Zedong. Mao was pushed aside within the internal power structure of the CCP; moderate pragmatists Liu and Deng Xiaoping freed the peasants from communes and imported wheat from Australia and Canada to feed the famine survivors.
For several years, Mao served only as a figurehead in the Chinese government. He spent that time plotting a return to power and revenge on Liu and Deng.
Mao would use the specter of capitalist tendencies among the powerful, as well as the might and credulity of young people, to take power once again.
The Cultural Revolution
In August 1966, the 73-year-old Mao made a speech at the Plenum of the Communist Central Committee. He called for the youth of the country to take back the revolution from the rightists. These young “Red Guards” would do the dirty work in Mao’s Cultural Revolution, destroying the “Four Olds”—old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. Even a tea-room owner like President Hu Jintao’s father could be targeted as a “capitalist.”
While the nation’s students were busily destroying ancient artwork and texts, burning temples and beating intellectuals to death, Mao managed to purge both Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping from the party’s leadership. Liu died under horrific circumstances in prison; Deng was exiled to work in a rural tractor factory, and his son was thrown from a fourth-story window and paralyzed by Red Guards.
In 1969, Mao declared the Cultural Revolution complete, although it continued through his death in 1976. Later phases were directed by Jiang Qing (Madame Mao) and her cronies, known as the “Gang of Four.”
Failing Health and Death
Throughout the 1970s, Mao’s health steadily deteriorated. He may have been suffering from Parkinson’s disease or ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease), in addition to heart and lung trouble brought on by a lifetime of smoking.
By July 1976 when the country was in crisis due to the Great Tangshan Earthquake, the 82-year-old Mao was confined to a hospital bed in Beijing. He suffered two major heart attacks early in September, and died September 9, 1976, after being removed from life support.
Legacy
After Mao’s death, the moderate pragmatist branch of the Chinese Communist Party took power and ousted the leftist revolutionaries. Deng Xiaoping, now thoroughly rehabilitated, led the country toward an economic policy of capitalist-style growth and export wealth. Madame Mao and the other Gang of Four members were arrested and tried, essentially for all of the crimes associated with the Cultural Revolution.
Mao’s legacy today is a complicated one. He is known as the “Founding Father of Modern China,” and serves to inspire 21st-century rebellions like the Nepali and Indian Maoist movements. On the other hand, his leadership caused more deaths among his own people than that of Joseph Stalin or Adolph Hitler.
Within the Chinese Communist Party under Deng, Mao was declared to be “70% correct” in his policies. However, Deng also said that the Great Famine was “30% natural disaster, 70% human error.” Nonetheless, Mao Thought continues to guide policies to this day.
Growth of the Revolution from the Countryside 1927-1935
The year of 1927
On August 1, 1927, the Communist Party of China (CPC) launched an armed uprising in Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi Province. The Nanchang Uprising led by Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De and Liu Bocheng gave birth to the armed forces of the CPC and marked the beginning of CPC’s independent leadership over armed struggles.
On August 7, 1927, the CPC Central Committee convened a meeting on August 7 in Wuhan. At the meeting, the general principle of carrying out Agrarian Revolution and armed resistance against Kuomintang reactionaries was made.
On September 9, 1927, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the peasants living in the Hunan-Jiangxi border area launched the Autumn Harvest Uprising.
On September 29, 1927, Mao Zedong carried out experiment to “establish branches of the CPC at the level of companies” in the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops during the Sanwan Reorganization, which symbolized the beginning of an army of the Chinese people under the leadership of the CPC.
In October 1927, the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Mao Zedong arrived in the Jinggang Mountain area and created the first countryside revolutionary base area there.
On December 11, 1927, under the leadership of Zhang Tailei, Ye Ting, Yun Daiying and Ye Jianying, the armed workers and some troops commanded by the CPC launched an uprising in Guangzhou to fight against the Kuomintang rightists’ slaughter of members of the CPC and its supporters.
The year of 1928
In April 1928, led by Zhu De and Chen Yi, the workers’ and peasants’ revolutionary army composed of the remained troops of the Nanchang Uprising and the armed peasants from southern Hunan Province joined forces in the Jinggang Mountain with the workers’ and peasants’ revolutionary army established by Mao Zedong after the Autumn Harvest Uprising in the Hunan-Jiangxi border area.
In October 1928, the Central Military Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was set up.
On December 28 and 29, 1929, the 9th Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was held in Gutian Village, Shanghang County of Fujian Province, which was later called the Gutian Meeting. At the meeting, the fundamental principles of building the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army were established and the questions on how to build an army mainly composed of peasants into a new-type army of Chinese people under the absolute leadership of the CPC were answered. The Gutian Meeting is a milestone in the history of the building of the Communist Party of China and the army.
The year of 1930
In March 1930, the Central Military Department of the CPC was renamed the Central Military Commission of the CPC.
On August 23, 1930, the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was formed in Liuyang County, Hunan Province.
The year of 1931
On November 7, 1931, the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army came into being in Huang’an County, Hubei Province.
On November 25, 1931, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Soviet Republic of China was established in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province.
The year of 1932-1933
In December 1932, the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army marched to the northern Sichuan Province and started to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi Border Base Area.
On May 8, 1933, the general headquarters of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was set up.
On July 11, 1933, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic of China made a decision to set the August 1,the date of the Nanchang Uprising, as the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. Since then, the August 1 each year has become the Army Day of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
The year of 1934
In October 1934, the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army withdrew from the Central Base Area in Jiangxi Province and embarked on the Long March.
On November 16, 1934, the 25th Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army abandoned the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Border Base Area and started its Long March.
The year of 1935
From January 15 to 17, 1935, the Zunyi Meeting, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, was held at Zunyi, Guizhou Province during the Long March. The Zunyi Meeting organizationally ended the domination of Wang Ming’s “Left” adventurism in the CPC Central Committee, established the correct leadership of the new Central Committee represented by Mao Zedong,thus saving the Red Army and the CPC from destruction at a most critical juncture.
In March 1935, the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army launched the Jialin River Campaign and then evacuated the Sichuan-Shannxi Border Base Area to start the Long March.
On September 16, 1935, the 25th Army of the Red Army ended its Long March by joining force with the Red Army troops in northwest China at the Yongping Town of Yanchuna County of northern Shaanxi Province.
On October 19, 1935, the main force of the First Front Army of the Red Army led by the CPC Central Committee arrived at the Wuqi Town in northern Shaanxi Province, which was the terminal of the Long March.
From December 17 to 25, 1935, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged meeting to make the policy and strategic guide line of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
The year of 1936
On February 20, 1936, the anti-Japanese forces in different places in northeast China were reorganized into the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Forces.
On July 5, 1936, the 2nd and 6th Corps and the 32nd Army of the Red Army merged to form the Red Army’s Second Front Army in the Long March.
In July 1936, the 1st Route Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Forces was established.
In October 1936, the First , Second and the Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army jointed forces in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Area.
Second Sino-Japanese War and Success of Communist Revolution 1937-49
The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) had a significant impact on the course of the Chinese Revolution. Known in China as the ‘War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression’, it was a catastrophic conflict for the Chinese people, causing up to 20 million casualties. It also had serious political repercussions for the nationalist Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Japan’s invasion of China in the early 1930s and the war that followed capped off decades of antagonism between the two nations. The political and economic development of Japan stood in stark contrast to that of China. The Meiji Restoration of the late 19th century had propelled Japan into the modern world. The Japanese had tapped into Western knowledge to develop an industrialised economy. Japan’s military, once a barefoot army of samurai, was now a well trained Westernised armed force, equipped with modern weapons. Its government was dominated by militarists and expansionists who hoped to make Japan an Asian imperial power.
The First Sino-Japanese War erupted in August 1894 over control of the Korean peninsula. This war ended with a Japanese victory in a little over eight months, despite Japanese forces being greatly outnumbered by the Qing armies. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in April 1895, saw China surrender control of the Liaodong peninsula, west of Korea, and the island of Taiwan. Six years later, following the disastrous Boxer Rebellion, Japan won the right to station troops in eastern Manchuria, giving them a military stronghold on the Chinese mainland. The collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 allowed Japan to further expand its sphere of influence in China. In 1915 the Japanese government issued Chinese president Yuan Shikai with a set of 21 territorial and concessional demands, which Shikai had no choice but to accept. An incident in Mukden, Manchuria in September 1931 provided the Japanese with the pretext for a full military invasion of Manchuria. Once established there, the Japanese set up the puppet state of Manchukuo and installed the last Qing emperor, Puyi, as its ineffectual head of state. In May 1933 the Nationalist president Jiang Jieshi, who was more concerned with fighting the communists than Japanese imperialists, signed the Tanggu Truce, effectively recognising the legitimacy of the Manchukuo puppet state.
Full-scale war between China and Japan began in July 1937, following an incident near the Marco Polo Bridge in Wanping, near Beijing. After Japanese troops opened fire on local soldiers a brief ceasefire was negotiated, however, both sides increased military numbers in the region. When the Japanese launched an invasion in late July, the Nationalists and CCP were seven months into a shaky alliance, dubbed the Second United Front. The Nationalist armies attempted to resist the invasion but were quickly overcome by the technological supremacy and preparedness of the Japanese. China’s underdeveloped industries were incapable of supplying munitions or engineering quickly or in sufficient quantities. Unlike the Japanese, the Chinese military had no tanks and only a few aircraft. The first phase of the war was a blitzkrieg of Japanese victories as their forces moved swiftly along China’s east coast. Almost a half million Japanese troops moved against Shanghai, Nanjing and other locations in mainland China, while Japanese military planes bombarded regions where their foot soldiers could not penetrate. In late 1937 the Nationalist government was forced to retreat from its capital, Nanjing, to Chongqing in western China.
Japanese troops were notorious for their brutal treatment of civilians and military prisoners. The Japanese occupation of Nanjing from December 1937, often referred to as the ‘Rape of Nanjing’, is the most infamous example of Japanese brutality in China. Estimates suggest that the Japanese massacred 300,000 people in and around the city, many of them civilians. Historian Jonathan Fenby describes the Rape of Nanjing as a uniquely “urban atrocity” because of “the way the Japanese went about their killing, the wanton individual cruelty, the reduction of the city’s inhabitants to the status of sub-humans who could be murdered, tortured and raped at will”. Thousands of civilians were buried alive, machine-gunned or used for bayonet practice. Females were taken and forced into labour as “comfort women” (sex slaves for Japanese officers and soldiers). The Japanese also conducted human experimentation in secret bases in China. Unit 731 in the country’s northeast was the largest biological and chemical warfare testing facility. Prisoners there were injected with diseases like anthrax, smallpox, cholera, dysentery and typhoid. Other experiments studied the effects of food deprivation and extreme cold; amputation without anaesthesia; and the effects of chemical weapons and flamethrowers. The Japanese also air-bombed cities like Ningbo and Changde with fleas carrying bubonic plague. Vast swathes of China were decimated by Japan’s ‘scorched earth’ warfare, epitomised by the slogan “kill all, loot all, destroy all”.
While Jiang Jieshi had some early assistance from Soviet Russian leader Joseph Stalin, the Nationalists had little support from foreign powers. In June 1938 Jiang ordered the dykes of the Yellow River dam to be blown, a desperate attempt to slow the advance of the Japanese invasion. While this ploy worked, it also caused a devastating flood that killed between 500,000 to one million Chinese civilians, rendered up to ten million homeless and ruined millions of acres of important farmland. The resulting food shortages, famine and human suffering only contributed to rising peasant hatred of Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist regime. Other problems confronting Jiang and the Guomindang government were widespread corruption, rising inflation and high desertion rates caused by poor treatment of Nationalist soldiers, most of whom were unwilling conscripts.
Beyond 1938 the Sino-Japanese war reached a virtual stalemate. China’s geographical size, her lack of infrastructure and scattered pockets of resistance all helped to slow the Japanese advance. By 1940 the Japanese controlled the entire north-eastern coast and areas up to 400 miles inland. They installed a puppet government in Nanjing under Wang Jingwei, a former Guomindang leader and political rival to Jiang Jieshi. Foreign assistance for the Chinese finally came after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 1941. As the United States was drawn into World War II, China became an important theatre in the war against the Japanese. In 1942 US general Joseph Stillwell was sent to China to assist with training, reorganisation and equipment. Jiang’s authoritarianism, however, hampered their collaboration. Jiang’s wife Soong Meiling, dubbed “Madame Chiang” by the Western press, proved a more skilled diplomat than her husband; she was instrumental in securing some foreign assistance.
“The Nationalist government, which bore the major brunt of the fighting, was so depleted physically and spiritually that it was manifestly incapable of coping with the new challenges of the postwar era.”
Immanuel Hsu, historian
During its war with the Japanese, the CCP continued to consolidate its base in Yan’an, while the Red Army – later reorganised into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army – defended the inland areas of the northwest. The Japanese had no desire to occupy rural areas in the interior, which created a misleading perception that the communists were successful defenders. Favourable reports from foreign visitors also came out of the Yan’an Soviet during the war period, such as praise from the American Dixie Mission of 1944 and from US president Franklin Roosevelt’s special emissary, Patrick Hurley. Zhou Enlai also became well respected among diplomats and foreign journalists. These factors were exploited by CCP propaganda, which helped generate support for the party and allowed it to present as an alternative national government to the Guomindang. By 1942 CCP membership had grown to 800,000, a twentyfold growth from the beginning of the war five years earlier. Scholars like David Goodman suggest the CCP’s tactics during this period were an essential element of the party’s eventual rise to power
The Second Sino-Japanese War came to an end in August 1945, after the United States detonated nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Russian troops invaded from the north and suppressed Japanese forces in Manchuria, while Japanese forces in China were ordered to surrender to Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalists. In assessing the impact of the war, historian Jonathan Fenby describes it as “an extended body blow for a regime already shot through with weaknesses. The length, scale and nature of the conflict had debilitated China and the Nationalists”. China emerged from the war politically unsettled, economically exhausted and scarred by an enormous amount of human suffering. With the CCP growing in size, popularity and prestige, and the Guomindang government grossly unpopular, the Chinese stage was now cleared for a civil war between the Nationalists and the communists.
1. The Second Sino-Japanese War had its roots in decades of tension between the two nations. In contrast to the modernised and highly militarised Japanese, Chinese republican forces lacked training, equipment and a strong industrial base.
2. Already with a foothold in northern China, and armed with superior military technologies, the Japanese invaded in July 1937. They rapidly occupied the east coast of China in 1938-39.
3. The Japanese used inhumane and sadistic methods during their occupation of China, typified by events like the Nanjing Massacre and their use of human experimentation.
4. Jiang Jieshi was widely criticised for his wartime leadership, for placing more importance on the struggle against the communists than the Japanese. He also led a corrupt government plagued by economic issues and failed to work effectively with China’s foreign allies.
5. The war left the Nationalist government in a vulnerable position, while the CCP managed to consolidate and expand their support, placing them in a more favourable position as China moved towards civil war.
Communist China
In October 1949, communist revolutionaries led by Mao Zedong seized control of China. The Chinese Community Party (CCP) was a relatively young group, formed in 1921 and inspired by the success of the Russian Revolution. Political and economic turmoil in China during the 1930s, coupled with Japan’s invasion of northern China, allowed Mao and the CCP to build support and work towards revolution. The CCP victory in China heralded a significant shift in global affairs. With a population of more than 540 million people, China was the most populous nation on Earth – and it was now in communist hands. In its first years the Cold War had focused on western Europe generally and the divided city of Berlin specifically. The Chinese Revolution opened up a new Cold War front in Asia. The communist victory in China also brought profound changes for the Chinese people. Communist China underwent modernisation and rapid industrial growth – but they were accompanied by authoritarian leadership, rigid social control and economic experiments culminating in mass starvation.
The seeds of the Chinese Revolution were nationalist rather than communist. Long regarded as the ‘sleeping dragon’ of the East, China had been a fertile prize for foreign imperialists. During the 18th and 19th centuries Europeans from several nations arrived in China. European merchants traded extensively with the Chinese, while Christian missionaries spread their religious beliefs and converted thousands of locals. By the late 1800s the British, French, Russians, Germans and Japanese had established spheres of influence (in effect, internal colonies) inside China. This foreign imperialism brought benefits for some Chinese but for the majority it produced only exploitation and misery. In their quest for profit and control, foreign imperialists subverted local rulers and undermined China’s social structures. The British defied a ban by Chinese rulers and introduced opium, an addictive narcotic, into the region. Opium production and trade grew in China, filling the pockets of British companies and turning thousands of Chinese into listless drug addicts.
The exploitation of China by foreigners fuelled an emerging nationalism. Many Chinese believed their people should fight for independence and liberation from foreign control. In 1899 a group calling itself the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists began attacking Europeans, Christians and foreign property in China. Western newspapers referred to these rebels as “Boxers”, a reference to their use of martial arts. Their anti-Western violence became known as the Boxer Rebellion; it lasted for two years before being suppressed by a coalition of eight Western nations. In 1911 a nationalist revolution overthrew China’s royal dynasty, the Qing. China began an optimistic but brief flirtation with republican democracy. The new government was weak, however, and failed to attract much support. By 1916 it had collapsed and China dissolved into a patchwork of regions, controlled by powerful warlords and their private armies.
The early 1920s saw the emergence of two new political parties: the nationalist Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Both dreamed of a free and independent nation, ruled by the Chinese with no foreign political involvement, but the similarities in their aims ended there. The Guomindang was pro-capitalist and supported by conservatives, the middle-classes, business interests and the West, particularly the United States. The CCP represented China’s industrial working-class and peasant farmers, who comprised more than 90 percent of the population. In its first years, the CCP was both inspired and directed by the Soviet regime in Moscow. In 1927 the Guomindang and its military reined in the nation’s warlords, reunifying large areas of China and restoring national government. The Guomindang leader Jiang Jieshi (or Chiang Kai-shek), a vehement anti-communist, then turned his attention on the CCP, initiating a massacre of communists in their urban base in Shanghai. Thousands of communists were forced to take refuge in remote areas, where they regrouped by forming soviets (communist collectives).
With military aid from both the United States and Nazi Germany, Chiang attempted to encircle and destroy the communists. In 1934 thousands of communists fled their largest soviet, Jiangxi, and began a daunting 8,000-mile trek to Shaanxi in northern China. This Long March, as it was later known, became a turning point for communists in China. It allowed the CCP to avoid defeat and annihilation – but it also heralded the arrival of a new leader: Mao Zedong. In 1937, as the CCP was reforming and building a new Soviet in Shaanxi, China was invaded by Japan. Hostilities between the Guomindang and the CCP eased, as the two groups formed a fragile union to fight against Japanese occupation. But after Japan surrendered and withdrew from China in 1945, the two rival groups resumed their conflict. Years of corruption, mistreatment and pro-capitalist policies had made Jiang Jieshi’s government unpopular, particularly with China’s 400 million peasants. In contrast, support for the CCP and its promises of land reform and respect for the peasantry soared. The communists steadily gained ground and, in 1949, Jiang Jieshi and his cohort were forced to flee to the island province of Taiwan. In October that year, thousands rallied in Tiananmen Square, Beijing to hear Mao Zedong proclaim the birth of a new communist state: the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
“Mao Zedong announced in the summer of 1949 that ‘there could be no third road’ and that China must lean to one side, to the communist camp, in the Cold War. In the circumstances there was no alternative for the new and unconsolidated Chinese regime, although Mao was careful not to exclude the possibility of loans ‘on terms of mutual benefit in the future’ from the capitalist powers… Mao may well have supposed that the Cold War pressures for unity in the communist bloc would be used to forge a durable working agreement between China and the USSR, in which China would not be a mere satellite…”
Alan Lawrance, historian
The United States government already had its hands full with Soviet expansion in Europe, so the communist victory in China was deeply concerning. American agents had worked with Mao Zedong and his group during the 1930s when both were at war with the Japanese. Now the US refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Mao Zedong and his CCP government. Washington instead chose to deal with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang in Taiwan, viewing them as the government-in-exile of mainland China. The US began to pay closer attention to south-east Asia. The successful revolution in China had opened up an ‘eastern front’ in the Cold War. Communism could now spread south through Asia, taking root in politically vulnerable states like Korea, Vietnam, Malaya and Indonesia. If these countries fell to communist movements, important US allies like the Philippines, post-war Japan and Australia would be isolated and at risk. Washington believed that China’s communists were largely controlled by Moscow. In reality, Mao Zedong was charting his own course and his relationship with Joseph Stalin was difficult.
During the early 1950s, the People’s Republic of China embraced policies similar to those of Stalinist Russia in the 1930s. All businesses were nationalised and private ownership of capital was prohibited. Beijing embarked on a land reform program, seizing property from landlords and redistributing it to peasants; the landlords were tried and vilified before village meetings and many of them executed. The new government’s main priority was to haul China out of medieval agrarianism through industrialisation and modern technology. Beijing fuelled this industrial rebirth with raw materials, machinery and thousands of technical experts from Soviet Russia. In 1953 the CCP government initiated its first Five Year Plan, an economic program that set ambitious goals for industrial and technological growth in China. This program was generally successful, producing dramatic increases in iron and steel production, electrification, coal mining, infrastructure and building projects. China’s military strength increased in line with its industrial capabilities. China’s development was so rapid that in late 1964 it test-fired its first nuclear weapon and joined the US, USSR, Britain and France as a member of the ‘nuclear club’.
But as in Soviet Russia, China’s rush into modernity came at an enormous human cost. The government’s second Five Year Plan (1958-62) – dubbed the ‘Great Leap Forward’ by Mao Zedong – was disastrous by any measure. After the economic advances of the mid-1950s, Mao became even more ambitious. Labour and resources were redirected into industrial production so that China might “catch up to the West” in just a few years. The Great Leap Forward set near-impossible production targets and quotas. This placed pressure on managers and workers, who submitted exaggerated or falsified production figures. The diversion of workers from farming to the industrial sector caused food production to decline, a problem exacerbated by a number of severe weather events and natural disasters. China’s industrial growth was consequently over-reported, while parts of the country were struck by severe food shortages. This led to a devastating famine that killed at least 10 million and possibly as many as 30 million Chinese, most of them peasant farmers.
The failure of the Great Leap Forward led to the CCP sidelining Mao Zedong from policy decisions. Mao retained his titular positions in the party and, more importantly, his prestige with the Chinese people. He returned to the spotlight in 1966 by organising a campaign against so-called ‘rightists’ (counter-revolutionaries) in the party, government and universities. This campaign evolved into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a mass movement dominated by young students. Utterly loyal to Mao and his ideas, these militant students formed uniformed brigades called the Red Guards. They rallied in support of Mao and formed gangs to denounce, intimidate and terrorise his perceived enemies. Among those targeted by the Red Guards were Mao’s political rivals, liberal-minded teachers and lecturers, government bureaucrats and foreign diplomats and embassies. Some Red Guards went as far as denouncing and betraying their own parents for being critical of Mao. The Cultural Revolution not only restored Mao’s authority and control of China, it created years of political authoritarianism, social disruption and economic paralysis.
1. Until the early 1900s, China was a weakly governed empire, dominated and exploited by Western powers. From 1927 China was ruled by the nationalist Guomindang, led by Jiang Jieshi.
2. The Chinese Communist Party was formed in 1921. After years of struggle and civil war, the communists eventually gained control of China in October 1949.
3. The communist victory in China created a radical shift in the Cold War. Previously focused on Europe, the US and the West now began to fear the spread of communism throughout south-east Asia.
4. Meanwhile, the communist regime in China embraced major economic reforms, seeking to transform their nation from a backward agricultural economy to an industrial and military power.
5. This process succeeded but came at an enormous human cost. Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward (1958-62) triggered a deadly famine that killed up to 30 million people. Later, his Cultural Revolution (1966) paralysed and terrified the nation.
Unit V
Establishment of Communist State and its Challenges
Transition to Socialism and Factional Conflicts
In the 1970s a fundamental assumption of Western scholarship was that China in the late 1950s had entered a path of development which significantly differed from that followed in the Soviet Union. According to this line of thought, Mao’s famous 1956 speech “On the Ten Great Relationships” was the first systematic summation of a new, uniquely Chinese political and economic line.’ Two years later, with the Great Leap Forward and the establishment of the People’s Communes, Mao took the initiative in implementing the new line. At that time (1958), the Chinese broke away from the Soviet development strategy and a specific Chinese strategy unfolded. From then on until Mao’s death in September 1976, except for a “revisionist period” in the beginning of the 1960s, this strategy has constituted the basis for Chinese socialism. Events in post-Mao China, however, indicate that the assumption of China’s divergence from the Soviet development pattern has to be reappraised. The three books under review are good examples of this ongoing debate on the nature and direction of Chinese political and economic development. They all seem to suggest that a change of paradigm is in the making. The new paradigm assumes that a pattern of convergence exists between Chinese (Maoist) and Soviet (Stalinist) development processes and politics. It also posits that it was only in the post-Maoist socialist transition period that a conscious attempt was made to break away from the Soviet strategy for economic growth.
Changes of Ownership and Economic Development
The Transition to Socialism in China, edited by Mark Selden and Victor Lippit, consists of ten articles. The two overarching themes binding the collection together are the change of ownership systems and economic development in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Selden introduces his essay with a brief exposition of the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao on the subject of the transition to socialism in the countryside. This tour d’ horizon of the Marxist-Leninist tradition and Mao’s earlier views on the agrarian situation in China provides a useful background for Selden’s primary concern: the formation and development of cooperatives and collectives in Chinese agriculture from the early 1950s through the “socialist high tide” of 1955-56. It is Selden’s conclusion that a strategy of forming cooperatives through popular support and voluntary participation by the peasants was thrust aside in the summer and fall of 1955. Instead China embarked on an accelerated collectivization process which culminated in the Great Leap Forward (GLF) of 1958-60. Why did this happen? Selden suggests that the change in strategy arose out of a mounting awareness that the targets of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) would not be fulfilled because of agriculture’s inability to support the industrialization drive. Selden also asserts that the Chinese leadership could (and should) have realized that the targets of the First Five-Year Plan were too ambitious, and scaled them down, or they could have changed investment priorities, i.e., directed more investment to light industry and agriculture. But these shifts did not take place. Selden argues that the reason they didn’t happen was that high growth rates for industry, especially heavy industry, remained as important in China as they had been in the Soviet First Five-Year Plan launched by Stalin in 1928. In my opinion this is a correct observation. The Stalinist development strategy is characterized by rapid industrialization, focusing on heavy industry, and by forcible collectivization. I think that although collectivization in China was significantly less coercive than in the Soviet Union, due to the historical alliance between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the peasantry, the underlying goal was the same: an attempt to increase the size of state revenue and the share of marketed agricultural products and rural accumulation without shifting investment resources from industry to agriculture. In short, agriculture was supposed to feed itself as well as finance accelerated industrial growth. The organizational means for ensuring the process ofsiphoning off resources from agriculture to industry were, ultimately, the agricultural communes.’ Selden argues that it was Mao himself who in the fall of 1955 set the CCP on a new course in the “socialist high tide,” thrusting aside his own theories of the gradual and voluntary transformation of Chinese agriculture. Thus a previously widely-held basic assumption, namely that Mao alone among the Chinese leaders represented the best interest ofthe peasants, must be discarded. Again I would agree with Selden. In fact, it seems that periods during which Mao dominated the political process in China were characterized by policies quite unfavorable to agriculture. Mao’s focus was on high accumulation rates and heavy industrial growth. Agriculture was assigned the role of accumulation base for the development of industry in this particular development strategy.
The Role of Accumulation in PRC Economic Development
Kojima Reiitsu’s contribution focuses on the issue of accumulation.” He lists seven forms of accumulation and argues that the extraction of surplus from the villages (form three), i.e., the Preobrazhensky notion of “primitive socialist accumulation,” has remained the most important form of state investment finance in the PRC. Kojima further observes that there are three important channels for siphoning off resources from the villages: the agricultural tax, scissors pricing, and the extraction of resources from the peasantry by comparatively high pricing of agricultural producer goods from the industrial sector. The last factor is in my view also an aspect of the scissors-pricing channel, so that we could limit this to two principal channels. Kojima concludes that the stress on accumulation increasingly contravenes the pressure for more consumption, i.e., the pressure for raising the living standards of the population.
The consequences of a development strategy stressing high accumulation rates also figure prominently in Victor Lippit’s contribution. He maintains that the transition to socialism in China has been jeopardized for two major reasons. First, the stagnation of the people’s living standard from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s in spite of increases in overall economic performance, and second, the perpetuation of a social and economic hierarchy, centered on state and party leadership, that has replaced traditional forms of class rule and state power in modern China. Lippit asserts that Chinese policies since the death of Mao should be viewed as an attempt to correct these two “principal deviations from the pure socialist model of development.” He further argues that as a consequence of the new economic policies initiated in the post-Mao period, market forces are being given greater play, thereby stimulating the economy and reducing the dominant position of central planners. Higher prices for agricultural products and a process of de-collectivization have invigorated agricultural performance. The role of heavy industry in economic growth has been downgraded in favor of light industry. Finally, more importance has been attached to increasing consumption, which has resulted in a marked drop in the accumulation rate. Lippit concludes that these reversals are the result of what he calls an “integrated strategy of reform and modernization.”
Economic Reform
Carl Riskin discusses the post-1979 attempt to reform the centralized-planning economic system, which was copied from the Soviet Union in the 1950s. 8 In the Soviet-inspired economic system, the activities of enterprises are controlled by a central plan. Profits are collected as budget revenues, and capital is allocated as nonrepayab1e budget grants. Prices are set by the state, and workers are hired through the state labor bureaus and assigned to factories, where they are paid wages fixed by the state. In short, it is a highly centralized planning system leaving no room for initiatives by independent economic actors, let alone responsiveness to market forces. Riskin claims that for Mao the alternative to this economic system was not giving greater play to market forces, but rather using social mobilization based on mass line methods of leadership. Although this approach decentralized economic activity, it did not basically transform the economic system.
This is also the conclusion of Andrew Walder, who in his article addresses the three issues of work incentives and motivation, leadership and participation, and enterprise organizational problems. Walder claims that Mao’s anti-bureaucratic reforms resulted in a concentration of power in the hands of the hierarchy of leaders starting from the plant director and stretching down to the shop floor. The concentration of power in the hands of line management was not checked by the revolutionary committees, which were set up in Chinese factories beginning in 1967. In fact, according to Walder, already by 1971 the revolutionary committees had emerged as empty institutional shells around the expanded authority of line management.
In 1971-73 former staff workers were returning to their office jobs, but the people who had been promoted to take their places during the Cultural Revolution and its immediate aftermath were not dismissed. Consequently by the early 1970s there was a stratum of office workers bloated beyond the 1965 level.” Walder observes that by the mid-1970s there were three aspects of the Maoist legacy in the area of leadership and administration: (I) power was concentrated in the hands of line management, (2) office staff had increased so that factory organization was more top-heavy than it had been previously, and (3) a “committee-ization” and bureaucratization of decision-making had resulted in conservatism and the evasion of responsibility. Thus Wa1der concludes that the Maoist efforts at reform had intensified rather than alleviated the problems of centralized Soviet-style economic management and administration. Edward Friedman, in his contribution, also argues that there are striking similarities between Maoist and Soviet policies.” Focusing on the 1948-58 period in the Chinese debate on the transition to socialism, he detects three major positions. Liu Shaoqi, Yang Xianzhen, and others contended that different ownership systems could coexist for a long time in the transition phase, and stressed the need for balanced economic development. The Chen Boda-Kang Sheng group (the Maoists) advocated rapid collectivization of agriculture, continued class struggle, and an economic strategy favoring heavy industry. Finally, the Sun Yefang-Chen Yun group supported giving market forces a greater play and using the law of value in economic planning.
In 1955-56 the Chen Yun-Sun Yefang group grew in strength, and China was moving towards Titoism, abandoning a Stalinist emphasis on the growth of heavy industry, centralization, and bureaucratization. However, in 1956 Mao threw his weight behind the Chen Boda-Kang Sheng group, and by 1958 this group had won the debate. China moved toward Stalinism.
Agrarian Policies
Tang Tsou, Marc Blecher, and Mitch Meisner analyze the rise and fall of the Dazhai Brigade as the national model for Chinese agriculture. The Dazhai Brigade symbolized a specific approach to the organization of Chinese agriculture: the brigade rather than the production team as the basic unit of accounting and ownership; the elimination of private plots; the restriction of trade in free markets; the introduction of political criteria for determining the number of workpoints earned by a peasant; the imposition of an upper limit on the value of workpoints distributed in order to ensure accumulation; the preparation to reinstate the commune as the basic unit of accounting and ownership, etc.
These policies were all discarded when Deng Xiaoping and his political associates succeeded in defeating the Maoists at the crucial Third Plenum in December 1978. The agrarian policies of the beginning of the 1960s were reintroduced, causing the fall of the Dazhai Brigade as a national model and the political rout of the party secretary of Dazhai village and politburo member, Chen Yonggui. William Hinton’s short contribution to the present book is a story of economic and technological transformation in the Chinese countryside (Long Bow village). His account reveals that the Chinese peasants still occupy the lowest rung in the Chinese power hierarchy, and that many initiatives are stifled by bureacratic absolutism. In this respect nothing much has changed in the Chinese countryside in spite of seemingly successful agricultural reforms. My general impression of The Transition to Socialism in China is that it is an important collection of essays indicating a pattern of congruence between Chinese (Maoist) and Soviet (Stalinist) processes and politics. The essays signify progress toward a more differentiated understanding of Chinese economic and societal development. However, I do have one minor objection, which concerns the absence of an analysis of the post-1978 Chinese debate on economic development priorities. Such an analysis would reveal considerable disagreement among Chinese economists and planners concerning how far to pursue the two main goals of economic readjustment: (I) slowing down the growth rate of heavy industry in favor of agriculture and light industry, and (2) reducing the accumulation rate.” It would also disclose various policy positions on the question of structural economic reforms, i.e. reform of the centrally-directed economic planning system that was set up in the 1950s. Are different groups or factions pushing for certain types of policies? If this is the case, what are the likely consequences for Chinese policymaking within the economic policymaking arena? Friedman identifies three distinct groups with their respective policy positions. Unfortunately, his analysis is limited to the 1948-58 period. What has happened since then? In short, the present book would have benefited from addressing the extent to which the Chinese themselves are united behind present policies, or whether one might find that present policies are determined by the push and pull of various groups of factions within the political leadership.
State and Party in China
Has the Chinese state become a roadblock preventing the articulation and expression of the interests and needs of the working population? Who controls the state in China-the party, the army, or the central bureaucracy? What are the relationships between these different organizations and institutions? Is power located exclusively at the center, or do we find a certain autonomy at the local level? These issues are addressed in State and Society in Contemporary China, edited by Victor Nee and David Mozingo.” The book is divided into four parts: party and state, state and society, state and economy, and centralized and local power. In the first part Gordon White analyzes the origin and form of the post-revolutionary Chinese state. He also attempts to assess whether Chinese politics can be characterized as authoritarian or democratic. 16White notes that “the main theory of party and state transmitted to the CCP was Leninism in its Stalinist form.?” Theory combined with history (the long tradition of the imperial Chinese bureaucracy) to form a socialist state, which in the 1950s emerged as a highly bureaucratic, bloated, and complex organization that was able to resist reform in succeeding decades. Of particular interest is White’s discussion of the distribution of power in Chinese society. The party is the key institution, “the essential dynamic component exercising political leadership,” “society’s ideological agent within the state.” However, the government machine and the army also exercise power and influence. Thus the party must share power with these other organizations, and its absolute power is not undisputed. White notes that party leaders sometimes act as representatives of social groups or classes, for example Peng Dehuai, who in the late 1950s represented the peasantry by highlighting the problems caused by the Great Leap Forward and accelerated collectivization. Similarly, Deng Xiaoping represented the intellectuals and the experts in the late 1970s. Unfortunately, White does not address this crucial issue further. What is in question is the relationship between leaders or factions of the leadership and key social groups or classes in the society. Too little research has been done on this subject in relation to China. Tang Tsou’s contribution aims to measure the degree of totalitarianism of post-1949 Chinese society. According to Tsou, the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76 marked the culmination of a specific totalitarian tendency, the “revolutionary-‘feudal’ totalitarianism of the ultra-leftists.” Political developments since 1976, especially from 1978-80, marked a retreat from the brink of “revolutionary-‘feudal’ totalitarianism,” and collective leadership has replaced the cult of the individual, i.e., a certain pluralism has been restored in the political system. I agree with Tsou that the Chinese political system is characterized by a certain pluralism. However, in my view, Tsoupresents too rosy a picture of the conditions of democracy in the post-Mao era. He downplays, for example, the significance of the crackdown on the Chinese democracy movement in the spring of 1979. One of the first and more prominent victims of the crackdown was the editor of the underground journal Exploration, Wei Jingsheng, who was sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment and deprived of civil rights for a further three years. 19 Tsou describes the harsh punishment ofWei as a case that marks a step forward compared to the judicial behaviour of the regime in the period before the Cultural Revolution. “Although I would agree with Tsou that there has been a trend toward liberalization in China since 1978, it is important to note that this trend represents a zigzag course rather than a straight line. The clampdown on the democracy movement was a serious setback for the implementation of socialist democracy in China.
State and Army
Whether the PRC ever developed into a party-state with the party wielding effective command over the state apparatus is questioned by Mozingo in his essay on the relationship between army and state in China.” In his view, the Chinese military class has consistently been an obstacle to the formation of a party-state or what Mozingo calls a “centralized bureaucratic order characteristic of Communist states elsewhere.” Mozingo notes that resistance within the army to a Soviet-style party-state might have been overcome if Mao had not turned against the party, in particular during the Cultural Revolution. Thus the convergence of Mao’s and the army’s opposition to the establishment of party supremacy became a decisive factor shaping Chinese politics, especially after 1959. Mozingo concludes that both the state apparatus as well as the military apparatus are now stronger than the party’s.
In my opinion, Mozingo is carrying the argument a bit too far. Several questions arise: How are we to explain the reduction of army representation in leading policy bodies, such as the Central Committee, if Mozingo’s observation is correct? Would army representation in the Central Committee and in sessions of the People’s Congress decrease if the army’s role in society had been augmented? In 1980 the military had its share of budget expenditures reduced by almost 3 billion yuan, and in 1981 the military budget was further slashed by 2.5 billion to the figure of 16.85 billion.” Are we to suppose that this is the result of policies originating in the army establishment? In fact, the military has ranked last in China’s Four Modernizations program, behind industry, agriculture, and science and technology. Such priorities could hardly please the generals and their officer corps. Clearly, the army is having its direct influence and role in society curbed as a result of decisions reached in the party, and not vice versa. Available evidence seems to prove that since the end of the Cultural Revolution, and especially since Lin Biao’s abortive coup d’ etat in September 1971, the army has seen its influence on national politics lessened, and the party has re-emerged as the central forum for decisionmaking in China.
State and Society
Maurice Meisner’s article examines the place and function of the concept of the dicatorship of the proletariat in the recent history of the PRC. But first he discusses the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state from which the concept was developed. In this discussion he primarily draws on writings by Marx and Engels. For some reason Meisner does not include Stalin and Lenin in his outline of the Marxist-Leninist heritage. The exclusion of Lenin is especially problematic, because Lenin, even more systematically than Marx and Engels, developed a theory of the state in the socialist transition phase. Moreover Lenin’s theory has had a determining impact on subsequent interpretations of classical Marxist works on the transition period and its political forms.
Meisner observes that in the socialist transition period, i.e., the period of transition from a capitalist to a communist society, the state takes the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx believed that the dictatorship of the proletariat would be based on the democratic self-government of the immediate producers. However, Meisner also tells us that in the post-Maoist era of the PRC the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat has become little more than a ritualized slogan. I am not quite sure that Meisner is correct in this conclusion. I am inclined to go a step further, arguing that the concept has a precise meaning in Chinese political discourse. Therefore, in the new Chinese constitution, adopted in December 1982, the proclamation of the concept is discontinued and the term “the people’s democratic dictatorship” is used instead.” It is interesting to note that it is not only in China that the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been discredited. The Eurocommunist version of Marxism also has removed the concept from its political vocabulary.
Richard Kraus explores the relationship between state and society in relation to China’s class system, especially the social position of China’s bureaucrats. 26 Marxist theoreticians usually define classes in terms of property relations; that is, the owners of the means of production constitute the dominant class in a given societal formation. However, in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, a class analysis appeared which stresses power and control rather than formal ownership as key concepts. Kraus demonstrates considerable knowledge of this class analysis as it was laid out in works by members of the French structuralist school, especially Louis Althusser, Charles Bettelheim, and Nicos Poulantzas. Moreover, he is aware of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system analysis, Max Weber’s works on bureaucracies, and the positions of the Trotskyites (Trotsky, Livio Maitan), the East European reformers, (Wlodzimerz, Brus), as well as the dissidents (Milovan Dji1as, Roy Medvedev). This solid theoretical background combined with respect for what has been written by empirically oriented Western scholars on the subject in relation to China has resulted in an interesting article.
Kraus points out that although the Chinese bureaucrats (defined as that part of the cadre corps in state and party which is paid with fixed state salaries) do not own the means of production in society, they do have a relationship to the means of production which is distinct from that of the rest of the population, that is, a collective authority over productive assets. Due to this position the bureaucrats are able to extract the economy’s surplus and plan its disposition as well. However, although the bureaucracy controls the levers of power of the state and society, it cannot be characterized as having established an unchallenged domination; in other words, the bureaucracy constitutes a class in formation rather than a fully established new class. Kraus also draws attention to the fact that although China’s new class in formation has shared material interests, there are nevertheless frequent and sometimes sharp internal divisions among the bureaucrats in the form of factional struggle. He concludes that these interbureaucratic conflicts also must be related to distinctions in the types of productive assets controlled by groups of cadres.
Edward Friedman concludes the part on state and society with an in-depth analysis of Chinese views on obstacles blocking China’s socialist progress. He detects two main positions: the “Marxist idealists” and the “Marxist materialists. “The first group believes that fascist feudalism is the principle obstacle on the road leading to socialism in China, whereas the second group points to the emergence of a new capitalist class strategically located in the party and state. The Li Yi Zhe group of 1973-74 is given considerable attention as an example of “Marxist materialists,” and Friedman correctly observes that in 1978-79 the “Zhe” of the group, namely Wang Xizhe, further developed the theories of the group. Friedman points to members of the Ma Yanwen writing group, who published several articles in Beijing Daxue Xuebao in 1978, as the most systematic proponents of the “Marxist idealist” position. Friedman also stresses that there were prominent party members, for example Yu Guangyuan, who went beyond official party policy in advocating the need for a democratization of Chinese politics in the post-Mao era.
State and Economy
Benedict Stavis claims that China’s economic strategy in resource mobilization and allocation has been based upon a very strong state.” This has weakened social, economic, and political constraints on the state and has augmented the power of the state bureaucracy. In short, economic progress has been achieved at the price of creating a strong state, which presents a danger to the ideological goal of achieving socialism and, ultimately, to the communist ideal of a classless society. Dorothy Solinger places the Chinese economic reforms of 1979-80 in a longer perspective by tracing Marx’ s view on trade and commerce. Subsequently she discusses different Chinese political stances toward the market in China.” In Solinger’s opinion there are three major policy positions on how to handle the circulation of commodities in China: the radical position, which focuses on class struggle, self-sufficiency, and mass participation in planning by local-level work units; the bureaucratic position, which stresses strict planned management of all trade and commerce, as well as controlled prices; and the marketeer approach, which involves relatively free exchange of commodities, fluctuating prices, and a plan moderated by the law of value. The radicals are represented by Hua Guofeng, the bureaucrats by Li Xiannian and Yu Qiuli, and the marketeers by Deng Xiaoping.
State and Locality
In the last part of the book, Victor Nee uses an institutional study of the Chinese militia system to throw light on the linkage between central and local power.» It is his opinion that this system is the principal instrument for state control in the countryside. But he also points out that the militia system is linked to social networks rooted in local interests. The very existence of these local networks implies a potential degree of local autonomy vis-a-vis the state.
There is also a close correspondence between the militia leadership and the local political elite. In fact, it appears that a subcounty elite has emerged, integrated through networks of personal ties and connections (guanxi). This elite constitutes a buffer between the peasants and the state bureaucracy, sometimes to the extent of frustrating the implementation of national policies. It must be remembered that one of the major achievements of the new state system created in China after 1949 has been the extension of organs of state power into the villages. ‘The penetration of the villages,” as Franz Schurmann has called it,” enabled the state to reach down to the countryside in a way unparalleled in Chinese history.
Richard Madsen’s contribution is concerned with the role of the militia system in channeling the energy and enthusiasm of peasant youth. He bases his analysis on a case study of a village in Guangdong province close to the Hong Kong border.” Madsen shows that the political potential of peasant youth differs considerably from that of urban youth sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. Peasant youth do not pose as serious a threat to social order as that posed by sent-down youth. He also claims that peasant youth have until recently been an important resource for the CCP in pursuing social and political objectives in the countryside. However, by the mid-1970s this “youth connection” had begun to disappear because of frustrated expectations and a breakdown in the credibility of policies emanating from party and state.
State and Society in Contemporary China is an important collection of essays drawing attention to the central role of the state in shaping political, economic, and social development in China. The book clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of the totalitarian model in analyzing state and society in China. However, I am not sure that editors Victor Nee and David Mozingo are correct in pointing out in the introduction that the contributors in general find the bureaucratic model an inadequate tool in explaining state-society relationships since 1949. This is certainly not the impression I get from reading the essays by White, Kraus, and Solinger. They all convincingly show that the bureaucracy plays a major role in Chinese society and that different bureaucratic systems in the Chinese polity compete to influence the political process.
The Theories and Policies ofthe Cultural Revolution
Per Moller Christensen and Jorgen Delman maintain that competing theoretical policy platforms form the basis for recurrent power struggles in the Chinese polity. Therefore, they argue, it is necessary to consider the theory behind the Cultural Revolution in order to establish a basis for analyzing actual policymaking. This theory is the theory of Mao Zedong and the Shanghai School of the Gang of Four. Basing themselves on several Shanghai School manuscripts, they argue that the Shanghai School significantly developed Marxist theories on the subject of transitional societies. In particular, the “generative class theory,” originally worked out by Mao and further elaborated by the Gang of Four, represents a “most significant contribution to socialist theory.” In the conclusion, Moller Christensen and Delman ask what the implications of the theory are for the understanding of modem China. This is a good question, which unfortunately is left unanswered. I think it is very important to attempt to identify the policy platform of the Gang of Four, and for this Moller Christensen and Delman deserve credit. However, crucial questions remain: How and to what extent was the theory articulated in the policymaking process at the apex of the power structure? Did the Gang of Four have any significant support from important sectors of the party-state-army nexus, or were they totally dependent on Mao’s power and prestige? Does the Gang of Four policy position play any role in present Chinese power struggles? Edward Friedman argues that the Gang of Four was easily quashed because they did not have any military base, and it was Marshall Ye Jianying and other military leaders who in 1976 put an end to the Gang of Four’s quest for power. (, Friedman is not happy with the policies of the Cultural Revolution. He thinks that they resulted in terror and arbitrary violence, and that the Gang of Four and their supporters were responsible for what happened. He concludes that in contradistinction to cultural revolutionary policies, post-Mao leadership offers a political course committed to liberalization and democratization. This is also the view of Ralph Crozier, who examines Chinese politics through the lenses of Chinese political cartoons.” These cartoons mushroomed in 1979 and formed a vehicle for social satire and protest. Crozier points out that by early 1980 the cartoons were veering away from open criticism of the Chinese political system in favor of order and authority. What had happened? Apparently the new power-holders felt threatened by the criticism and reacted by restricting the newly extended freedoms, thereby causing anxiety and fear among the artists.
Agricultural Policies
The articles by Mitch Meisner and Marc Blecher, Victor Nee, and Victor Lippit all examine post-Mao policies in relation to the Chinese countryside. Meisner and Blecher discuss the role of the county in rural affairs in the PRC. In particular, they address the comprehensive approach to rural development embodied in Hua Guofeng’s 1975 policy guidelines for setting up Dazhai-type counties. They conclude that although the county in the post-Mao period has continued to play an important role in rural development, it has nevertheless been strictly limited in its capacity to intervene in rural economic affairs, and the key role of county party leadership has been downgraded. This development is associated with the rapid dismantlement of the Dazhai model by the post-Mao leadership.
Nee deals with recent changes in a rural production brigade in Fujian province in which he did field work in the spring of 1980. He describes trends toward smaller production teams, greater team autonomy, and new incentive systems which reward individual efforts. These trends reveal that important changes have occurred in the Chinese countryside since the death of Mao. However, Nee also finds indications of a certain continuity. To his surprise none of the local cadres have been purged, although Fujian province was considered a stronghold of the Gang of Four. Thus, considering the changes in national policies, the stability ofthe local elite has been quite impressive.
Lippit also asserts continuity between the Maoist and the post-Mao period.” He provides a detailed account of the evolution of the commune system since the Great Leap Forward and argues that this system has not changed much in the post-Mao period. He concludes that the commune system “remains an intrinsic part of the new development strategy.” In my view this is not the case. Rather, the new agricultural policies implemented beginning in 1979 involved a dismantling of the commune system. Thus, in December 1982 the National People’s Congress decided to abolish the commune system in agricultural production. At present the contract system based on individual households has been adopted by more than 95 percent of peasant households.
In reviewing the “new overall development strategy,” Lippit notes that agriculture now receives a much higher share of state investments than at any time during the 1966-76 period. Thus the share of state capital construction funds devoted to agriculture increased from 10.7 percent in 1978 to 14 percent in 1979, and will increase to 18 percent a year in 1982-84. The sources for these estimates are Yu Qiuli’s report on the 1979 National Economic Plan and an article in the Beijing Review on the Agricultural Development Program contained in “The Decision on Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development” approved in September 1979 by the Central Committee.” However, according to the “Communique on the Fulfillment of China’s 1982 Economic Plan” and the 1982 Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian, the proportion of state capital construction allotted to agriculture actually decreased from 11.1 percent in 1978 to 6.1 percent in 1982.
How are we to explain the discrepancy between these figures and Lippit’s figures for the share of state capital construction devoted to agriculture? The problem appears to be that Lippit’s figures in a strict sense reflect more than agricultural capital construction investment (mostly irrigation and water control projects) in the sense that they also cover funds to aid agriculture, loans, and other payments for agriculture in the 1978-82 period. In short, it is probably not correct to state as Lippit does that the share of state capital construction allotted to agriculture increased to 14 percent in 1979 and will increase further to 18 percent by 1982-84. In fact, reliable Chinese sources reveal that by 1982 the share of state agricultural investments had dipped to 6.1 percent of total state capital construction outlay.
Development Strategies
James Nickum compares the market-oriented economy of Taiwan with the plan-oriented economy of the PRC. 44 In doing this, he chooses a relatively advanced political-economic unit within the PRC, namely Shanghai, to match against Taiwan. In Shanghai the principal mechanism for resource allocation and mobilization is the state plan, whereas in Taiwan the market is the principal means for allocating resources and determining what will be produced. These are quite different paths to economic development. Nickum concludes that the present trend of events appears to point to a convergence of development paths, in the sense that Shanghai and other urban areas in the PRC seem to be moving toward the Taiwan model of development. Major indications of the change on the mainland are more mobility of labor, a boosting of service trades and urban collective enterprises, the influx offunds from abroad, and the intensification of economic and trade relations with foreign countries.
In the last contribution to China from Mao to Deng, Peter Van Ness and Satish Raichur also deal with development strategies.” They argue that three alternative strategic lines have been attempted in post-revolutionary China: a Stalinist model emphasizing centralized bureaucratic planning (strategy A); a Maoist approach based on Party-directed mass movements (strategy B); and a strategy of “market socialism,” which represents an attempt to build a market mechanism into the planned economy (strategy C). Strategy A was implemented in China during the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). Strategy B was attempted during the Great Leap Forward, and strategy C began to take shape after the new leadership had consolidated its power in 1977.
Van Ness and Raichur’s project of analyzing socialist development in post-revolutionary China in the light of different strategic lines is well-conceived. However, certain inconsistencies and misconceptions must be pointed out. They claim, for example, that Mao advocated the simultaneous development of agriculture and industry, and that the Great Leap Forward saw the implementation of this approach. This is undoubtedly not the case. In fact, it appears that the Great Leap Forward actually represented an intensification of the Stalinist strategy rather than a break, especially in regard to the relationship between the main sectors of the economy. Thus investments in heavy industry were higher during this time than during the First Five-Year Plan. Moreover, a closer look at Mao’s writings does not substantiate the proposition that Mao broke with the Stalinist development strategy, or what I have elsewhere dubbed the Feldman-Preobrazhensky paradigm for economic growth.” In short, it seems to me that Van Ness and Raichur establish a false distinction between strategy A and strategy B, thereby losing sight of the fact that in the economic realm Maoism in several important aspects is an intensification of Stalinism.
ensification of Stalinism. It is also problematic that Van Ness and Raichur avoid a discussion of the readjustment policy of 1961-65 which also-by using their definition of the term-constitutes a specific strategic line. This readjustment policy was meant to, and in fact did, lower the excessively high rate of accumulation. In addition, it altered the relationship between the main sectors of the economy in favor of agriculture. Thus a basic change of goals and means for economic development was implemented during the readjustment and consolidation period of 1961-65.
Van Ness and Raichur note that after Mao’s death and the downfall of the Gang of Four a new strategy of socialist development began to take shape in China. This is strategy C (“market socialism”), which in the view of the authors is synonymous with the Four Modernizations program, the strategy of the Deng Xiaoping leadership. In my view, strategy C, the market approach, cannot easily be identified with the Four Modernizations program in the form advocated by Hua Guofeng in 1977-78 and embodied in his Ten-Year Plan, put forward in February 1978. This plan represents a continuation of Maoist policies rather than a break. Moreover, the Third Plenum held in December 1978 actually shelved Hua Guofeng’s modernization program rather than adopting it. Then and only then did strategy C come to the forefront of economic policymaking.
Finally, it is probably sound to distinguish between the Soviet model (the centralized-planning economic system) and the Soviet (Stalinist) development strategy (the “big push”). The Chinese reformers are primarily concerned with changing the economic system into a less rigid and centrally controlled system, whereas the readjusters concentrate on altering macroeconomic priorities (the strategic line).
Conclusion
It is important to remember that Chinese planners and politicians work and think within a Chinese context. Yet our understanding of the transition to socialism in China will be broadened only by drawing constructive parallels with the other socialist countries and their implementation of the MarxistLeninist program. The three books reviewed in this essay constitute a promising start in this direction.
It is my impression, however, that most ofthe contributors take it for granted that China is in a transition to socialism, and nowhere do I find the question explicitly raised whether China actually might be in a flight from socialism. Obviously, in the near future the Communist party and state ownership of the major means of production within the industrial sector are not going to go away, and Marxism-Leninism will remain the formal legitimating ideology. However, decollectivization of agriculture, individually owned enterprises in the service and transportation sectors, a widening of wage disparities, the import of technology from the West, and the opening of special economic zones, etc.-are these not all tendencies pointing away from socialism? This crucial question is not raised in any of these otherwise very stimulating books
Great Leap Forward
The Great Leap Forward was the name given to China’s Second Five Year Plan (1958-62). The Great Leap Forward was born from Mao Zedong’s impatience for industrial and manufacturing growth (in his words, “more, faster, better, cheaper”). While the First Five Year Plan had succeeded in stimulating rapid industrialisation and increased production, Mao was suspicious of Soviet models of economic development. Instead, Mao favoured an ideological shift in economic policy that would continue industrialisation but also move China towards agricultural collectivisation. This may have been driven by Mao’s suspicions about the growth of technology, the rise of a potentially bourgeois ‘expert’ class and the expanding divide between urban and rural production. Implemented in 1958, the Great Leap Forward had two objectives: to create an industrialised economy in order to ‘catch up’ with the West; and to transform China into a collectivised society, where socialist principles defined work, production, even people’s lives. History records the Great Leap Forward as a disaster. It gave rise to economic stagnation, led to food shortages and famine, and caused the deaths of untold millions.
The Great Leap Forward was announced by Mao at a party meeting in Nanjing in January 1958. China must follow a different path to socialism than the Soviet Union, Mao told delegates, by allowing the peasants to participate in economic modernisation and making more use of their labour. Rural collectivisation would be at the heart of this ‘Great Leap Forward’. Collectivised farms would better organise peasant labour, eliminate waste and inefficiency and greatly increase production. Cooperatives and collectivisation had been encouraged during the mid-1950s but it was not until the Great Leap Forward that the ‘people’s communes’ became official government policy. Initially, peasant families were organised into cooperatives of around 20 to 40 households. In 1955 Mao called for the enlargement of cooperatives, into communes of 100-300 households. The policy of collectivisation sparked debate within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with moderates like Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi urging caution. Yet despite the discord within the Party, by late 1958 the entire Chinese countryside had been divided and organised into around 26,00 communes.
According to a CCP propaganda jingle from the late 1950s, “communism is paradise [and] the people’s communes are the way to get there”. In reality, the transition to communal living far from easy and created considerable misery. Most private property was confiscated, while land plots, farm buildings, tools and livestock were relinquished to the government. As targets were increased, even private homes were confiscated. The leadership of the people’s communes became fanatical about implementing government policy, increasing production, meeting targets and outdoing other communes. They demanded a regimented, almost militarised lifestyle; they also had overzealous expectations about work and production. According to historian Philip Short, “officially, everyone was supposed to have at least six hours’ sleep every two days, but some brigades boasted of working up to four or five days without stopping”. Other features of communal living included collective childcare, nursing homes, communal kitchens and the banning of cooking at home. Mao proclaimed that “communism means eating for free” and the communal dining halls allowed the government to control all aspects of food distribution and consumption. Most did not like the public dining halls, however, and there were issues with food supply – for example, food allocations intended to last for a week sometimes disappeared in a day.
As the targets for industrial and agricultural output increased, so too did the pressure on the people’s communes. This led to cadres and commune leaders inflating production figures, simply to keep pace with other communes. Some communes were referred to as ‘good news reporting stations’ while reaching a new high number was called ‘launching a sputnik’ (a reference to the Soviet Union’s recent launch of an artificial satellite into space). The communes, with Mao’s blessing, also experimented with radical agricultural practices, like the concentrated sowing of seeds, deep ploughing of the soil, close cropping and other ineffectual farming techniques. Most of these changes proved disastrous. The peasants, who had long experience with growing crops, were incredulous at the new policies – however after the Anti-Rightist campaigns of the 1950s, few were prepared to stand up to the government and local party cadres.
“The impetus for the GLF came from the CCP’s shocking recognition in late 1957 that Stalinist models of industrial growth were not suited to Chinese conditions. China’s population in 1950 was four times as big as that of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, while the Chinese standard of living was only half as high. In spite of universal collectivisation, farm production had not noticeably increased. From 1952 to 1957 the rural population had increased by about 9 per cent, while the city population had grown by about 30 per cent… The First Five-Year Plan had got results as expected, but to go ahead with more of the same would invite disaster.”
John K. Fairbank, historian
Frank Dikötter points out that Mao’s visits to the countryside were carefully stage-managed. Farmers, for example, were told to transplant rice along Mao’s route to give the impression of a big harvest. Crop production was also affected by the deployment of farmers in backyard steel production and mass labour projects, such as the construction of roads, large-scale irrigation projects, dam building and even the construction of the massive new Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The failed techniques, the absence of farmers and requisitioning of grain for feeding city workers were compounded by poor weather. By 1959 the harvests were insufficient for feeding the population, and the resulting famine devastated the peasant population. As Short concludes, the Great Leap Forward “ended in an apocalyptic failure.”
The Consequences
In the end, through a combination of disastrous economic policy and adverse weather conditions, an estimated 20 to 48 million people died in China. Most of the victims starved to death in the countryside. The official death toll from the Great Leap Forward is “only” 14 million, but the majority of scholars agree that this is a substantial underestimate.
The Great Leap Forward was supposed to be a five-year plan, but it was called off after just three tragic years. The period between 1958 and 1960 is known as the “Three Bitter Years” in China. It had political repercussions for Mao Zedong as well. As the originator of the disaster, he ended up being sidelined from power until 1967, when he called for the Cultural Revolution.
1. The Great Leap Forward was a slogan used to describe the Second Five Year Plan – and Mao’s program for China’s hasty transition into industrialised socialism.
2. Rural collectivisation forced peasants to live in huge communes of up to 300 households. Private property was seized by the state and people were forced to eat in communal dining halls.
3. The demand for increased steel production was a feature of the Great Leap Forward, with Mao claiming that China’s steel production would overtake that of Britain.
4. Every citizen was mobilised in the production of steel through the use of backyard furnaces. This program was a failure, producing useless steel and stripping the countryside of fuel.
5. Increased agricultural production was another key target, however, output fell due to failed agricultural experimentation and other factors. In addition, production figures were unreliable, often exaggerated or distorted by local officials.
Cultural Revolution
The Cultural Revolution was launched in China in 1966 by Communist leader Mao Zedong in order to reassert his authority over the Chinese government. Believing that current Communist leaders were taking the party, and China itself, in the wrong direction, Mao called on the nation’s youth to purge the “impure” elements of Chinese society and revive the revolutionary spirit that had led to victory in the civil war 20 years earlier and the formation of the People’s Republic of China. The Cultural Revolution continued in various phases until Mao’s death in 1976, and its tormented and violent legacy would resonate in Chinese politics and society for decades to come.
The Cultural Revolution Begins
In the 1960s, Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong came to feel that the current party leadership in China, as in the Soviet Union, was moving too far in a revisionist direction, with an emphasis on expertise rather than on ideological purity. Mao’s own position in government had weakened after the failure of his “Great Leap Forward” (1958-60) and the economic crisis that followed. Chairman Mao Zedong gathered a group of radicals, including his wife Jiang Qing and defense minister Lin Biao, to help him attack current party leadership and reassert his authority.
To encourage the personality cult that sprang up around Mao Zedong during the first phase of the Cultural Revolution, Defense Minister Lin Biao saw that the now-famous “Little Red Book” of Mao’s quotations was printed and distributed by the millions throughout China.
Mao launched the so-called Cultural Revolution (known in full as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) in August 1966, at a meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee. He shut down the nation’s schools, calling for a massive youth mobilization to take current party leaders to task for their embrace of bourgeois values and lack of revolutionary spirit. In the months that followed, the movement escalated quickly as the students formed paramilitary groups called the Red Guards and attacked and harassed members of China’s elderly and intellectual population. A personality cult quickly sprang up around Mao, similar to that which existed for Josef Stalin, with different factions of the movement claiming the true interpretation of Maoist thought. The population was urged to rid itself of the “Four Olds”: Old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas.
Lin Biao's Role in the Cultural Revolution
During this early phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-68), President Liu Shaoqi and other Communist leaders were removed from power. (Beaten and imprisoned, Liu died in prison in 1969.) With different factions of the Red Guard movement battling for dominance, many Chinese cities reached the brink of anarchy by September 1967, when Mao had Lin send army troops in to restore order. The army soon forced many urban members of the Red Guards into rural areas, where the movement declined. Amid the chaos, the Chinese economy plummeted, with industrial production for 1968 dropping 12 percent below that of 1966.
In 1969, Lin was officially designated Mao’s successor. He soon used the excuse of border clashes with Soviet troops to institute martial law. Disturbed by Lin’s premature power grab, Mao began to maneuver against him with the help of Zhou Enlai, China’s premier, splitting the ranks of power atop the Chinese government. In September 1971, Lin died in an airplane crash in Mongolia, apparently while attempting to escape to the Soviet Union. Members of his high military command were subsequently purged, and Zhou took over greater control of the government. Lin’s brutal end led many Chinese citizens to feel disillusioned over the course of Mao’s high-minded “revolution,” which seemed to have dissolved in favor of ordinary power struggles.
Cultural Revolution Comes to an End
Zhou acted to stabilize China by reviving educational system and restoring numerous former officials to power. In 1972, however, Mao suffered a stroke; in the same year, Zhou learned he had cancer. The two leaders threw their support to Deng Xiaoping (who had been purged during the first phase of the Cultural Revolution), a development opposed by the more radical Jiang and her allies, who became known as the Gang of Four. In the next several years, Chinese politics teetered between the two sides. The radicals finally convinced Mao to purge Deng in April 1976, a few months after Zhou’s death, but after Mao died that September, a civil, police and military coalition pushed the Gang of Four out. Deng regained power in 1977 and would maintain control over Chinese government for the next 20 years.
Long-Term Effects of the Cultural Revolution
Some 1.5 million people were killed during the Cultural Revolution, and millions of others suffered imprisonment, seizure of property, torture or general humiliation. The Cultural Revolution’s short-term effects may have been felt mainly in China’s cities, but its long-term effects would impact the entire country for decades to come. Mao’s large-scale attack on the party and system he had created would eventually produce a result opposite to what he intended, leading many Chinese to lose faith in their government altogether.